Mathias Guenther

Human-Animal Relationships in San and Hunter-Gatherer Cosmology, Volume II
Imagining and Experiencing Ontological Mutability

palgrave
macmillan
For Stephan and Daniel
Preface

This book is written to fill two gaps in anthropology, in two of the discipline’s research fields, the one in hunter-gatherer studies, specifically its subfield of Bushman studies, the other in the more recent field of what some refer to as “the anthropology of ontology” (Scott 2013) and others have dubbed the “New Animism” (Harvey 2006: xi)—as opposed to its “Old”, evolutionary rather than relational, predecessor, pace Tylor. These two fields at present exclude each other, in terms of ethnographic substance and theoretical discourse, to the detriment of both. This book sets out to bring the relational ontology paradigm to San studies, and vice versa, to the respective research field’s benefit.

This goal is all the more apposite in that hunter-gatherer studies and relational ontology have been linked from the start, back in the 1990s. This is when the “ontological turn”—which has since then been taken in socio-cultural anthropology generally (and is part of an even wider—posthumanist—turn across Western thinking generally)—was first taken in Amazonian studies, among such hunting people as the Achuar, Araweté and Avila Runa, by Philippe Descola, Eduardo Vivieros de Castro and Eduardo Kohn, the three leading voices in Amazonian studies (Costa and Fausto 2010). Through the influence of another leading voice, Tim Ingold, studies of relational ontology were undertaken at around the same time in the Subarctic, from northern Scandinavia, through Siberia (Brightman et al. 2012; Halbmayer 2012) to North America, where ethnologists such as Adrian Tanner, Harvey Feit, Robin Ridington, Colin Scott and Robert Brightman had worked on relational and cosmological aspects of hunter-prey relations even before the 1990s. The influence is evident in these ethnographies of another Subarctic researchers, Irven Hallowell, who a generation before, in an essay on Ojibwa ontology that has since become a foundational article in relational ontology, conceptualized the “non-human person” (or “other-than-human person”), thereby widening the field of social relations—and the concept of both society and culture—beyond humankind (1960). A similar recasting of “animism as relational epistemology”, which acknowledged Hallowell’s influence (Bird-David 1999: S71), was the theme, 20 years ago of a then seminal
and now classic *Current Anthropology* article by Nurit Bird-David, which situated relational ontology among a number of hunter-gatherer-horticulturalists in southern Asia.

Yet, the ontological turn, for all of its paradigm-shifting effects on the study of hunter-gatherers during the last and first decades of the previous and present centuries, all but by-passed the Kalahari, among whose hunting-gathering people ethnographers were wont to examine the human-animal relationship not in social, cosmological, mystical fashion but instrumentally and strategically, as a meat-on-the-hoof resource, cherished—more so than plant—for its high caloric yield and thus a key concern of the “foraging mode of production” and its *modus operandi*, “optimal foraging strategy”. This cultural-ecological, theoretical-materialist bent in San studies was especially marked and engrained in San studies, with the San, ever since the path-breaking “Man the Hunter” conference in 1966 and as a result of a large number of high-quality ethnographic writings on the San. The effect of all of this was to render this foraging group one of the two (alongside the Aché) textbook cases of the optimal forager, whose “immediate-return” subsistence economy afforded people “affluent” lifeways. When Amazonian and Subarctic hunting became considered in social-relational and cosmological terms rather than instrumental-alimentary ones, in the 1990s, the materialist paradigm continued to inform research in San studies (albeit, not exclusively so, especially through the “Revisionism Debate” this field generated, in terms of political economy and World Systems theory, both paradigms the discursive links of which to relational ontology are no closer than they are to optimal foraging).

I set out in this book to show that San world view and lifeways are in fact also pervaded—at the ontological level, the way people conceive of, perceive and experience their interaction with animals, along with other beings of their (preter)natural world—with relationality and intersubjectivity (and have done so in the past, on the basis of ethnohistorical and archaeological evidence largely on southern San that will be marshaled). In filling this gap in our understanding of San ethnography and culture I will also fill the gap in ontological anthropology, which has excluded these southern hunting people from its neo-animistic purview. Apart from adding new insights to the
relational ontology perspective in anthropology, this study, of San-imism, also underscores the important insight that animism is not some monolithic schema or cosmologico-religious complex but something diverse and multiplex, structurally varied, ecologically and historically contingent. Indeed, as I will also argue, one such included in many and varied animisms of people and cultures of this world are those from the West.

I have recently dealt with these issues in two exploratory articles on relational ontology in the context of San cosmology and lifeways, namely “‘Therefore Their Parts Resemble Humans, for They Feel That They Are People’: Ontological Flux in San Myth, Cosmology and Belief” (in Hunter-Gatherer Research 2015) and “‘The Eyes Are No Longer Wild: You Have Taken the Kudu into Your Mind’: The Supererogatory Aspects of San Hunting” (in The South African Archaeological Bulletin 2017). These articles gave me the impetus, with some encouragement from colleagues and friends, for this book. It adds to, as well as expands and complements, what is presented, more or less provisionally, in these two articles.

The ethnographic base of this book consists of both my own field work and of ethnographies by other Kalahari anthropologists, as well as of ethnohistorical sources, both published and archival. Given the quantity and variety of this entire source material, most of the contemporary and historical San linguistic groupings of southern Africa are referenced in this book. (See Map 1 for their distribution over southern Africa, and of some of their Khoe- and Bantu-speaking neighbors.)
Most of the archival source consists of unpublished /Xam texts from the Bleek/Lloyd archive. They are referred to by the notational system used by Wilhelm Bleek and Lucy Lloyd that differentiated between interlocutors, informants (by the first, Roman numeral), and by the notebook number and its page number(s), e.g. L VIII. – 4, p. 6365 rev.
These archival text references can be readily looked up in University of Cape Town’s open-access digitalized Bleek /Lloyd archive (“Digital Bleek and Lloyd”, lloydbleekcollection.cs.uct.za ). The identifying Roman numerals for the other two key narrators are II for //Kabbo, V for Dja!kwain; for the two main !Kung informants, !Nanni and Tamme the identifying numerals are XI and XII. For more information on the /Xam informants see Bleek and Lloyd (1911: vi–xvii), Deacon and Dowson (1996: 11–43), Guenther (1989: 25–29), Lewis-Williams (2000: 32–33) and—for the most comprehensive account—Bank (2006a).

In addition to these mostly anthropological sources I draw on the writings, rich in quantity and quality, of scholars from a number of other disciplines who have worked in the field of Khoisan Studies (many of them drawing on the Bleek /Lloyd archive). These are archaeology, rock art studies and history, as well as folklore, art and literary criticism. The interdisciplinarity of source material has also left its imprint on the content and scope of this book, which, in volume two, moves from the San to their Khoe- and Bantu-speaking neighbors in southern Africa, to the Inuit of the eastern Arctic and to the Two Cultures of the West.

References


Mathias Guenther
Waterloo, ON, Canada
The original version of this book was revised. This book was inadvertently published with few errors which has been corrected now. An erratum to this book can be found at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21186-8_8.
Acknowledgments

In the process of this far-reaching project, I have engaged with the ideas of many scholars, both through their writings and in person. Many of these researchers are recognized in the introduction—the section on interdisciplinarity—and here I again acknowledge the quality of their scholarship and the intellectual stimulation I have derived thereof in my own work, over the years and decades.

I especially acknowledge the many colleagues and friends whose ideas and counsel I have been able to draw on with respect to this project in discussions, both at home in Canada, or at various conference or guest lecture venues in other countries, and in southern Africa. The former, in alphabetical order, are Leila Baracchini, Alan Barnard, Megan Biesele, Laird Christie, Ute Dieckmann, Thorsten Gieser, Jean-Guy Goulet, Erica Hill, Bob Hitchcock, Rockney Jacobsen, Dean Knight, Tihamer Kover, Frédéric Laugrand, Megan Laws, Jenny Lawy, Richard Lee, Chris Low, Andrew Lyons, Harriet Lyons, Junko Maruyama, Bob McKinley, Mark Münzel, Amali Philips, Sigrid Schmidt, James Serpell, Thea Skaanes, Sian Sullivan, Renee Sylvain, Liz Marshall Thomas, Ingrid Thurner, Thomas Widlok, Rane Willerslev and Sandra Woolfrey.

Before turning to the long list of colleagues from Africa, I acknowledge three special debts of gratitude. They are to Pieter Jolly and Neil Rusch of the University of Cape Town, for inviting me (in October 2017) to accompany them on a field trip to the Northern Karoo, the home territory of //Kabbo, /Hanǂkasso, Diäǃkwain and the other /Xam storytellers from whom Wilhelm Bleek and Lucy Lloyd obtained their—and the world's—treasure trove of /Xam myth and lore. Apart from viewing many rock art sites that derive from ancestral /Xam hands and specific features of the landscape that are referred to by the storytellers in one or another tale, this visit afforded me a feel for the landscape—the /Xam!kau:xu, or “hunting ground”. Another debt to my two hosts and travel companions is that they gave me permission to use some of their images (photographs and rock art tracings).

At the occasion of that trip to South Africa I also visited David Lewis-Williams, who had invited me to Witwatersrand University’s Rock Art Research Institute (of which he is the founder), as well as showed me around its exhibition at the Institute’s Origins Centre
museum. I have admired David’s work on San religion, mythology and art ever since I first became acquainted with it when reading and reviewing his path-breaking *Believing and Seeing* almost four decades ago. I was eager to discuss my current project with him at the occasion of my visit (which, as expected, was most fruitful).

The third debt of gratitude is to the late Irene Staehelin, founder and *spiritus rector*, as well as initial funder, through her Swiss-based UBUNTU Foundation, of !Khwa-ttu, a San culture and education center which, quoting from its mission statement, “celebrates San culture, present and past, for a better future”. This NGO has been able to do all that and more, in the 20 years of its operation. I have been fortunate to be associated with !Khwa-ttu on a couple of occasions. One was in 2011 when Irene invited me (along Megan Biesele) to assist in setting up a museum exhibition on /Xam cosmology, around the theme of “The Mantis and the Eland”. It was the discussions, planning and research on this project, and head-long delving into the /Xam Archive, that spawned this book project. Irene, who died early this year (2019), has drawn a number of other San researchers to !Khwa-ttu, to assist and consult, with the salutary effect of making and keeping them aware of problems and issues about the San people that are more real and urgent than so much that “academics” think and write about in academe’s ivory tower.

Colleagues in southern Africa who provided valued input to my project over the past few years are Sam Challis, José Manuel de Prada-Samper, Janette Deacon, Janet Hermans, Jeremy Hollmann, Mary Lange, Willemien LeRoux, Al Morris, Alicia Mullen, Richard Northover, John Parkington, Rian Rifkin, Pippa Skotnes, Andy Smith, Larissa Swan, Carolyn Thorpe, Helize van Vuuren and David Witureson.

Special thanks to David Pearce and David Witleson of the Rock Art Research Institute for their assistance in procuring permissions for some of the rock art images; to Maude Brown of Kuru Development Trust for the same assistance with respect to the contemporary San art; to Stephan Guenther for producing four of the rock art tracings (nos. 3.15, 3.18, 3.21, Vol. I, 4.1, Vol. II); to Brittany Ostic and Daniel Guenther for assistance in copy-editing, to Mary Al-Sayed and Linda Braus at Palgrave Macmillan, New York, and Beth McAuley and Lesley-Anne Longo at the Editing Company, Toronto, for their invaluable assistance
in editing the manuscript and getting it in ship-shape condition for the printer.
Note on Orthography

All San (and Khoekhoe) languages include clicks within their inventory of consonants (Guenther 1999: 11). The four that are best defined, phonetically and phonemically, and that appear throughout this book whenever vernacular words, terms and expression are cited are the following:

1. The dental click (/), produced by placing the tip of the tongue against the back of the upper incisors, creating a sound similar to what we transcribe as “tsk, tsk” (the vocalization used when gently chiding a child).

2. The lateral click (//), produced by placing the sides of the tongue against the sides of the upper row of teeth, creating the sound a rider makes when urging his/her horse on to greater speed.

3. The alveolar click (ǂ), produced with the tongue pressed against the bony projection on the roof of the mouth (alveolus).

4. The cerebral (or alveopalatal) click (!), produced by placing the front of the tongue against the roof of the mouth, behind the alveolus, creating a “cork-popping” sound.
Contents

1 Introduction
2 Being Other-than-Human: Ontological Mutability and Experience
3 Monsters and Carnivory: Tolerance of Ontological Ambiguity
4 Experiencing Transformation
5 The Enchantment and Disenchantment of the World of the San
6 (S)animism and Other Animisms
7 Conclusion: Ontological Ambiguity and Anthropological Astonishment

Correction to: Human-Animal Relationships in San and Hunter-Gatherer Cosmology, Volume II

Appendices
References
Index
List of Figures

Fig. 5.1 Chicken-therianthrope, Strandberg, Northern Cape. (Drawn from a photo by E. Wettengel in Skinner 2017: 131)

Fig. 5.2 Horse-ostrich engraving, Arbeidsvreud farm, Northern Cape. (Photo Neil Rusch, with permission)

Fig. 5.3 Neil Rusch sounding a rock gong, Varskrans, Northern Cape, 20 October 2017. (Photo by author)

Fig. 6.1 “Shaman Revealed” by Ninqeokuluk Teevee, lithograph 20. 15” × 18”. (Reproduced with the permission of Dorset Fine Arts)

Fig. 6.2 Iglulik shaman Anarqâq’s depiction of spirit helpers. (Rasmussen 1929: 209)
Footnotes

1 For elaboration on these points see Guenther (2015: 281–82, 302–9; 2017: 3–4).
1. Introduction

Mathias Guenther

(1) Department of Anthropology, Wilfrid Laurier University, Ontario, ON, Canada

Mathias Guenther

A correction to this publication are available online at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21186-8_8

“Attentiveness”, “attunedness”, “subjective identification with the prey”, “extension of people’s senses”, “tapping into sense perceptions of other species”: the language of the last two paragraphs of this chapter, which also reverberated throughout the entire discussion of hunting, as it did through that of ritual and ludic dancing, is the language of the body, of perception and experience. The effect of the reiterations of this experience of cross-species intersubjectivity and its transforming effects on the human being’s being within these different domains of San culture, and of thought, imagination and action, is that the central theme of San cosmology, ontological mutability, is both mutually corroborated within the people’s thought world and grounded, at times bodily, in experience.

The previous volume of this book ended the chapter on hunting, and the volume, with the epigraph that introduces the present volume. It also stated that the experiential dimension of San cosmology is the present volume’s central concern, specifically its ontological
component, on the intersubjective human-animal relationship and the porous species divide.

Before proceeding, a brief synopsis of the book as a whole (i.e. Vol. I and II) is provided, as a broad background and context for the matters dealt with in the present volume.

Synopsis of Book
The two volumes of this book are complementary, the first being primarily descriptive in tone and substance, the second discursive. The ethnographic information of Vol. I is presented in anticipation of the arguments of Vol. II, which in turn refers back to the preceding volume, grounding analysis here in the description there. Ideally, the two volumes should thus both be read.

However, each volume also to some extent stands on its own; the first as an ethnographic monograph on San cosmology and ontology, and the second as an anthropological study of ontological ambiguity or, as I refer to it because of the inherent dynamic element of transformation, ontological mutability. It does so in terms of what in the discipline is a standard, tried-and-tested, two-pronged modus operandi for anthropological analysis. The one mode is an in-depth study of a certain matter in one culture, the one visited by and known to the writer on the basis of intensive and protracted ethnographic fieldwork that strives toward an understanding of the visited people in terms of their culture. The other is comparison, in an attempt to broaden the understanding gained on the researched matter by the first study. In this book, the latter endeavor, dealt with in Vol. II, inherently, through its epistemological operation, refers to the San ethnography in Vol. I; however, in presenting new ethnographic information on other cultures and peoples this part of the book also tells its own story.

Volume I deals with how ontological mutability is manifested, through hybridity and transformation, via the imagination, in myth and lore, conveyed by storytellers as well as, more concretely and starkly, through images produced by past and present-day San artists on rock surfaces or canvas and paper. Also considered is how ontological mutability enters people’s awareness not virtually, via the imagination, by means of stories and images, but actually, through experience, in the
lived world, specifically the real-life contexts of ritual, play and hunting. Each of these events provides the principals and participants involved in them—trance dancers, intiands, play dancers, hunters—moments at which being-change may be experienced, either mentally (“feeling eland”) or bodily (“being eland”).

How ontological mutability is experienced, as well as the impacts of this inherently disjunctive and potentially disorienting experience on human and personal identity and integrity, is elaborated on in Vol. II, as that volume’s primary concern. This is examined in the context of the San and with reference throughout to the ethnographic information presented in the other volume, in terms of epistemological, experiential and environmental parameters, through which awareness of ontological mutability is conveyed to and through the mind and the body and through being-in-the-world groundedness.

After this discussion, the ethnographic ground and analytical scope shift and expand, to how other people and cultures think about, perceive and experience ontological mutability. This is done within a loosely comparative framework referenced to the San. It considers three cultural contexts, each broader in scope than the next, expanding the number and kind of factors—structural, acculturational, historical, ecological ones—that impinge on how people in different cultures engage with animals. The first is the Bantu-speaking neighbors of the San with whom some San groups have had contact for centuries, with mutual influences on one another’s cosmologies, mythologies and ritual practices and their human-animal aspects. The second comparative context is another hunting society, in another, remote and ecologically radically different part of the world (Inuit of Canada’s eastern Arctic).

The third context, the one broadest in scope and vision, is Western cosmology, especially its post-Cartesian, posthumanist take on the human-animal nexus and animals' personhood, being and umwelt. All this is quite a new and little-charted cosmological territory for anthropocentric, species-solipsistic Westerners and outside their epistemological and ontological mainstream, raising fundamental questions and issues, about species identity and autonomy and, more generally, human beings and being human. For the San, and other hunter-gatherers, such matters lie in their intellectual and cosmological mainstream and within well-charted terrain. Thus a study of their view
of human-animal relations—of the kind here presented—may provide
Westerners, specifically the recent researchers, cognitive ethologists
and other Western “anthrozoologists” who have jettisoned the
Cartesian perspective, with helpful clues and insights in their new and
novel, intellectually recalibrated take on the age-old and universal
question of what is human.

The book’s conclusion discusses critically the impact of the
relational ontology paradigm on San studies and considers epistemological and ontological implications of the San (and hunter-
gatherer) perception of the human-animal relationship for Western ideas on the same matter.

Outline of Chapters

Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 consider the experiential implications of a
cosmology in which ontological mutability—ambiguity and inconstancy
—holds sway. The central issue considered is how people experience ontological mutability and deal with this profound identity issue mentally and affectively. The matter is dealt with in general terms in Chap. 2, which lays out three avenues followed in this phenomenological consideration of transformation: a general receptiveness to ontological ambiguity; the experiential impact, on the mind and senses, of transformation; an intersection of the myth and spirit world with reality. They are the topics for the subsequent three chapters.

The first (Chap. 3) chapter is about what might be deemed a “tolerance for ambiguity” in San’s world view and mindset. I considered this sort of tolerance in my previous book, at the level of social-structural and conceptual ambiguity (Guenther 1999: 226–37), and I ask here whether such tolerance is found also at the more fundamental level, of ontology—being, being-in-the-word and species identity—than of social organization and epistemology. Does tolerance for ontological ambiguity underlie the other type of ambiguity, the same way ontology constitutes, as argued by Tim Ingold, the foundation for epistemology, the former concerned with life and being, the latter with thought and knowing (2006: 19)? How do people whose human identity at times merges with that of animals deal with the matter of monsters, the
prototypal embodiment of which is held—by Westerners—to be a being that confounds ontological categories (Cohen 1996: 6; Weinstock 2014: 1)? And how do they deal with what is perhaps the profoundest of existential issues for humans, the basic contradiction, conundrum and moral dilemma, over eating the flesh of animal-persons?

Chapter 4, on the impact of the experience of transformation, considers this impact from two perspectives, one virtual and vicarious, through myth via the imagination or as witnessed by someone watching a shaman's lion transformation, the other actual and direct, through the person’s body and the senses.

Chapter 5 deals with the at-times hovering closeness of myth and spirit beings and presences in the natural and social world of the San that brings some of the myth and spirit world’s ontological inchoateness and inconstancy to this world. The San forager’s being-in-the-world place and space is the natural environment, in particular the hunting ground, the arena within which animals are encountered most directly, eye-to-eye and cheek-to-jowl. This in itself keeps humans constantly aware of ontological ambiguity and mutability, their sameness—as and otherness—from animals whose identity they may assume mentally and bodily at certain moments in the hunt. That awareness is intensified by the presence, in the same landscape, and, at times on hunting ground, in the form of a lion- or jackal-shaman or a trickster-eland, of the ontologically uber-fluid beings or states from the mythical and preternatural domains. This presence potentially transforms their being-state, from virtual, imagined or thought-out myth and spirit beings to actual ones, seen, encountered or even “become” by people.

Given that the conceptual and expressive arena wherein ontological mutability is played out most extravagantly and explicitly is myth, and given its evident intersection with reality, on the hunting ground and its doings, a number of phenomenological questions are raised: How does an umwelt that contains mythic beings and mystical happenings affect people’s lives, as they walk, gather and hunt, instrumentally and prosaically as they must in marginal environments? Do mythic and mystic presences enhance or diminish their “being-in-the-world” experience, over which, Ingold, one of the leading voices of the New Animism, would fly a flag bearing “the insignia of life” (2013: 248)?
How do so “prosaic” a hunter-gatherer folk as the San are by some researchers alleged to be square their prosaicism with enchantment? Or do they? Is the latter something from the past, more or less remote and situated not within the San’s imagination but instead within the analyst’s “pre-colonial imaginary”, all of it superseded by a more disenchanted present? The last question is dealt with in the last section of Chap. 4; the other questions, intimated in the chapter, are returned to in the conclusion.

Chapter 6 considers San animistic cosmology, in terms of the New Animism paradigm of relational ontology cross-culturally by comparing “(S)animism” to other animisms. Each of the two sets of people and cultures focused on in this comparative exercise is linked to the San, one in terms of geographic contiguity and the other in terms of cultural similarity. The first are neighboring Bantu-speakers with whom some San groups have had close and long-standing contact and whose culture contains mytho-magical notions and practices about animal hybridity and transformation, inviting speculation on inter-acculturative influences The second are other hunter-gatherer cultures in other regions of the world (specifically the Inuit of Canada’s eastern Arctic, which I have selected for this cross-cultural exercise as it sheds light on certain cultural-ecological aspects of San and hunter-gatherer cosmology and ontology).

In accordance with anthropology’s predilection for “them”–“us” comparison, I also include a section on animistic elements, in relational-ontological terms, in Western cosmology—which are, and have always been there, notwithstanding Cartesian and Christian anthrocentrism—I include a few remarks about recent trends toward a “post”- or “trans”-humanist perspective that has crystallized in Western thought over the last couple of generations, among writers and thinkers whose thinking about humankind and their place in the world, in each of Two Cultures (pace C.P. Snow) this thinking occurs, has taken an “animal turn”. Some of these thoughts have yielded insights that resonate with and amplify San cosmology and ontology, and that of other pre-industrial hunting people, whose own insights, in turn, would amplify those found in Western culture. As doing justice to such a project would require another book, all I have done, in addition to the discussion of this topic in Chap. 6, is incorporated, in other chapters,
snippets from the West’s Two Cultures wherever they are seen to underscore aspects of S(animism).

The conclusion deals with what, in the context of San ontology and cosmology, I see as both strengths and weaknesses in the New Animism discourse. The former are a new and novel concern with hunter-gatherer cosmology and ontology (including hunting) from a relational, phenomenological, as well as posthumanist perspective and an appreciation and enlisting, in that scholarly endeavor, of the “indigenous perspective”. The weaknesses derive from an overly dogmatic or fervent—“wonder”-fueled—and ethnographically misinformed interpretation of the posthumanist “ontological turn” by grafting New Age shoots onto New Animism stock. Having been successful in shedding the Old Animisms baggage—of racism, evolutionism, Cartesianism, neglect of the indigenous perspective—the New Animism is in danger of burdening itself with new baggage—of ethnographically naïve eco-idealistic celebration of vitalism and failure, in a spirit of a naïve neo-Eliade’ian notion of solidarité mystique, to recognize that, on the part of both human and animal, there is as much retention of species autonomy as there is dissolution.

References
Cohen, Jeffrey J. 1996. Monster Culture (Seven Theses). In Monster Theory: Reading Culture, ed. Jeffrey J. Cohen, 3–25. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. [Crossref]


Ingold, Tim. 2006. Rethinking the Animate, Re-Animating Thought. Ethnos 71: 9–20. [Crossref]


2. Being Other-than-Human: Ontological Mutability and Experience

Mathias Guenther

(1) Department of Anthropology, Wilfrid Laurier University, Ontario, ON, Canada

In a protracted sensory awareness-based experiment described in his recent book *Being a Beast: Adventures across the Species Divide*, in the style very much of a posthumanist ethnographer doing participation observation-style field work among other-than-human species, the English philosopher, biologist and veterinarian Charles Foster came closest to his goal—of being a red deer—when he had himself chased by a human hunter and his hound. This is how he describes this experience, in physiological and behavioral terms:

My adrenals were pumping out cortisol and adrenaline. The cortisol made me taunt ... Blood was diverted from my gut to my legs. Though I was slumping from the effort, I’d stop from time to time, holding my head up high and reflexively sniff. If I’d had mobile ears they’d have pricked and swiveled. (Foster 2016: 163–64)

The experience, lasting several hours, peaked at the moment, near the chase’s end, when “mostly unconscious I was behaving very much like a hunted deer”. Stirred awake in his body were atavistic “preobjective” perceptions from “existential beginnings”—of “embodied existence
outside of and prior to culture” (Csordas 1990: 9, paraphrasing Merleau-Ponty 1990: 9)—that had him act in just the right predator-evading ways, underscoring the transformative experience he was in the grips of:

I ran to the driest ground I could find. I knew (from well before birth, rather than because I’d read books and watched hounds) that dry earth doesn’t hold scent well, or, if it holds it, hugs the particles close, leaving few for snuffling noses. (ibid.)

This was one of a number of such transformative experiments and experiences—others were into a badger, fox, otter and chimney swift—by a Western zoologist who, even though being squarely situated intellectually within the Western Academy and its Cartesian-based perspective on animals and nature, discloses at the beginning of his book that he is both familiar with and sympathetic toward shamans:

I don't for a moment deny the reality of true shamanic transformation. Indeed, I have experienced it: I have a tale about a carrion crow, which is for another time. But it is arduous and, for me, too downright scary for regular use. And it’s too weird for its results to be convincing to most. (ibid.: 11)

We will meet Charles Foster again in the next chapter when dealing with the self-consciousness which he felt about his unsettling experiences and why he dodged and deferred the task of describing them to his friends and academic colleagues (who reportedly found Foster himself “weird”, if not also “downright scary”, during the weeks and months he was involved in his unorthodox project).

In this and the following three chapters, I will attempt this task—of describing and explaining the dimension of animal transformation—in the context of a people whose cosmology and world view is more amenable to such experiences, especially their shamans and initiands, storytellers and visual artists. And their hunters, who would be able to appreciate Foster’s own hunter-prey sympathy link (including from the, latter’s—the prey’s—vantage point). A “connective cosmology” and “interconnected world view” permit of such experiences and a person who has had one of them can actually “be convincing” to people to
whom he or she relates the same. They likely will have had similar experiences, perhaps when they went through initiation, been—or watched, or heard of—a shaman at his or her lion metamorphosis, or the mimetic performance of a dancer, or felt a hunter's tappings. And all have heard the stories—narrated with mimetic fervor—about the First Order and its animal, human and humanimal beings, some of whom may also make their presence felt and seen on the hunting ground and the trance dance circle and initiation seclusion sites. And seen them depicted on boulders and rock shelter walls, as striking images painted or engraved on stone surfaces.

Volume I deals with these stories and pictures, rituals, of trance curing and female and male initiation, ludic dancing and hunting, with a focus on human-animal hybridity and relationality, revealing these expressive, ritual and instrumental domains to be interconnected. Each is informed with attributes of the others so that myth, play, ritual and hunting each goes beyond its own symbolic and cosmological, narrative and expressive spheres and bounds. Myth becomes reality-linked rather than confined to its own other-world fantasy or imaginary beyond. Trance is more than a body- and mind-transcending altered or alternate state of consciousness but a portal also to the world of myth and a modality for species boundary dissolution, along with ludic dancing and hunting. And hunting, through its sympathy bond between hunter and prey, ontologically, socially and symbolically lessens the species divide as well, tempering the encountered animal’s otherness and, in resonating with the therianthropes of myth and art, giving mythic salience to animals and faunal concreteness to mythic beings.

Linkages of this sort among the domains of myth, ritual, play and hunting were seen in the chapters in the preceding volume to be what undergirds the San connective cosmos—“boundary-less universe” or “interconnected world view”—as its cultural and conceptual building blocks. The register of the discussion in these chapters was primarily though never exclusively conceptual, couched in terms of what San people, drawing on their cosmology and beliefs, think or imagine, through their myths, dreams and stories, or image, through their rock or canvas paintings, engravings and prints. The discussion principally was of religion “thought out” rather than “danced out”, using an Old Animist’s—or, more accurately, “Animatist”—famous bon mot (Marrett
While dancing, an important aspect of San ritual and expressive culture, too, was included in that discussion; I turn in this chapter to what Robert Marrett meant here by the term in a less literal sense—religion as “it develops under conditions psychological and sociological, which favour emotional processes, whereas ideation remains relatively in abeyance”. The concern is with religion as experienced, not cerebrally, intellectually, but viscerally and affectively—religion “concerned not with mere thought” (“ibid.” x); indeed, religion experienced “where thought breaks down”.

Yet, for all its breaking down, thought is not altogether bracketed out: “religion as a whole” is viewed by Marrett as “the organic complex of thought, emotion and behavior” (ibid, my emphasis). This notion, of the existence and co-existence of two opposite mentalities in mankind, “causality”—rational, logical—and “participation”—“prelogical”, affective, mystical, “felt and lived rather than thought” (Lévy-Bruhl 1966: 447)—was found in another early armchair-thinker, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, whose ideas resonate with the Old- and New-Animists, and have recently been revisited by a number of anthropologists and scholars of religion (Dawes 2014).

My treatment of San religion, specifically its cosmological aspects of ontological hybridity and transformation, is inspired by Marrett, reviving thereby, and bringing into the New Animism discourse, yet another of the Old Animists, as happened with respect to such other Victorian animism luminaries as Tylor (Stringer 1999), Frazer (Willerslev 2011) and, as noted earlier, in Chap. 2 of Vol. I, Lang.2 The discussion is about to change focus now, from “ideation”, the primary concern in the preceding chapters in how these cosmological features are manifested in San myth and art, ritual and hunting, to experience.

Given the “organic” connection in religion of “emotion and behavior” with thought, experience was however not bracketed out in the discussions in the preceding chapters and volume, especially the ones on ritual, San religion’s “danced” out component, as well as in the chapter on hunting. The description of these two domains of praxis would have been incomplete and unenlightening without reference to lived experience. Thus, an account of lion transformation in terms of a mere description of the actions of the ritual performer, its choreography, setting, participants and so on would be barren without
appreciating the feelings of uncertainty, dread and even terror that people sense, both the dancers and onlookers when such an event comes about. As would accounts of a man’s evident transformation into a baboon, or of a girl at menarche into an eland and, in a different emotional register, by the dancers around the menstrual hut. Another experiential component of transformation that adds to elucidating its emotional impact that was dealt with in the previous volume is altered states which, in the ritual context of shamanic healing, is linked to it in complementary fashion (as “tranceformation”). An account of a young hunter’s initiation or of ambush hunting and endurance hunting by a seasoned hunter is incomplete without the experiential aspect of mystical sympathy or identity, with animals through “catching the eland feeling”, or bodily “tappings” in spots of a hunter’s body that correspond to those in the springbok. Experiential and sensual, too, is the mystical process of transference of essence (Low 2009: 80) through eland fat or soot from charred bones rubbed on a hunter's skin or cuts in his body or, perhaps, when stalking his prey, through wearing an animal skin disguise, and “getting into the animal”—and experiencing thereby, in the most direct way imaginable, what David Lewis-Williams refers to as “the concept of enveloping, transforming animality (2010: 226) (which, in Vol. I, we saw to lie at the core of San cosmology and ontology). Such substances and objects, along with gnu tails, antelope stick legs, springbok rattles and horn caps, are props also in mimetic dancing, both ritual and ludic, and in the description thereof its phenomenological effects—on the sympathy bond between dancer and animal, on essence transfer and Wesenswandel—needed to be an integral part of the description. Ludic dancing usually also includes elaborate mimicry of animals, choreographed with dancing routines and vocalizations that link dancer and animal both mimetically and, as suggested, potentially also metamorphically (as through the ostrich’s grunts issued by a Ju/'hoan tshoma dancer he “would ‘know’ the animal”). Storytellers not only tell of animals or mythic therianthropes, they also embody them, as we saw, and “talk” like them with special clicks and the visualization and vitalization of the latter and bringing them from the First Order into the Second is underscored whenever one of them, most likely the trickster, appears on the dance site or the hunting ground to a trancer or hunter.
Such moments, in San thought, feeling and praxis, especially by ritual or ludic dancers, initiands, storytellers and hunters, have the effect of grounding their connective and interconnected cosmology and worldview in the “true real, coarse and subtle” thereby rendering what they experience “really real” rather than, in the spirit of anthropology’s fin de siècle penchant for constructionism, “really made-up”. What we have here is terminology and discourse from more recent studies of religion (Taussig 1993: xvi, xvii; see also Solomon 2014: 714), a century or so after Marrett. Yet their focus on direct, unmediated experience, “mobilizing the body, tuning the senses and generating emotions” (Meyer 2015: 1), resonates with Marrett, especially his concept of awe. This point was compellingly argued in a recent reappraisal by Dutch anthropologist of religion Birgit Meyer (2015) of the Victorian armchair scholar in the context of current, post-structuralist and constructionist studies of religion as embodied and felt, performed and lived.

The following discussion of the experiential dimension of transformation, in tandem with its incumbent state, ontological hybridity, flamboyantly manifested by therianthropes of myth and art and more discreetly by humans engaged in ritual and ludic practices and in the hunt, is concerned with the ontological ambiguity, and the mental conundrums and moral ambivalences this can create for people when they experience such ontological mayhem. Transformation, along with trance, is a deeply felt and psychologically and existentially unsettling experience. It is capable of generating one of the most awe-inspiring “wow” effects of religion, which Meyer holds to be the “emotional core” of Marrett’s theory of religion (and witnessed herself in her field work on charismatic, “sense-ationalist” Pentecostalist churches in Ghana). This “surplus” effect of religion creates both exhilaration—viz. “tracking is like dancing because your body is happy”—and terror—from malevolent lion-shamans who “stalk the desert in search of human prey”. Or from the experience of a person undergoing transformation into a predatory cat and realizing, with growing finality, that “I do not any longer feel that I know” (Bleek and Lloyd 1911: 91).

The basic question underlying this chapter is how the San, as level-headed a people as any, with an efficient subsistence economy, an enviable work-to-leisure ratio and a well-functioning society, deals with
ambiguity besetting so fundamental an issue of their cosmology and world view as ontological identity. My answer to this question will consider three interrelated phenomenological aspects of San cosmology, the first in the garb of epistemology, the second of experience and the third of mythology. I note, in a final nod to the Old (quasi)Animist I have conjured up, that I go about this in Marrett’ian fashion, by considering the same two factors this armchair Victorian did in his study of religion as danced out rather than thought out: “conditions psychological and sociological”, both of them “favour[ing] the emotional and “motor process” of religion, or, as I hope to show, transformation.

What links San cosmology and world view about ontological interconnectedness between human and animals to the actual experience of such connections is what might be considered a tolerance for ontological ambiguity. It is an epistemological stance that pervades San cosmology and belief, and through them, their attitudes and dispositions. In Vol. I, we traced its various reiterations, through myths and paintings, ritual and dance and certain hunting practices, all variations on the theme of ontological identity merger and the dissolution of species boundaries and attribution of personhood and human sociality to animals. I will recall some of these in this chapter and elaborate on them, in a discussion that reveals a tolerance for ontological ambiguity and how this is experienced and sustained, as well as intellectually or affectively challenged (for instance by the “hunter’s dilemma” and “carnivore’s guilt” evoked by the San’s—as any other hunting people’s—participatory world view).

The most direct and absorbing way of sustaining tolerance for ontological ambiguity is through the actual experience of transformation. It is experienced through different modalities, in different settings—ritual, ludic, performative, instrumental—and with varying degrees of intensity, from, incremental and partial, incipient bodily or psychic sensations, through mimetic animal dancing that plays at and partially achieves transformation to full-blown metamorphosis that consummates such fore-play at animal—lion or eland—transformation. The affective quality of animal transformation, from incipient to realized, on an emotional range from terror, through anxiety and disassociation to euphoria, is similar to that of trance, an
experience that resonates in some ways with how humans experience the link to non-humans, in terms of a range of affective values and relational patterns. How does a human undergoing such being-change, with a mindset that is rooted in a connective cosmology, experience animalian alterity? Does he or she, in this experience, retain his or her own species integrity? A more basic question here, one age-old in anthropology, is how real—as opposed to imagined, auto-suggested, culturally constructed—is something like transformation?

Ontological ambiguity is also manifested temporally, whenever the worlds of myth and of spirits impinge upon the lived-in world. This we saw happening now and again, for instance, when the trickster appears, as a spirit or as god at a trance dance or initiation site or, as Spirit Protector, on the hunting ground. Such appearances, akin to the landscape of Australian Aborigines, may become permanent presences on the landscape, such as hills or trees on the hunting ground the erstwhile bodies of an Early Race agama lizard cut in two by lighting or of bow-hunters or music players illicitly glanced at by a “maiden”. For the most part they are fleeting presences, however, little more than brushes humans have with beings from the myth and spirit worlds when these show up in their lives and affairs, connecting humans to these nether-worlds. It is a connection that, as we will see in a later chapter, supplements, complements and amplifies the connection humans have to their own world and its fellow-human and other-than-human beings (as well as plants, wind and weather, water bodies, pans and hills dealt with in this book only in passing but a part also of the San’s connective cosmos). Being-in-the-world for the San thus also contains awareness of and interaction with beings from alternate nether-worlds, whose quality of inchoateness and ontological mutability spills over also onto the beings of this world (and being-in the same), mostly in the context of ritual and hunting, both praxis spheres within which human-animal transformation occurs to varying degrees.

In sum, these three themes—tolerance for ontological ambiguity, experience of transformation, intersection of myth and spirit world with reality—will structure the discussion of ontological mutability as lived experience.
References


Csordas, Thomas J. 1990. Embodiment as a Paradigm for Anthropology. Ethos 18 (1): 5–47. [Crossref]


———. 2017. “...The Eyes Are No Longer Wild, You Have Taken the Kudu into Your Mind”: The Supererogatory Aspect of San Hunting. The South African Archaeological Bulletin 72: 3–16.


Solomon, Anne. 2014. Truths, Representationalism and Disciplinarity in Khoesan Researches. Critical Arts: South-North Cultural and Media Studies 28: 710–721. [Crossref]

Stringer, Martin D. 1999. Rethinking Animism: Thoughts from the Infancy of our Discipline. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 5: 541–556. [Crossref]


Footnotes

1 Especially so in his posthumously published *Carnets*, in which he moderated the degree of dichotomization of his earlier formulation and conceptualization of the two mentalities, holding them to be complementary as well as present among both pre-industrial and industrial society, with “mystical mentality more marked and more easily observed among primitives than in our own society, but present everywhere in the human mind” (cited in Bunzel 1966: xvii).

2 As well as elsewhere and more tangentially, such post-Victorians as Eliade, Lévy-Bruhl and Hallowell (Guenther 2017: 12).

3 Which, as noted in the introduction and argued elsewhere (Guenther 1999: 226–47), underlies a tolerance also for conceptual ambiguity in San society and values, religion and beliefs.

Mathias Guenther

(1) Department of Anthropology, Wilfrid Laurier University, Ontario, ON, Canada

Mathias Guenther

The Porcupine said: “People do not live with that man, he is alone; because people cannot hand him food, for his tongue is like fire. He burns people’s hands with it. You need not think that we can hand food to him, for we shall have to dodge away to the sheep opposite. The pots will be swallowed with the soup in it. Those sheep will be swallowed up in the same way, for yonder Man always does so. He does not often travel because he feels the weight of his stomach which is heavy. See, I, the Porcupine live with you, although he is my real father; because I think he might devour me”. (Bleek 1923: 35)

But he was not willing to let men kill game, therefore, he beat the things as he felt that he could not let man kill things. He therefore beat the game to frighten it. ... As my grandfather !Xugen di told me, it was on account of “Chaser-of-Food’s” doing that we now have to lay in wait for anything as we must not let the things see us. For we used to handle the game. “Chaser-of-Food’s” doings are the reason we hide well waiting for anything we want. The things must not see us for they tremble whenever they think of the things “Chaser-of-Food” did to them. He still does
A telling measure of how a culture deals with ontological ambiguity is its members’ attitude to those beings—of its myth and lore, its dreams and collective imagination—that conflate ontological attributes and categories. These were-creatures, that blend human with animal or other non-human traits, are referred to collectively as monsters, in cultures with a low tolerance for ambiguity—ontological or otherwise—such as the West. In such cultures, such were-beings are at the most unequivocally demonized and at the least deemed unsettling and uncanny.

On the demonized—indeed, “cursed”—end of the spectrum are the werewolves and vampires of folklore and fake-lore (via Hollywood, US, or Hammer Film Productions, UK) and such “Beast Folk” of literature as inhabit vivisectionist Dr. Moreau’s island, in H. G. Wells’s novel with the same title. A dozen-odd in number, the latter are as outrageously mixed-up in their ontological make-up as any of the /Xam therianthropes of myth and art, including not only such run-of-the-mill were-fare as Ape-Man and Dog-Man, but such multi-species and gender-ambiguous concoction as “Hyena-Swine”, “Mare-Rhinoceros-Man” and “Half-Finished Puma-Woman”. Topping the list, as the doctor’s “most elaborately made of all creatures” and “complex trophy of Moreau’s skills” is his chimerical servant M’ling\(^1\) concocted from bear, dog and ox components. As they did for Well’s narrator-protagonist, such beings evoke stark horror and terror in Western grown-ups and they stand as the bogey-men for their children through whose dreams and bedrooms such monsters may parade (or lurk, under the bed)—and which their parents may either use to scare and bring in line unruly children, or may satyr-rize and render “adorable”—more or less—as does the children’s book illustrator Maurice Sendak in his classic *Where the Wild Things Are*.

At the unsettling end of the spectrum of Western reactions to were-beings we find Freud, who, in his classic 1919 essay *Das Unheimliche*
(The Uncanny), deemed such beings embodiments of that quality, because of their ambiguity, their dual and opposed nature, blending within their being both the “heimlich” (“homely”)—as well as the “heimisch” (“native”)—with its opposite, the unheimlich, the former quality the being’s human part, the latter the animalian. Such brutish, monstrous creatures are unsettling, notes Freud—and we can see him speaking here for Westerners in general—because, on the one hand, they evoke both fear and dread. On the other, their being also “vertraut” (“familiar”), indeed, “längst vertraut” (“long familiar”), such negative feelings are mitigated, creating moral ambivalence (1919: 1–3). Freud’s Austro-Hungarian contemporary Franz Kafka, to whom I will return in Chap. 6, conveys this hauntingly in his therimorphic “animal fables”, about such were-beings as a beetle-human named Gregor Samsa, the chimpanzee-man Rotpeter and an unnamed badger and dog. These hybrid beings uncannily blend both human traits—especially speech and reasoning—with animalian behavior, the one digging and snuffling, the other licking and sniffing (“auf hündische Art [durch] ehrenvolle Beschnupperung”). All this is unsettling for the human reader who finds his or her ontological identity and integrity obscured by these tales about hybridity and metamorphosis.

Another way in which monstrous uncanniness can also manifest itself in such were-beings is in moral perversion, absurdity or atrociousness (the manifestation, as seen below, of monstrosity in San world view). Here, too, were-beings have been literary devices by western writers, for instance, Kafka’s compatriot Karel Čapek, or George Orwell, whose salmandrine and porcine humans’ attempts to bring morally and socially hybridizing “Salamandrisms” and “Animalism” to their dislocated, human-cast and human-dominated worlds are biting critiques of the atrocities and absurdities, respectively, of fascism and communism.

While San myth and tales also feature monsters, they are of a different cast. What makes most of them monstrous is not their Mischling’s ontological ambiguity and fluidity, but the last-noted quality, moral and social transgressions. Of these, the one deemed most monstrous in such beings is excessive, unchecked food greed and lack of sharing (and commensality), followed by social aggressiveness, directed especially at children whom such a monster is inclined to eat
(combining the two transgressions, gluttony and rage, thereby maximizing the monster’s monstrosity).

Food greed—so unchecked that not only the contents of a demanded a pot of food is devoured but also the pot itself—and raging anger are monstrous failings that are exemplified most egregiously by //Kkhwai-hem of the /Xam First Order (first epigraph). His name means “He who is a Devourer of Things”—“sheep, people, everything”—which he not only chews in his mouth before devouring them but also burns with his tongue which “is like fire”. He is huge in stature—“his shadow resembles a cloud”—and grossly paunched (his other name is “Fat-Stomach”) and he is uncontrollable in his appetite. So much so that, when visiting his in-laws, in a fit of rage, he is wont not only to eat the food they provide him—pot and all—but even some of the people themselves (such as /Kaggen, who has adopted the monster’s daughter Porcupine who is herself worried that she herself might be “devoured” by her natural father, along with her adopted father). His irascibility—“he has blackness and darkness inside him”—makes him unfit for human company, and has him living, a hermit’s life, a long distance away from his family group, in remote mountainous terrain (“people do not live with that man, he lives alone”).

A voraciously gluttonous, meat-devouring being of like monstrous cast, named !nu !numma- !kuiten (“White Mouth”), was described by /Hanǂkasso, who remembered this ogre from his childhood because parents were wont to conjure White Mouth up whenever children cried, with his ghastly cry “Hu-u! Hu! I kill children who cry! Hu-u! Hu! I will kill children who cry!” His monstrosity consisted not so much of gross body features, ontologically mixed and mismatched, as in his bodily frame he was a man: “a man who eats great pieces of meat, he cuts them off, he puts them into his mouth (? holds them in his mouth)” (VIII. 29. 8557). This, greedy meat eating, is what defines him as a monster and bogey-man—and also renders him “a beast of prey” (which, as noted below, is a category of beings the /Xam, too, included in their notion of monstrosity). The way he devoured meat also gave him his name: his white mouth was caused by excessive salivating for meat.

Two other monstrously voracious Early Race beings were !Ko and !Khau, the former a mongoose the latter an agama lizard person, both
of whose food greed is so extreme and unchecked that they would eat their own flesh, in obsessive feats—and feasts—of self-immolation (Guenther 1989: 101–4; James 2001: 85–86). The former being, !Ko, does so in a systematic fashion—as a hunter would do with the carcass of the prey animal he just killed—by completely butchering himself, bit by bit: thigh and buttocks, shoulder blades, entrails, liver, kidney, back of his neck. That accomplished, this Early Race uber-glutton then shoulders the slabs of meat—his own flesh—on whatever is left of his body to take it home to his wife, who mistakes her butchered husband for a quagga (Guenther 2017: 11).

The meat-greed of !Khau Lizard’s mongoose counterpart is even more voracious, and unchecked by any sharing as !Ko did not take any meat back to his camp but devoured all of it out in the veld, compounding the moral perversion, of self-immolation and self-cannibalism, with selfish non-sharing of food, a premier moral shortcoming in San sociality and morality (Guenther 1999: 41–19). He is seen frenziedly cutting chunks upon chunk of flesh from his thighs, buttocks and skin, with a dull knife that causes him to shout out in pain (“saa!”) with every cutting, and roasting and devouring each in turn, after “beating off the ashes” (an action of incongruous gustatory fastidiousness that, despite, or because of, its incongruity underscores this “all-devourer’s” voraciousness). After doing this over and over—some 27 times—at several self-hunt outings, !Ko finally “sat down, while he sat thinking that he was getting small, as he was cutting off himself”. After one more helping of meat—cut from his shrunken and shriveled thigh—he “was thinking that he had nothing that he could cut off”! This tale of profligate food greed is spun out masterfully by the storyteller /Hanǂkasso, with much detail and over two dozen repetitions of the chanted refrain addressed to the west wind by the protagonist about the dullness of his knife—“O my grandfather, the knife does not bite, that I may cut off”—which he sharpens once or twice during the story. The tale ends with the Mongoose’s, physically spent and diminished, final shout—a complaint—to the west wind: “Great west yonder, what am I to do, I am hungry”! (L. VIII. – 13. 7119–7205).

A monster like “All-Devourer” and beings of that ilk can be conceptually linked to the First Order, as the social equivalent and
counterpart to its ontological inchoateness, the one grossly immoral monsters beyond the pale of its as yet precariously social order, the other ontologically unstable therianthropes in an as yet not fully formed world (Guenther 2017: 7). And it is this sort of being, the moral transgressor and social inverter, not the latter, transformation-prone therianthrope, the ontological hybrid, that constitutes monstrosity in the San—and arguably hunter-gatherer (McGranaghan 2014: 5–6)—scheme of things and view of the world. What breeds monsters here is not so much ontological ambiguity and its threat to people’s sense of who and what they are and are not and to their conceptual categories but social and moral deviation and otherness, both threats to the social order.

The social disorder also derives from what Ouzman and Loubser refer to as “apocalyptic” threats to people’s way of life, as San experienced in South and southern Africa during the colonial period (2000). This historical scenario gives rise to yet another iconographic depiction of such beings, according to some San rock art analysts, with specific reference to San “contact” rock art—also referred to, because of its disastrous impact, as “eschatonic” art (Ouzman and Loubser ibid. Ouzman 2003). The imagery here consists of bizarre humanoid figures dubbed “Eldritch” by researchers, distorted, elongated, spectral, painted with semi-transparent white pigment, that, it is suggested, may be conflations of destructive invader-settlers with malevolent spirit beings, possibly spirits of the dead (Ouzman 2003: 15; Jolly 2015: 202–6). As such, human-spirit hybrid beings, these rock art figures would approximate the Western monster prototype.

Encompassed as well within this interpretive paradigm are predators, especially lions, the /Xam’s “most powerful idiom for antisocial monstrous behavior” (McGranaghan 2014: 10). The whiff and taint of monstrosity attached to some of these beings for their anti- and extra-social lifeways—the /Xam rogue lion duo met above, Mat and Belt, come to mind here, a “pair of malevolent but foolish, wandering lions”, who are out and about in the veld looking for victims to eat. Such beings live beyond the bounds of any moral community; as the “quintessential ‘angry people’”, they were irascible and vindictive, killing—and eating—not only other beings but even their own kind. In Vol. I (Chap. 5), we dealt with the conflation, in /Xam, Naro and other
Khoisan folklore, of lions—or other “clawed animals”—with Blacks and Boers and other “people who are different”. It is a reiteration, among Khoisan people, of a universal human tendency and social boundary-maintenance mechanism, to attribute non-human traits—more or less monstrous ones, including monopodism and headlessness—to outsiders and to reserve “real humanness” to one’s own group (viz. Khoi Khoi—“People People”, i.e. “the real people” [Boonzaier et al. 1996: 2]).

In his article on monstrosity in /Xam oral literature, Mark McGranaghan includes another figure within the monster category, the pan-Khoisan figure “Eyes-on-his-Feet” (Schmidt 1986; McGranaghan 2014: 7), whose anatomical peculiarity—his eyes located not on his face but hidden in among his toes—leads him to play malicious tricks on his dupes (Guenther 1989: 56, 58–59). Because of the ambiguous nature of this Myth Time being, I would include the same not within the San rogues’ gallery of monsters but that of tricksters (Guenther 1989: 56, 1999: 102). The latter are beings in whom moral failings are offset by strengths, rather than, as in the San notion of monstrosity, being unmitigated and unequivocal. This is the case with the many other trickster beings of San mythology who, their moral egregiousness notwithstanding, are too ambiguous socially, morally and ontologically to qualify as monsters, in terms of San criteria.

This brings us back to what started this discussion of monstrosity: transformation into human-animal hybrids, the prototypical monster in the Western imagination Cohen 196)—but not, as is my contention, in the imagination of the San (and, possibly other hunter-gatherer peoples). While not without its unsettling, even terror-inducing aspects, as lion transformation and transformed lions can be for some San people, it is not to them something so utterly uncanny, alien or abominable to human beings, and to being human, as to warrant fear and banishment from the spheres of social intercourse and being-in-the-world into dark worlds beyond—or under the bed—and beyond the pale of human congress. The next chapter will reveal the ubiquitousness in people’s actual world of the therianthropes from the world of myth, in which such beings display were-weirdness with the wildest abandon and to the highest degree. Mythic therianthropes provide a template for depictions, accounts and experiences of human-
animal conflation in other expressive domains—art, belief and lore, ritual and play—as well as in hunting, an instrumental activity that may elicit an ontological shift in the hunter through intense sympathetic attunement to the prey animal. The recurrence, in different forms and to different degrees, of human-animal merging in the imagination and experience of people contributes toward rendering such merged beings familiar to people and embedding them in their cosmology and world view, as something not alien and abominable but familiar and if not quite normal, also not really altogether abnormal. And, as seen in the discussion of hunter-prey sympathy in the last chapter of Vol. I, that cosmology and world view also enable humans to “adopt the animal’s perspective”, which both deepens the human’s appreciation of the animal as animal and of the human as human, each, through this shared perspective, somewhat of a “strange being” to itself.

As for transformation, the process that brings such beings into being, its experience, no matter how real it may seem to a Westerner undergoing it, usually in some drug-induced altered state, is generally deemed a hallucination by Westerners (Masters and Houston 1966: 56–60, 76–78; Duerr 1985: 168). It is a view on the matter that goes back to the Victorians, such as Edward B. Tylor and Edward Clodd, the contemporaneous popularizer of “Dr. Tylor’s animism doctrine” through books and pamphlets such as Animism, The Seed of Religion and Myths and Dreams which, readily accessible and likely widely read, presumably contributed toward implanting this notion within the Western imagination. Both writers deemed transformation—or, using their terminology, “metamorphosis” and “metempsychosis”, its related manifestation—a belief of “barbaric races”, which they saw re-emerging, as a survival of “savage mental philosophy” (Clodd 1891: 89), in medieval Europe in what “may be conveniently called the “Doctrine of Werewolves”” (Tylor 1870: 307). It was to these two Victorians a belief clouded very much in terms of such forms of “vagaries of the human mind” or of “morbid imagination”, as “hallucination” and “delusion”, according to the one (Clodd 1891: 81–99), and “insane delusion” and “a form of mental disease”, according to the other (Tylor ibid.: 126), much of it entertained, as well as concocted and manipulated, primarily by “sorcerers” (or shamans, using the term
generically in a way not used by Tylor, who restricted its use to Siberian hunter-herders).

This sort of characterization of transformation is inappropriate as regards the San (or hunting-gathering peoples like them). Pippa Skotnes, writing about the /Xam, notes that “we need to recognize that transformations were part of the range of experience described by the /Xam as a normal part of their existence”, rather than—the point of her article which she presented as an early critique of Lewis-Williams trance hypothesis—“linked exclusively to trance curing” (1996: 243).

The experience of transformation and the beings and states that derived therefrom were not, to the San, hallucinations “conjured up from the imagination”, continues Skotnes, “but were perceived as physically real”. They “thus existed independently of human thought, they were understood to take their own initiative” (ibid: 244). Moreover, people who underwent transformation, such as a shaman-lion, especially one inexperienced and a danger to himself and people around him, were handled by their fellows with matter-of-fact efficiency rather than panicking fumbling, by holding, restraining and massaging him and rubbing his neck to make the lion hair sprouting from it recede, thereby returning the transforming man from his alternate ontological state to reality (much the same way they do a shaman in trance, from his altered state of consciousness). The ≠Au//ei man whose fitful transformation into a baboon is described in Sylvain’s ethnographic vignette in appendix two was attended to by his fellows in similar fashion, with calm purpose.

In addition to human-animal hybrid beings not being deemed abominations—that is to say, monsters—and transformation, the process that brings them into being, as delusions, nor both of these manifestations of ontological mutability as epistemologically and phenomenologically aberrant and threats to rationality, saneness and the order of the universe, other aspects of cosmology, thought and belief of San culture came up at various places in Vol. I that also contribute toward its members tolerance of ontological ambiguity. A key one is the San—and hunter-gatherer—notion of animals as other-than-human persons, a notion in concert with the myth-derived idea that animals (and humans) of today’s Second Order of Creation were animal-humans in the First Order, whose human traits such present-
time animals as hare, quagga and elephant have been retained in parts of their bodies. The bodily aspect of these mystical and mythical expressions of ontological overlap of beings and being is reiterated and reinforced by the San concepts as n!ow and !kia, premised on the interspecies—humans to animals, different animal species to each other—transfer of essences and sharing of potencies and of “tappings” in the hunters body in places that correspond to those in the animal’s body.

Ontological blending becomes ontological entanglement once the perspectivist component is added, that is, the perspective of the animal-other vis à vis the human, in which the former, viewing itself in the same exceptionalist terms as humans view themselves, views the latter, humans, as other-than-humanimal persons, creating a knot of ontological entanglements conducive to much overlapping or breakdown of species boundaries and identities. All of this operates within a “connective cosmology”, underwritten by myth and belief (along with dreams), in which human and animal identities are merged, thereby dissolving species boundaries and, more generally, Cartesian dichotomies. And underwritten by experience, whenever a shaman or initiand, painter or storyteller or hunter becomes him/herself an animal. In short, the epistemological foundation for ontological discreteness of beings and being is lacking.

Yet, all that said, for all of this tolerance, ontological ambiguity can also be mentally and existentially unsettling. As we will see presently, in moments when such ambiguity is sensed, when a shaman or hunter blend species identities with a lion or a kudu, or a transforming musical bow player into a tree, autonomy of the individual is never fully dissolved but remains intact, on both sides of the species border, so that both identity and alterity are retained while the human becomes, or is, animal. This “schizoid” state, of being simultaneously “same as” and “other than” the animal, is one of the most basic manifestations of ontological ambiguity which, while accepted in an animistic cosmology like that of the San as a basic condition of what being human constitutes, also brings with it doubts and uncertainties.

As we will see in the next chapter, these swirl mostly around the personally felt experience of transformation and the culturally postulated existence of transformed or hybrid beings, including, as we will see below, doubts about whether any of these exist at all or, if they
do, how “real” they are, as opposed to imagined or “faked”, that is, instances, respectively, of mimesis or metamorphosis. But before turning to questions and issues, there is one basic conundrum San and other hunter-gatherers have to grapple with, that derives from their animistic perception of the human-animal relationship.

**Carnivory and Cannibalism: The Human Meat Eater’s Dilemma (Especially Animists’)**

This conundrum is meat eating, a practice by humans that stirs fundamental doubt and uncertainty and strains tolerance for ontological ambiguity, especially in people who subscribe to a world view in which humans and animals share ontological identities, as do hunter-gatherers (as well as humans of any other societal type, a topic to be dealt with further in Chap. 6). Human carnivory creates a dilemma, over the uncomfortable closeness of this alimentary endeavor to cannibalism. While the human “carnivore’s dilemma” is universal (Herzog 2010: 175–207; Baggini 2016), its potential for stirring qualms in humans is especially high if these humans think and perceive in the terms of an animistic cosmology and world view (Descola 2013: 285–89). Philippe Descola, writing specifically about hunter-gatherers subscribing to his animism schema, sees this as such people’s central moral dilemma—a “background of angst peculiar to animism” (ibid: 286). He defines the same by way of certain key questions this angst raises in their collective subconscious mind, questions that are as unsettling as they are irresolvable, thereby intensifying their troubling effect on the animist hunter’s conscience.

From the point of view of its very singular premises, animism is constantly confronted by a problem both ethical and doctrinal .... how can one be sure that humanized nonhumans are not indeed human? Of course, their bodies are manifestly different, as are the behavior and mores that are determined by their biological apparatus. And it is primarily that difference of physical envelopes that makes it possible for humans to feed daily upon animal and vegetable persons without sinking into routine anthropophagy. But the resemblances between
interiorities is so powerful, affirmed so vividly in all circumstances in which humans are involved, that it becomes really difficult to ignore it completely when cooking and eating. A niggling doubt always lingers: beneath the body of the animal of plant that I am eating, what remains of its human subjectivity? What guarantee is there that I am not munching (or worse) on a subject just like me? (Descola 2013: 285)

The textbook case, which Descola also brings into his discussion, is the Inuit (or Eskimo), whose anxiety on this matter is about “eating souls”—the latter the manifestation par excellence of Descola’s “interiority” and “subjectivity”—when they consume the flesh of a hunted seal, as expressed to Knud Rasmussen on his Fifth Thule Expedition in the early 1920s by Ivaluardjuk, an Eastern Arctic Iglulik hunter in passage much cited in the animism literature:

The greatest peril in life lies in the fact that human food consists entirely of souls. ... All the creatures that we have to kill and eat, all those we have to strike down and destroy to make clothes for ourselves have souls, like we have, souls that do not perish with the body, and which must therefore be propitiated lest they should revenge themselves on us for taking away these bodies (1929: 56).

While the San, who have a less developed notion of animal souls, let alone ones with vindictive feelings toward humans (see Chap. 5), would not express their own version of the animist hunter’s dilemma and in quite those terms, they share the same moral qualms. And these fasten not only on the other-than-human-person’s interiority, or soul which Descola’s and Rasmussen’s meat-eaters “munch on”, but also its “exteriority”: animal bodies, too, in San myth and thought contain First Order humanness, some more than others, such as elephants and quaggas, whose flesh smells human and looks human (as do the she-elephant’s two breasts), and the hare, part of whose body is human flesh and needs to be excised and thrown away when cutting up the carcass. As discussed elsewhere (Guenther 2017: 11), the human carnivore’s dilemma is a theme of San myth and belief people deal with,
more or less explicitly and in multiple ways, ranging from the /Xam trickster /Kaggen, who is inter alia, a Spirit Protector of eland, hartebeest and other animals, also allowing humans to hunt and kill his charges, indeed, in some stories, himself doing so, weeping for his favorite animal, the eland, as it suffers death at the hunter’s hands. The above-detailed myth about a hunter hunting and butchering his own flesh, as he howls with pain during this process of self-immolation, is a corollary of the same theme, of the hunter suffering the pain he inflicts on the prey animal, with which he also identifies.

A more explicit expression of the hunter’s dilemma is found in Dja!kwain’s story, which is either a myth about the Early Race or a legend about a man from the /Xam Second Order, featuring a man, named !Komm ta hi (or “Chaser-of-Food”), “who was not willing to let men kill game, therefore he beat the things as he felt he could not let men kill things. He therefore beat the game to frighten it” (second chapter epigraph). This protagonist of /Xam myth or legend is reminiscent of a remorse- and guilt-ridden contemporary Western “reformed hunter” perpetrating “anti-hunting propaganda” (Cartmill 1993: 239), in the context of a moral culture that places the hunter on the horns of an unresolvable dilemma.

Such myths are part of an arsenal of ploys and rationalizations and moral coping strategies with which animistic hunting folk—and humans generally—try to solve that dilemma and through them salve their conscience about eating animals, body, soul and all. They consist of a variety of rationalizing, justifying or obfuscating “distancing devices” (Serpell 1986: 159–61; see also Preece 2005: 13–16), such as explanatory and propitiatory cosmological notions and myths and beliefs and ritual acts or routines such as verbal concealment, that, through “verbal concealment” ploys “de-subjectivize” the source of the food semantically, “to make it just a thing” (Descola 2013: 285), or “transubstantiating the meat into plant food”, or “semantically reducing it to animals less proximate to humans” (Vivieros de Castro 1998: 472). As shown by German anthropologist Janina Duerr (2010: 138–43), such rationalizations—around what she refers to with the fulsome German term Tiertötungsskrupulantismus8—may take on the sophistry and fancy footwork, ingenuity and disingenuousness of a legal eagle lawyer’s argumentation, for instance, “denial of responsibility”, through
taboo names or claims that the killing was not intentional but accidental. Another such line of argumentation is on the “cheating death” notion, achieved by such ploys as balancing killing of an animal with revitalizing the same in some manner, either by restoring the bones and organs of killed animals so that “new animals could grow out of them” or by means of erotic and procreative actions, between the hunter and his wife—a stand-in for game—or the Spirit Keeper or his wife with the spirit of the hunter. \(^9\) Their ubiquity and inventiveness in human cultures and history (Rudolph 1972) attests to the universality of what Ortega y Gasset, in his classic *Meditations on Hunting*—the Western conscientious hunter’s Bible—refers to as “a certain restlessness in the hunter’s conscience, over the death that he deals the beguiling animal” (1957, my translation). Mythologist Joseph Campbell refers to it as a “primordial guilt of life that lives on life” \(^10\) (cited in Serpell 1986: 136).

Especially wide-spread is the last ploy, the metaphoric and metonymic linkage of wife/husband, game/hunting and women/mating, especially among hunting peoples (as well as people who hunt, in cultures anywhere). One is the Siberian Yukaghir, whose notions of hunting and mating and sex and seduction, between hunter and the Spirit Keeper of the prey animal (elk), are especially elaborate and instrumental at the symbolic level of assigning personhood to animals (see Willerslev 2007: 100–5). The notion—“that killing [game] is modelled on sexual intercourse”—is also established among the Inuit of the eastern Arctic among whom, as reported by Laugrand and Oosten in their recent comparative monograph on Inuit human-animal relations, the vernacular term *qiniqquq* holds the double meaning of “to look for a proper game animal” and “a woman who agrees” (2015: 354). As Matt Cartmill discusses in his study of hunting in Western history, this notion—“murderous amorousness” (1993: 238)—has also been entertained by hunters—and poets\(^{11}\)—outside the pre-industrial hunter-gatherer realm, one of them Tennyson (cited in Cartmill 1993: 263, end note #17):

Man is the hunter, woman his game:
The sleek and shining creatures of the chase,
We hunt them for the beauty of their skins;
They love us for it, and we ride them down.

A more subtle and sensitive expression of the chase as courtship, between a human man (once again, a poet not a hunter) and a doe in which the former is drawn within the ontological sphere of the latter, is D.H. Lawrence’s “A Doe at Evening” (see Chap. 5).

We find rationalizations and justifications of this sort also among the San, starting, as already seen in an earlier discussion of the San’s notion of “women like meat,” with San cosmology’s and mythology’s own version of “erotic and procreative action” between a hunter and his wife and the latter’s identification with the game. A pan-San myth motif is a married man—usually recently married—realizing, usually after some “eye-opening” prodding and importuning by male kinsmen in his band, that instead of a woman, he has “married meat” (Schmidt 2013: 128–32). It is the central theme of a lengthy story Qhomatcã, master Naro storyteller, related to me at D’Kar in 1995, as a morbid tabloid tale in which not only the hapless wife—who, her husband’s younger brother told him, was not a “playful woman” but an elephant—was roasted and eaten but also her infant son (by his uncle, after developing a craving for his newborn nephew’s flesh just after his birth). Another ontological ambiguity theme of San mythology and cosmology in the narrative (discussed in Vol. I, Chap. 2) is the identification not just generally of human with elephant, specifically human and elephant flesh, but of women with elephants (Rusch and Parkington 2010), specifically through the shared anatomical trait of paired breasts. Here is an excerpt from Qhomatcã’s myth text:

“The woman is an elephant”, [the younger brother thought], “the one he has married.” And he just told his younger brother that this woman is not a playful woman. When the younger brother said this he was thinking of eating his brother’s son.

Just then a trance dance was about to start and he told his younger brother to go and see the dancers. And the younger brother refused. He said “give me your children, I want [you] to sleep, I’ll just watch them”. He was thinking of eating the child. When they were there at the dancer’s place he just took the child and he put the foot prints of the children in the sand some
distance away (about three metres). And he killed the child and he cooked it. And ate it.

And the younger brother said to his brother’s wife; he asked her for an awl. And he took it and pretended to take a thorn out of his foot. He looked at his brother’s wife and saw an ant crawling on her throat. He said, “I’ll just take that ant off your throat”. “No”, she said, “you just want to kill me.” He said, “I’ll just take it off with this’, and he took the awl and stabbed her. He killed her. And he cut off her breasts and put them in the fire.

And his brother, when he was running along, was thinking about his brother being alone with his wife and he thought that he would go back just to see what was happening. When the elder brother came he just saw his younger brother killing his wife. He was just roasting her breasts and he was starting to eat one of the breasts.

And the elder brother asked him, “What are you doing? What have you done?”

And his younger brother told him, “Come, and take a taste of this. You said you have married a woman, but you have married an animal.” (Guenther field notes, D’Kar, 31 May 1995)

As regards San cosmological notions about the matter of human carnivory, we find an implicit “licence to kill”—and eat—animals in James Suzman’s account of Ju’/hoan cosmology, as an integral feature of their connective cosmos. The anthropologist bases his account on what he learned from /!a’e, a renowned ≠Au//ei hunter in the Omaheke whom we met in Chap. 6 (Vol. I). We saw him out on hunting and tracking excursions at which the hunter revealed consummate skills at his craft, along with keen and focused, mental, expressive, kinesthetic involvement in what he was doing out on the hunting ground, attuned to the “cacophony of narratives etched into the sand”. It laid the basis for what Suzman, who accompanied him on hunting outings, refers to as an “experiential” sense of animals—and, through empathy and projection, also of “an animal’s view of the world” (2017: 169), providing Suzman the mental and perceptual context for his reading of this aspect of ≠Au//ei cosmology. In a discussion Suzman had with
/I!ae about differences between animal species, the hunter dwelled on anatomical and behavioral differences specific to each. In differentiating animals, collectively or individually, by species, from humans Suzman’s informant found it more difficult to do this in behavioral terms:

He found it far harder to make broad categorical distinctions ... – not least because humans, being so adaptable, had so many things in common with so many other species. Humans could climb trees like baboons, stalk like big cats, run like wild dogs, dig like porcupines, and fight with the ferocity of bull elephants. To his mind there was just a single world in which different species interacted with one another. And in this world the only thing that most of the nonhuman species had in common was that it was permissible for people to eat them. The Ju/'hoan term that most closely approximates the word “animal” is !ha, a generic term for meat. (2017: 169)

This lexically backed mytho-cosmological justification to eat animals— which the ≠Au//eisi, like San generally, “insisted ... were people of a sort – not humans, but people because they lived and thought” (Suzman 2017: 163)—becomes all the more justifiable as the animal-human-meat conflation gave the same permission to predatory animal-people, for:

according to this reasoning, if leopards ever discussed their animal neighbours among themselves, they probably referred to Ju/'hoansi – along with other creatures they considered edible – to be different kinds of meat as well. (ibid)

I have some doubts about the applicability of this sort of “perspectivist” reasoning (see conclusion), which is common as an explanation and justification for the conflation of carnivory with cannibalism, among Lower Amazonian hunting people (Vivieros de Castro 1998: 472, 479–80), to their southern African counterparts. The categorical distinction between human and animal (and vice versa), in the alimentary terms of which is and which is not permissible to eat, is out of tune, (cosmo)logically, with the close identification of the two, as seen
throughout this book in the abundance of therianthropes and preponderance of transformations in the World of Myth and the natural world the San inhabit. In the former world, the Early Race, were indeed hunters who hunted and ate First Order animals. However, just as many they did not hunt, but associated with, visited, lived together with, intermarried amongst; indeed, shared being and identity with, as they, the Early Race, were themselves in most instances part-animal. Thus, doubts and moral questions about eating animal flesh remain.

In an early exploratory article on the San instance of the “carnivore’s guilt” (Guenther 1988), I suggested a way San hunters attempt to resolve the moral dilemma around meat eating incumbent on the existential conundrum of being both “same as” and “other than” their animal quarry and, thus, by logical extension of the former proposition, being de facto cannibals when eating the animal’s flesh (as was the case, in flagrante, with the mythic Agama Lizard and Mongoose Early Race hunters, where the quarry’s flesh they butchered, roasted and ate was actually the self-same hunters own flesh). It is to situationally keep these two contradictory relational modes apart. Thus, when butchering, cooking and eating the meat, as well as sharing raw and cooked portions out among band members and visitors, people bracket out the “same as” mode and activate through their thoughts and actions the “other than” mode. The morally compromising “same as” mode becomes momentarily eclipsed as people are fully preoccupied with practical-instrumental tasks and social-moral actions that fully absorb them with one another, in a pattern of relationality that is human-to-human, charged with sociality, as well as sociability. It is a scenario, of cooperative tasking, sharing, commensality and interaction, all around meat eating, in which the animal, its carcass butchered and meat cooked, is object through-and-through, its subject state being now altogether off people’s minds. In such a social, rather than “animistic” moral context, people eat meat without any qualms and compunctions—and with much relish.

However, I also noted, as a concluding caveat to my somewhat rudimentary thoughts on the matter at the time that this sort of dichotomization does not always apply in praxis. This point I would reiterate and emphasize, more than before, in the present discussion. Some, if not most of hunting San carry out, is indeed practical and
instrumental, in which opportunistic, meat-foraging hunters bracket out sympathy and engagement; as seen in the in an earlier discussion in the preceding volume, small-game hunting, snaring, nocturnal or pit-fall hunting are examples. But big-game hunting may combine empirical, practical-instrumental tracking, chasing and dispatching the quarry with sympathy moments at every step of a protracted hunt that may take days and nights, during which supererogatory elements—mythic and mystical, ritual and relational ones—are not bracketed out but impinge on the hunters’ practical tasks vis à vis his wary and resourceful quarry. Moreover, the instrumental and social tasks of butchering and cooking, sharing and eating the meat are accompanied by stories—“telling the hunt”—in which the activity of hunting acquires yet another mytho-poeic cast, as the hunted and butchered, eaten and shared animal carcass becomes recognized and valorized as the resourceful, challenging prey animal that it was on the hunting ground from where it was taken after an exciting chase dwelled on in the retelling of the hunt. This retelling will also dwell on and embellish such remarkable or uncanny aspects as may have transpired during the hunt, consigning the animal of the veld to the World of Story and of Myth.

Rane Willerslev found the same process of mental and practical contextualization of animals among the Siberian Yukaghirs:

The same animal – an elk, for instance – thus has quite different meaning depending on the context in which it is experienced. It is not, as Durkheim would have it, that regularities in social organization provide an overarching animist cosmological schema for perception in general. Rather, different frameworks of perception flourish side by side, and the same individual will move in and out those frameworks depending on the context. I should therefore move at once to correct the misleading idea to which the “ism” in animism is apt to give rise, namely that the term refers to a coherent cosmological schemata for perception in general. Among the Yukaghirs – and, I suspect, among other hunter-gatherers as well – animism is nothing of the sort. Rather, it is a particular way of perceiving animals and the environment that is brought into play in specific contexts of
practical activities. Outside these particular contexts of close involvement with prey, Yukaghirs do not experience animals as persons any more than we do, but instead live in a world of ordinary objects in which the distinction between human subjects and nonhuman objects is much more readily drawn. (2007: 116–17)

The San approach to assuaging humans’ meat eater’s guilt can be summed up much the same way: situational dichotomization and balancing of what is an abiding, cosmologically grounded moral ambivalence about killing and eating animals whose ontological identity they share (along with the animals’ alterity).

Yet, like all other such guilt-assuaging ploys, this, too, is not fully effective. It is true that San, like Siberian Yukaghirs, eat meat with gusto and “without any visible sign that they experience guilt or conflict when they are eating it” (Willerslev 2007: 79). Yet, for the Yukaghir, and the San along with other animistic hunting people, their meat cherishing and craving notwithstanding, “the problem of cannibalism is nonetheless a moral paradox at the very center of their hunting cosmology” (ibid.). It squirms in and nibbles at their conscience: “the fact is”, notes Descola about animistic peoples, in general, “that no measures of compensation, however well intentioned, can ever totally dissipate the brutality of the following recognized fact: the maintenance of human life involves the consumption of nonhuman persons” (2013: 286).

In the end, what keeps guilt at bay and allows these hunting people to eat the animals they hunt is not any structuralist dichotomization of human as opposed to animal (along with no small amount of obscurantist obfuscation). This is the Western way, as per Descartes and, arguably Christianity (White Jr. 1967), as well as, to a lesser extent and less successfully, also that of San and Siberian hunters. Instead what assuages guilt is an anti-structuralist acceptance of—a tolerance for—ontological ambiguity and of a world that, as Åke Hultkrantz put it, in the context of North American subarctic hunting peoples, “that is usually unequivocal but sometimes ... appears mystified” (1982: 179). Such tolerance and acceptance we readily find in animistic cultures but
very much less readily in Western ones (a matter to be examined further in Chap. 5).

The reason we do find it in the former is that transformation is something animistic peoples like the San experience either directly or vicariously, rather than, as we do in the west, abstractly, via, the imagination or, allegedly, hallucination, or as dreams (which on that theme are usually nightmares), myth and folklore and fake-lore—as well as literature, specifically its sub-genre of “metamorphosis literature”. Myth and oral literature and its “executive arm”, storytelling, too, convey the themes of transformation and human-animal hybridity among the San; however, again in as much as experience—of transformation, directly or vicariously experienced—may become an aspect of that mode of transmission, less “suspension of disbelief” is required of the San story listener to such tales than of the Western story reader.

These two expressions of ontological mutability, through the actual experience of transformation and virtually via the imagination, through myths and stories widely and volubly told, render this feature of San cosmology real for the people who subscribe to it. They are powerful epistemological and phenomenological underpinnings for their tolerance for ontological ambiguity.

We now turn to the former, the experience of transformation, the most immediate and physical, psycho-somatic modality for conveying to people their cosmology’s central theme, ontological mutability.

References


Boonzaier, Emile, Penny Berens, Candy Malherbe, and Andy Smith. 1996. The Cape Herders a History of the Khoikhoi of Southern Africa. Cape Town/Athens: David Philip/Ohio University
Press.


———. 2017. “...The Eyes Are No Longer Wild, You Have Taken the Kudu into Your Mind”: The Supererogatory Aspect of San Hunting. The South African Archaeological Bulletin 72: 3–16.


Herzog, Hal. 2010. Some We Love, Some We Hate, Some We Eat: Why It’s So Hard to Think Straight about Animals. New York: Harper Perennial.


Footnotes

1 An abbreviation, perhaps, of “Mischling”, the German term for a hybrid?

2 “in doggish fashion through noble mutual sniffing” (Müller 2010: 109; see also Harel 2013).

3 While there are more than a few ways in the Western world view through which monstrosity manifests itself (Asma 2009; Weinstock 2014), the prototypical Western monster is a being who confounds ontological categories (Cohen 1996).
4 The cited passages are from /Hanǂkasso’s account of //Kkwai-hem’ visit to his daughter’s people (VII. – 22: 7812–16, 7906–56).

5 Skotnes’s point was reiterated some years later by Neil Bennum—“transformation was not the exclusive province of the trancing healer”—in a discussion of two hallmarks of /Xam symbolic culture, “a perception of the liminal nature of things and a readiness to accept the possibility of transformation” (2004: 358).


8 Direct translation: “animal killing scruple’cism”. The term was coined by the German psychoanalyst, ethologist and paleoanthropologist Rudolf Bilz. Qua psychoanalyst Bilz speculated that a man’s depression suffered over his wife’s miscarriage or his child’s serious illness may derive from primordial guilt over hunters’ killing of animals (Peters 2003: 62).

9 This technique is elaborated extensively among Siberian hunters, such as the Yukaghirs (Willerslev 2007: 100–5).

10 Albeit a guilt not generally shared by Western sport and trophy hunters, whose method of hunting—scoped rifle 300 yards distant from the quarry—obviates any sympathy encounter between hunter and prey, or up from the sky from helicopter. Killing the hunted game here is “an immediate pleasure, free of remorse or guilt ... as the human killer can no more afford to be sorry for the game than a cat can for its intended victim” (Cartmill 1993: 299; see also Foster 2016: 154–60; Carmine 2010: 242–44; Gieser 2018). The references are a small sampling drawn from an extensive literature on Western hunting, from subsistence and trophy hunting, with rifle or modern, high-power bow and arrow, to “primitive hunting” with an aura of “neo-animist mysticism” (Carmine ibid.: 243), primarily by men but also by women, even feminist ones (Merskin 2010). For an overview of hunting in Western history see Cartmill (1993); for a multi-disciplinary anthology on contemporary Western hunting see Kowalsky (2010). The German hunter-anthropologist Thorsten Gieser maintains an active and informative website on his field of research (http://hunter-anthropologist.de).
For a feminist deconstruction of “male phantasies” on the “erotics of hunting”—that is, its “complicated relationship” to the objectification and (dis)regard of women—written by a Western woman who is herself a hunter/ress see Debra Merskin’s “The New Artemis? Women Who Hunt” (2010).

See Vol. I, Chap. 5.

A publication of the full text, with annotative and exegetical commentary, is forthcoming.

An identical rationalization is used by the Siberian Yukaghirs, who, as noted by Rane Willerslev, “have not found an absolute solution to the moral dilemma posed by killing and eating prey. Rather, what makes animals edible from their viewpoint is the fact that, although they are seen to have their own minds and thoughts, just like humans, they are at the same time conceived of as ‘other’” (2007: 78). This is a variant of one of the dichotomizing “ploys” described by Descola (also in the context of Siberian hunters): “taking the line that subjectivity [of the eaten animal] is unaffected by the eating, so the integrity of the animal person survives as long as its interiority does” (2013: 286).
4. Experiencing Transformation

Mathias Guenther

(1) Department of Anthropology, Wilfrid Laurier University, Ontario, ON, Canada

My forays into the phenomenological dimension of transformation will move from the virtual to the actual. People may experience this phenomenon of ontological identity- and being-change at first via their imagination, their myths and stories and the enlivened way in which the protagonists of Myth Time enter their awareness through lively storytelling, with whom they are able to identify and whose experiences they share vicariously. This virtual and vicarious transformation, from the World of Story, some San individuals—shamans, dancers, initiands, hunters—may experience actually, either through faint stirrings on and in their body, which may be sensed psychically or bodily, through mimetic dancing or big-game hunting, attuned to an animal or in an all-absorbing bodily sense of animal metamorphosis and alterity.

... Through the Imagination

Before turning the latter, to the somatically absorbing modality of actually experiencing transformation, which is as “heimisch”—“native”—within San cosmology as it is alien and disconcerting—if not altogether monstrous—to that of Westerners, the former, transformation, as a virtual experience, mediated through the
imagination, is actually familiar and established, as a counter-current, in Western cosmology and ontology.

These are the terms with which Charles Foster tried to explain to himself his own transformative experiences, into badger, fox, otter, deer, and—the most elusive—swift:

Our anatomy and physiology impose some limits on us. ... I can’t fly. Nor is there time to learn all the words necessary to compensate poetically for my absence of wings. But our capacity for vicariousness is infinite. Empathize enough with a swift and you’ll be able to rejoice so much with the screeching race around the church tower that you won’t mind not being one yourself (Foster 2016: 216).

We will return to Foster and other Western writers, in both the humanities and the sciences, who have used the imagination—by activating variants of Foster’s “capacity for vicariousness”—in the next chapter.

I will start my exploration of how this capacity plays itself out in the imagination of San storytellers and listeners with three excerpts from their rich store of stories from the mythology of the southern /Xam and the northern !Kung.

The girl listens to the goura with her ears. The man stands. He stands because the maiden looks at him with the maiden’s eyes. The maiden looks, fastening him to the ground. And it is so. His legs are those of a man, but he is a tree. His arms are those of a man. He holds the goura with his mouth. He is a tree. He has his eyes, because he was a man. He has his head. He has his head-hair. He is a tree which is a man. He is a man. He is a tree. He has his feet. He is shod. He has his nails. He has his mouth. He has his nose. He has his ears. He is a tree. He is a man. He is a tree, and it is so that he plays the goura. He is a tree. He plays the goura, while he is a tree. He is a man. He plays the goura. It is so that he is a tree that stands playing the goura. He looks with his eyes. And it is so that he plays the goura, because she looked. //Kabbo (L.II. 2: 295–7)
... the ornaments (i.e. earrings, bracelets, leglets, anklets) of themselves came off. The kaross (skin cloak) also unloosened (itself), the kaross also sat down. The skin petticoat also unloosened (itself), the skin petticoat sat down. The shoes also unloosened (themselves). Therefore she sprang up; she in this manner trotted away. Her younger sister, shrieking, followed her. She (!kō-gnuin-tára) went; she went into the reeds. She went to sit in the reeds.

Her younger sister exclaimed: “O !kō-gnuin-tára! Wilt thou not first allow the child to suck?” And she (the elder sister) said: “Thou shalt bring it, that it may suck; I would altogether talk to thee, while my thinking-strings still stand.” Therefore, she spoke, she said to her younger sister: “Thou must be quickly bringing the child, while I am still conscious; and thou shalt bring the child tomorrow morning.”

She went to her elder sister; she walked, arriving at the reeds. She exclaimed: “O !kō-gnuin-tára! Let the child suck.” And her elder sister sprang out of the reeds; her elder sister, in this manner, came running; her elder sister caught hold of her, she turning (her body on one side) gave her elder sister the child. She said: “I am here!” And her elder sister allowed the child to suck. She said: “Thou must quickly bring the child again, while I am still conscious; for I feel as if my thinking-strings would fall down.” And her younger sister took the child upon her back, she returned home; while her elder sister went into the reeds.

And, near sunset, she went to her elder sister; while she felt that her elder sister was the one who had thus spoken to her about it; her elder sister said: “Thou must quickly bring the child, for, I feel as if I should forget you, while I feel that I do not know.” ... She [the younger sister] exclaimed: “O !kō-gnuin-tára! Let the child suck!” Her elder sister sprang out of the reeds; she ran up to her younger sister. And she caught hold of her younger sister. Her younger sister said: “I am here! I am here!” She allowed the child to suck. She said: “Thou must quickly come (again); for I feel as if I should forget you (as if ) I should not any longer think of you.” Her younger sister returned home, while she went into the reeds.
Her younger sister, on the morrow, she went to her elder sister; she walked, coming, coming, coming, coming, she stood. And she exclaimed: “O !kô-gnuin-tára! Let the child suck.” And her elder sister sprang out of the reeds, she ran up to her younger sister, she caught hold of her younger sister. Her younger sister said: “I am here!” Therefore, she (the elder sister) spoke, she said to her younger sister: “Thou must not continue to come to me; for, I do not any longer feel that I know.” And her younger sister returned home.... /Hanǂkasso (Bleek and Lloyd 1911: 87–91)

And he [the Hare] lay, and the sun rose, and /Xue came to him. And came to object and said, “Thou art the Hare, and I am /Xue; get food (grass and foliage) while lying on the ground eating, leave off lying in a hut, lie upon the mere ground. For thou art the Hare and I am /Xue, and am a Bushman and will lie in a hut; a little grass hut I will lie in; but thou art a Hare, lay thyself on the ground.”

And the Hare objected and said, “I am not a mere Hare, but am a Bushman Hare, and am /Xue; for thou alone art not /Xue, for we two are /Xue, and are Bushmen.”

The Hare spoke to /Xue; and /Xue did not talk, but was silent, and stood laughing; and listened to the Hare and laughed. And said, “Thou art a mere Hare, lie thou upon the ground to eat, do not lie in a hut while eating; for I am /Xue and am a Bushman, and sit in a hut while eating.”

And the Hare objected, “I am not a mere Hare but am /Xue, for we two are two /Xues.”

And (/Xue) spoke to the Hare and said, “Or speech (Bushman) I understand; thou art the great /Xue, speak to me, that I may hear.”

And the Hare heard, and spoke the Bushman language, and said (speaking in a little sharpish voice), “Say! What! I do speak the Bushman language.”

And /Xue made a quiver and made a bow, and threw them away [into the Bushman country]. And said, “Hi! Hi! Here is a quiver and here are arrows, shoot the Hare; for the Hare dislikes
you and says, that you smell badly. Another day, when you see
the Hare, shoot the Hare.”

And the Hare sat and listened and cried, trembled with fear
of /Xue, and cried. And /Xue stood and looked at him, and
scolded him. He (/Xue) said, “Leave off being afraid of me and
crying, be silent.”

And the Hare spoke to him and said, “Do not give the
Bushmen the bow, that they may kill me.”

And /Xue refused and said, “Thou dost dislike the Bushmen,
and I will give them the bow, to kill thee.” (Tamme, Bleek
1934/1935: 263–65)

Myths and stories of this sort, even though they convey
transformation virtually and vicariously through imagined beings
undergoing imagined transformation, are nevertheless capable of
conveying the latter experience with much psychic impact on the
storyteller and listener. For protagonists and characters of the World of
Story, among San and in the orature and literature of any other people,
experience life in much the same way as do real people, frequently
distilling its emotional side, its conundrums and contradictions, lows
and highs, moral uprightness and dastardliness. The lengthy epigraphs
are excerpts from even lengthier stories which, inter alia, deal with
transformation, the matter focused on in the excerpts. Given that
storytelling—like rock art image making—fell within the skill set of San
shamans, for whom animal transformation was something they
experienced intensively, and that hunting provided much fodder for
stories which no doubt also included a hunter’s “tappings”, and other
aspects of species-crossing sympathy moments, myths and stories
become all the more relevant to a San-situated phenomenological
exploration of transformation (and its outcome, hybrid beings, or
therianthropes).

The last, a phenomenological exploration of transformation, I see as
the implicit theme of the story about /Xue and one of his animalian
ontological aspects. This, hare’ness, the human /Xue is attempting to
eschew from his being, in the course of a protracted Streitgespräch
( verbal disputation) (Thurner 1983: 237) with his leporid alter ego,
who contests his humanoid side’s claim that the other is a “mere Hare”
and that, instead, he, too, is /Xue. Also thrown into the ontological mix are “the Bushmen”, with whom /Xue shares ontological affinities. He denies Hare’s claim to this ontological aspect, even though the latter attempts to prove this claim to his human self by speaking the Bushman language—albeit a little “sharpish”—when challenged by a taunting /Xue to attempt what he deems an impossible feat for his animalian self. Another line of attack by /Xue, in his effort to dissociate hare’ness from his being, is to alienate Hare—and his kind—from Bushman humans by both telling the latter that Hare “dislikes” humans for their malodorous smell and giving the same the weapons for hunting and killing Hare (and hares, his kind). This frightens the Hare, who cries and, after unsuccessfully beseeching /Xue not to provide bows, quivers and arrows to the Bushmen to kill him, falls silent. The disputation between the two ontological sides of /Xue thus ends on an inconclusive note and we do not know if and how the protagonist’s inner conflict and existential concern about the potential loss of his human identity or integrity is resolved and whether /Xue has been successful in jettisoning his “inner Hare”. It is unlikely that he quite did, given the extreme ontological volatility of this First Race being, who in serially chimerical fashion was seen in Chap. 3 (Vol. I) to wantonly merge being with any creature at any time and any place. However, in even this most transformation-prone a therianthropic beings of San Myth Time angst about loss of humanity can rear its head.

Such angst pervades the other two myth excerpts, about transformation, subdued and diffuse in the one case, and explicit and progressively unsettling in the other. The first features a young man playing music to himself on his bow and catching the illicit glance of a maiden who listens to his music playing in her menarcheal seclusion site. This brings about his slow but inextricable transformation into a tree. In the former—which I have described in more detail elsewhere (Guenther 2014: 195, 203, 2015: 287–88)—we see human’ness slowly but inexorably give way to tree’ness, as the young man, still playing his goura, metamorphizes into a tree, has become a tree, yet still has a man’s arms, head, hair, mouth, nose, feet, nails, still playing music. All the same, all this humanity notwithstanding, tree’ness appears to prevail; whether or not it finally does—as it did Ovid’s ill-fated geriatric
couple Philemon and Baucis—is left unclear as the story ends before
the man's transformation into the tree is completed.

The other/Xam myth is about a young mother who, poisoned by a
jealous woman yellow band member, turns into a “lynx” (caracal). The
narrative is an excerpt from the lengthy myth about the “Dawn’s [or
Day’s] – Heart” (the star Jupiter)—“which contains many minor,
and some beautiful incidents” (Bleek and Lloyd 1911: 98)—which Bleek
and Lloyd collected in three versions, masterfully told by //Kabbo and
//Hanǂkasso, each in his own narrative fashion (Hewitt 1986: 94–103),
with different emphases and “emotional cores”. In the former narrator’s
rendition the female protagonist !kõ-gnuin-tára, who is Dawn’s Heart
wife, changes into a lion, in a narrative that does not deal much with the
transformation component of the tale. This is what //Hanǂkasso’s story
embellishes, in terms of an ever-more unsettling, anxiety-inducing
process of metamorphosis of a human—a Lynx-Woman of the
ambiguously human Early Race (Schmidt 2013: 181)—into a lynx-
animal, a predator whose menace and danger becomes increasingly
evident. It does so both to herself and to her younger sister who visits
her regularly to bring to her the older sister’s child to nurse. The
younger sister becomes increasingly alarmed at her sister’s strange
behavior that starts when her clothes fall off her, item after item, and
she runs off to withdraw into the reeds to hide, displaying further
behavioral traits that are anti-social and not human. While sufficiently
uneasy to announce her arrival at her third visit to the reeds, with her
sister’s child, in a reassuring “hey-it’s-me” fashion, the younger sister
does not fully realize what is happening to her older sibling that she is
in the grips of a transformation, incrementally (as is //Kabbo’s goura
player) from lynx-human to lynx-animal (of the clawed, predatory
kind). The elder sister becomes increasingly aware of and alarmed by
what she is experiencing, as her “thinking string”—her reasoning
power—“fall down” and sentiments of human sociability and maternal
nurturance change into animal aggression. Her memory of her sister
begins to fade; however, not before she is able to admonish her to stay
away and not come back to her reed lair, aware that she is no longer
able to hold on to her humanity—“for, I do not any longer feel that I
know.” Her transformation into the lynx-animal peaks at the end of the
story, when she seizes one of the goats her husband, her younger sister
and other band members have driven to the reeds, in order to lure her, now fully predator-animal-lynx out of her hiding place, to subdue her and restore her to her previous human-lynx state and social status as mother, wife and sister.

While the human-animal identity dissolving experience is less unsettling, as argued above, to the San whose cosmology is “connective” and premised on humans and animals sharing ontological features one with the other, it is capable as well, as seen in the case of /Xue, Dawn Heart’s wife !kô-gnuín-tára, and the nameless First Race goura player, of generating its fair share of anxiety on the part of the protagonist. The reason is the inherent ambiguity of this connected cosmology, which asserts both identity and alterity for human and animal. The latter, alterity, may manifest itself as enmity, when the two kill and eat one another (in the case of predatory animals), exacerbating and sustaining human ambivalence over an unresolvable moral conundrum.

The virtual treatment of transformation and ontological hybridity, through myth and art, resonates with how people experience the same, and, by reflecting, intensifying and crystallizing these extraordinary, bewildering sensations, help people who have brushes with them—shamans, initiands, dancers, hunters—make “becoming-animal” more ordinary and understandable and thus that much less unsettling.

---

### Through the Body

When I turn into a lion, I can feel my lion hair growing and my lion-teeth forming. I’m inside that lion, no longer a person. Others to whom I appear see me just as another lion. Tshao Matze (Katz et al. 1997: 24)

The experience of transformation may actually start out as such, as something that is not out of the ordinary and all that unsettling, in its initial, incipient manifestations, in a process that, as already noted on several previous occasions in the preceding volume, lies on a spectrum. Its poles are incipient stirrings of animal-alterity, on the one end, such as faint “tappings” of a distant game animal or vague animal sensations when miming an animal, the experience reinforced by touch and smell through an animal skin that envelopes the dancer. On the other end, as in
the experience of the Ju/'hoan shaman Tshao Matze above, we find a full-fledged sense of actually being that other animal, eland or lion, or, in animistic cultures in other regions of the world, with different fauna and animal templates, jaguar or bear, deer or elk. Another way in which transformation may gradually slide from ordinary to extraordinary reality, in terms of the subject’s ontological constitution, is that miming of an animal—ritually, ludically or, in the context of the hunt, instrumentally—may change from feeling like the animal to being the same, as mimesis becomes one with metamorphosis.

The width of this experiential spectrum, from incipient to full, imagined to real, faint to acute and even painful, can be appreciated from the comments and testimonials by Ju’hoan elders and healers, to Bradford and Hillary Keeney, two ethnographers whose fields of research, psychology, specifically what they refer to as “creative therapy”, attune them “professionally” to such phenomena as altered states of consciousness (as well as, tangentially, alternate states of being) in the actions, feelings and thoughts of their San informants. All but one of the following verbatim statements by the Bradfords’ informants is on the theme of animal transformation and the tone and tenor of most of them is intensely affective.²

Their [shamans] ears change shape and they grow lion's fur. Their hands become identical to a lion’s paw and they roar mightily. (Keeney 1999:81, quoted by Lewis-Williams 2015: 126)

When I start to become a lion, I feel pain and I start to cry. I have to leave the dance and go into the bush where I make the change. The lion’s spirit changes my mind and body. Fur grows out of my skin and claws grow from my hands. This is when I am most powerful. (unidentified /Ju’hoan informant, Keeney 1999: 93)

When a healer shakes, he is going back and forth between first and second creation. When we shake very hard, it’s like slipping out of our skin, so we come something else. As all strong healers know, it’s not physically being the other animal. It’s becoming
the feeling of the other animal ... A strong healer can close his physical eyes and ears and awaken the strong feelings of the heart. This is when our second eyes and ears open, and when our senses of taste and smell become altered. (G/aq’o Kaqece, Ju/'hoan elder, Keeney and Keeney 2015: 153)

I have had to protect myself from attacks. I turned myself into something else in order to fight back. I have turned into a lion as well as other animals. I was once one of five men who drank the greenish liquid of an eland’s liver. After we drank is I became an eland. I could not sleep. I felt I was in the fire. My mother saw what was happening and told everyone in the village. ‘Do not criticize him, but go set up a fire for a dance.’ In the dance, I could turn into other animals. I would become it. It jumped and swallowed me and I turned into it. (G/aq’o Kaqece, Ju/'hoan elder, Keeney and Keeney 2015: 10–51)

While the healer won’t see himself as the animal, at the same time he won’t see himself as different from the animal. He will properly see the song that rises out of his heart and feel it in the way it is correctly associated with the animal. The most important change takes place through how feelings change, which in turn transforms how we see, hear, and smell. (unidentified Ju’hoan informant, Keeney and Keeney 2015: 95)

A spectrum of thoughts and emotions is evident in these testimonials: one informant describes his lion transformation as a real, morphological change—lion teeth, lion hair, lion paws—and lion’s “mighty roar”—along with sharpened senses, of taste, smell and hearing. To another it’s a matter not of “physically being the other animal” but of becoming “the feeling of the other animal” that starts in the heart and makes him appreciate the aesthetic and phenomenological link between the song he sings and the animal it is associated with. To a third the experience is not clear-cut, attached to it is the same ontological ambiguity that we have seen run through this book as its idée fixe: “the healer won’t see himself as the animal, at the same time he won’t see himself as different from the animal”, providing
the basis, epistemologically and phenomenologically, for measures of doubt and uncertainty.

What comments like these, from Ju/'hoan shamans, bring to mind is Richard Katz’s above-noted insight about such men’s and women’s “rich fantasy life”. Some of this may be at play here in the imagination-stimulating context of his or her mystical experience of human-animal identity wavering or merging, the experience mythically stimulated, as we will see below, by First Order characters, whom a trance dancer may encounter when “he is going back and forth between first and second creation”. Indeed, as noted before in the same place, such mythic beings may themselves appear beyond the dancing circle watching and engaging with the dancers, their “being there” sensation intensified through the absorbing impact of performative storytelling, the other salient expressive activity around the nocturnal fire (Wiessner 2014), either the preceding or following night or part of the trance dance performance itself (Guenther 2006: 248–51). So stimulated and fired up, the imagination may conjure up an experience of human-animal transformation, in the human who himself becomes a therianthropic being of sorts, one modeled on therianthropes of myth and rock art, in the context of his consciousness- and being-altering ritual performance.

Ratcheted up notch or two, especially in the context of a state of altered consciousness, active imagination may become auto-suggestion—“he will properly see the song that rises out of his heart and feel it in the way it is correctly associated with the animal”, “close his physical eyes and ears and awaken the strong feelings of the heart”—or hallucination—“I could turn into other animals. I would become it. It jumped and swallowed me and I turned into it.” The latter comment, by G/aq’o Kaqece, is part of an account of an eland transformation he (felt he) underwent, the bizarreness of his experience exacerbated perhaps from just having ingested what was likely a more or less toxic food substance—“the greenish liquid of an eland’s liver” (along the lines of Ebenezer Scrooge’s self-analysis, when encountering the First Ghost of Christmas: “an undigested bit of beef, a fragment of underdone potato”).

The suggestion that some of the transformation experiences San informants describe are such—vividly imagined, auto-suggested or hallucinated—rather than real is not only “etic”—derived from an
outsider-academic's rationalist-skeptic mindset—but also “emic”, that is, shared by some San people as well. One might speculate that G/aq’o Kaqece’s mother’s admonition to her fellow band members, when her son underwent a lion transformation, not to “criticize him”, was directed at such potential skeptics. There is certainly room for such doubting Thomases in San symbolic culture about transformation, given its wide phenomenological spectrum, from incipient and faint, to fully felt, as well as, imagined, possibly self-suggested or hallucinated by the subject and thus in need of the epistemological process of corroboration by cultural insiders.

We have now stumbled into a debate that, in anthropology, is as old as their discipline, on the actual—as opposed to virtual or vicarious, constructed or imagined—reality of this transformation, so pivotal cosmologically and phenomenologically to San people. Do they, as suggested by the cited epigraphs, deem lion or eland transformation “real” (as in “I can feel my lion hair growing and my lion-teeth forming”)? And if they do, this raises two further questions, one epistemological and the other existential: How do they square such an assertion with their “empirical” view of the world, which, as efficacious hunters and gatherers, they entertain and practice? How do they deal with what above I referred to as “schizoid” angst, over one’s basic ontological, species identity, over being evidently both same as and other than animal? The rest of this section will consider these questions, in terms not so much of the ideas of anthropologists and researchers from other branches of Western academe but in terms of San cosmology and ontology (as per this Western academic’s understanding of the same, raising yet another of the discipline’s foundational problematics, one much pondered).

As noted above, this basic epistemological question occurs not only to Western cultural outsiders most of whom would be inclined toward questioning the reality of animal transformation and hybridity, given their culture-based intellectual and epistemological bent. Among the San, too, we find people with that inclination. Their skepticism, as I observed from discussions with San informants, ranges from outright denial that such a thing is possible and if encountered something based on delusion or fraud, to qualified considerations about such a things being possible (especially among a disliked Other San groups, or non-
San group who, so go the allegations or assertions, are, or harbor, “Hyena-People” or “Predator-Animals”, as opposed to one’s own group, where such things do not and cannot occur. Yet there are also those who believe lion and animal transformation to be something both real and realistic from its beginning transformative “beatings in the flesh” (Schapera 1930: 138)—“tappings”, “Bushman letters which speak the truth”, as opposed to a dream which “speaks falsely”, as pointed out to Bleek by //Kabbo—to its consummation, in the form of an actual lion, visible, rather than invisible (or visible only to shamans) toothed, clawed, maned—a being that some Ghanzi Naro described to me as “terribly real”.

Yet, to most the matter seems less clear-cut: lion transformation is allowed as a possibility on the part of some individuals, within one’s own kin and linguistic group and social network (rather than pejoratively labeled Others in some contexts and in certain ways). Some, though not all, trance dancers, it is affirmed, may and do in fact actually become lions, partially or fully, as part of their trance ritual, as do some, though not all, ludic dancers or hunters, at certain moments in their animal pantomime or when chasing down a kudu or face-to-face with a chased, exhausted eland. Such affirmations are of real, actual transformations rather than imagined, virtual ones, the only qualification being with respect to degree, from incipient to full, transient to protracted, temporary to permanent.

These are affirmations that are based on experience, either directly, “danced out” bodily and mentally, or vicariously, as engaged watchers of dancers undergoing trancformation. Or as listeners to stories of a hunter’s transformation experience that isomorphically recapitulates the ontological inconstancy of Myth Time and its therianthropic denizens. And the reason the San—and, I would submit, other hunting people like them, with animistic cosmologies—for the most part endorse, with or without qualifications, the (f)actuality of human-animals transformation is found in how they experience the “becoming animal”—and “being animal”—process and state: in terms of ambivalence and ambiguity. Moreover, the way ontological transformation is experienced also mutes the skepticism of San Doubting //Omas around the issue of fraudulence about the “shamming
shaman” who simulates becoming or being a lion, as opposed to being such, actually and really.

The discussion of the animist’s meat eater’s angst in the previous chapter dealt with the abiding ontological ambiguity in San cosmology about the paradox around humans being both same as and other than animals (and vice versa). This is this book's leitmotif and its most recent reiteration is in the last Keeney excerpt in the Ju/'hoan shaman’s observation “while the healer won’t see himself as the animal, at the same time he won’t see himself as different from the animal.” Like therianthropes of myth, dancers or hunters who become, or have become, animals are both human and animal but also neither human nor animal, nor not-human and not-animal, (n)or both. Their entangled, mirror-in-mirror, ontological ambiguity and inconstancy is magnified through other ambiguities: lion-shamans who, reportedly (by San and anthropologists) are either real lions, or “ghost lions”, or incompletely transformed, partial lions (such as the transforming Ghanzi shaman I describe in Appendix 1 or the collapsed /Xam shaman whose neck his attendees would rub with eland fat to remove sprouting lion hair); they are visible either only to shamans or to all and sundry; fully or partially transformed, or, if invisible to non-shamans, are nevertheless also visible to the latter in another situation. This is when such a trancer-lion is encountered out in the veld, either during the day or, more commonly, at night, with the qualification, yet again, of either actually discernible through such a were-lion’s extra-luminous eyes, or virtually, in one’s dreams inside the hut (into which a man-lion—or, as seen in the Sylvain ethnographic vignette—Hyena-Man may actually enter thereby obscuring the human-animal encounter even further by conflating dream with reality).

These qualities, of fluidity, inconstancy and inconsistency, are all embellishments of one fundamental ambiguity that applies to the ontological status and identity of the human: that (s)he is a being in whom human’ness is merged with animal’ness in such a way that her or his identity is both asserted and obscured, shared and apportioned, merged and kept apart. Given such an ambiguous ontological state, humans, when they encounter animals—in a trance state, a ludic mimetic performance, a hunt, a dream a story or myth—experience both their own identity and that of the animal, whose alterity partakes
of that identity (and all this, again, vice versa). Moreover, from his theri-
transformed perspective, his human identity is also reaffirmed in
unequivocally human terms, his morphological, corporeal contours
becoming clearly defined as he, a transformed were-lion, jackal,
antelope, bird, approaches his human group and engages with its
human members, frequently in a weird and awkward—uncanny—way
as his social and communicative capabilities are impaired through his
ontologically hybrid state. As noted by Descola, “it is, in the end,
metamorphosis that testifies to the humanity of animal-persons ... since
it makes supremely manifest the separability of interiority and
physicality” (2013: 286–87).

As for existential angst around ontological identity, an “us-them”
framework is instructive for the discussion of this issue, as it was in an
earlier section, on tolerance of ontological ambiguity, specifically as
manifested in ideas of metamorphosis and ontological hybridity. The
latter, Westerners’ archetypal monster—the cursed Werewolf and his
bat counterpart, the doubly-cursed Vampire—is deeply conflicted in his
being. In Jekyll-Hyde fashion, such a being is painfully, pathetically,
indeed, in the Western view, pathologically, aware that—switching from
English to German literary tropes—“zwei Seelen wohnen, ach, in meiner
Brust” (“two souls, alas, inhabit my soul”). While in certain contexts this
realization might arise also in an animist’s breast, it would not elicit
near as much existential angst and contribute to weltschmerz, as it did
for Goethe’s Faust, over the anguish-inducing irreconcilability of the
two souls: “die eine will sich von der andern trennen” (“the one desires
to separate itself from the other”). San cosmology, mythology and
ontology recognize and accept, as part of the human condition and way
of the world, both the separateness of the human and animal souls and
their connectedness (and does the same for the other-than-human
subjects). The two souls—human and animal—are thus not
irreconcilable, as for Faust, but can be reconciled. A context for this
among San is meat eating, as seen in the discussion in the section
above.

That said, a measure of qualms, doubts and guilt remain, which are
contained, situationally, at times strategically through mental and moral
stock-taking and they are, in the final analysis, balanced and reconciled.
This balance is precarious and depends on the nature of the experience,
the temperament and mental disposition of the person doing the experiencing, the historical and acculturative context of his or her life situation. These all impact on the degree to which doubts and qualms are felt, acknowledged or admitted.

Animal transformation for the San is thus within the realm of the conceivable and the possible, existentially and epistemologically. When it is experienced by a person it does not, for all the anxiety that such moments elicit, negate her or his sense of what it is to be human, nor is it dismissed as something contrived, imagined or hallucinated. Although it could be, as in the case of trance dances contemporary Ghanzi dancers, trembling and shaking, groaning and shrieking, perform for politicians or tourists, through truncated performances held during the day which are widely seen by their San fellows as shammed (Guenther 2005). How real, how genuine transformation is to a person undergoing it or witnessing it in another person depends both on a person’s individual inclinations and receptivity to paranormal phenomena and his or her experiential frame of mind, in certain situations or moments, that may attune him or her to ontological identity or alterity. If this momentary disposition were to be one of “becoming-animal”, or being such, as in some moments in a trance dancer’s, initiand’s or hunter’s experience, this experience could for her or him be “utterly real”, “really real” or, using Mikko Ijäs, terms, in the context of a transformation experience of a San persistence hunter, “a full body experience and a terribly realistic one” (2017: 109).

Yet, to the latter Western researcher (who reportedly had such experiences himself), for all this “realism”, it is still not “really real”. Instead, it is a trance-induced “transformative hallucination” (Ijäs 2017: 13, my emphasis). Drawing on a number of neurobiological studies on persistence running (ibid: 117–31), Ijäs formulates the “main hypothesis” of his “persistence hunting hypothesis” on San (and hunter-gatherer generally, including prehistoric ones) in hallucination terms:

Our distant ancestors tracked and ran down big game. During this process they possibly became immersed in the minds of animals and experienced something that was extremely difficult to describe in words. This experience was extremely powerful
and it felt significant. These hunters could have felt that this cognitive shift, into the mind of the animal and *hallucinations* of transforming into the hunted animal, might have played a part in the hunting success. Alternatively, this experience might have also established a connection to the supernatural realms in their beliefs. The inexplicable *hallucinatory* hunting experience of transformation into an animal might have served as an origin for purposefully set up ceremonies, the kind still practiced among the hunter-gatherers of the Kalahari. (*2017*: 33–34, my emphases)

Trance-generated hallucination is the neurobiological explanation offered also by Lewis-Williams and associates (Lewis-Williams and Dowson *1989*, Lewis-Williams and Pearce *2004*: 30–47), as one of the most intense outcomes of altered states of trance. It is “characterized by full hallucinations in all the senses” and includes subjects’ reports about changing into animals, among a number of other sensory hallucinations such as attenuation of limbs, or the possession of extra limbs, including from ontologically different beings, such as a claw or a hand at the end of a lion’s tail (Kinahan *2010*:48). In that hallucinatory state “animals feature prominently” and one of the hallucinatory experiences is hearing animal voices. The animal experience peaks when, instead of saying “I am *like* a tiger!”, the subjects will say “I *am* a tiger!” (Lewis-Williams and Pearce *2004*: 33, emphasis in original), his humanness having merged with tiger’ness.⁶

What individuals experiencing such animal transformation are reportedly struck by the most is their utterly real nature. “*Being* a fox” was to one subject experiencing a drug-induced animal transformation not only as a feeling but as somatic awareness: “my long ears and bushy tail and by a sort of introversion felt that my complete anatomy was that of a fox” (Lewis-Williams and Pearce *2004*: 45). Another subject, in the same hallucinogenic state, looked into a large mirror and “a huge jaguar stared back” at him while, at the same time, “I felt the jaguar body with an intensity that I had never before felt his own human body” (Duerr *1985*: 135). Yet, once out of his hallucinating state that intense “being-jaguar” certainty of being evaporated in the light of day and return of the subjects normal reasoning faculties and what was a jaguar
then now becomes “a stupid ethnologist, his brain shooting out hallucinations, who scrabbled like an madman on the floor and uttered idiotic sounds” (ibid).

Instead of neuro-biological accounts about the brain’s capacity to deceive its owner into believing, mentally and bodily, that something that is not real seems utterly so, the San’s account, phenomenologically rather than scientifically cast, is that animal transformation is, in fact, really real because it can be, in certain situations, while in others it is indeed false or imagined, or hallucinated. The latter explanation, while given due consideration by San, does not obviate the other so that, in its light—of day and reason—the human-animal becoming and being dissolve into thin air. The San perspective allows for both an utterly real lion experience—red in tooth and claw, mane, roar and all—and for doubt or even dismissal thereof, deeming the lion transformed into something “not real”, “invisible”, “visible only to a shaman”, a “dream lion”—a figment at worst, a feeling at best. The evident polar oppositeness and irreconcilability of these two views on the matter of lion transformation notwithstanding, both are given space within San cosmology and ontology, creating both epistemological and phenomenological clarity and ambiguity, the former both underwritten and subverted by the latter.

**Mimesis and Metamorphosis**

Fraudulence and authenticity, of human-animal transformation, too, are not as clearly opposite in the San view of the matter than to Western cultural outsiders (as well as to some San individuals themselves, in an intellectual culture that, as just seen, allows for a wide range of opinions and equivocation). That is, when a shaman or ludic dancer or an animal-disguised hunter mimics a lion, gemsbok or ostrich this does not necessarily constitute fraud—“he’s just play-acting!”—but, instead, is, or may well be, transformation, in its incipient phase. Mimesis and metamorphosis are in this scheme of things not qualitatively different and negations one of the other but continuous, as the subject leaves the one ontological domain—human—for another, with one of whose animal beings he blends his own being.
In his posthumously published essay “On the Mimetic Faculty” (1991) Walter Benjamin finds nature’s propensity for mimicry—“this highest capacity for producing similarity”—to be the most developed in humans (a position on the matter of mimesis that is Aristotelian rather than Darwinian, the latter, as opposed to the former, placing “imitation within the realm of nature rather than culture” [Norris 1980: 1232–33]). Beyond being “not simple imitation but creative engagement with an object”, mimesis is to Benjamin a “powerful compulsion ... to become and behave like something else” (cited in Taussig 1993: 19, my emphasis). Benjamin sees the mimetic faculty playing a “decisive role” in human behavior generally, especially that of prehistoric and pre-industrial people. Benjamin's thinking here—“on the extensive role of mimesis in the ritual life of ancient and ‘primitive’ societies”—is very much evolutionist and Early Animist as he regards these latter societies as more “mimetically adept” than Westerners, among whom mimesis, when it plays itself out, is an instance of “the surfacing of ‘the primitive’ within modernity” (one of Benjamin’s “enduring themes”, according to Taussig [1993: 20]).

In his book Mimesis and Alterity Michael Taussig makes much the same point about this dual aspect of the mimetic faculty, whereby the person, in experiencing mimesis—“becoming like something else”—also experiences metamorphosis. Disavowing the second aspect of Benjamin’s ideas on the subject—“the equation of savagery with mimesis”, which he traces to its “foundational moment” when Charles Darwin, in 1832, mused on the beach of Tierra del Fuego, on “the wonder at the mimetic prowess of primitives” (1993: xiv)—and considering Benjamin’s “mimetic faculty” in an altogether different ethnographic and theoretical context—colonialism and constructionism and its then “suffocating hold” on anthropological theory—Taussig finds “the wonder of mimesis” to lie “in the copy drawing on the character and power of the original, to the point whereby the representation of the original may even assume that character and that power” (ibid.: xiii). It may do so viscerally and somatically, as a “fundamental move of the mimetic faculty” which, notes Taussig at a later point in his argument, “take[s] us bodily into alterity” (ibid: 40).
Benjamin’s and Taussig’s insights about the processual and constitutive connection between mimesis and metamorphosis resonate with the San experience, when dancers or hunters imitate an animal, in the context of a ritual, a dance or a hunt, and that experience of being like an animal becomes being the animal. Mimesis and its experiential progression, metamorphosis, are indeed active forces in the cosmology and ontology of this preindustrial society (while Benjamin’s explanation here, that its members, by virtue of their more “ancient and ‘primitive’” socio-cultural and mental constitution are closer to “nature’s propensity for mimicry” is as moot as it is outdated). Mimesis derives not so much from mimicry of the Other as it does from identification with the same through moments of engagement that suspend the integrity of each Other’s identity and alterity. The driving force behind mimicking an animal, acting it out through ritual or play, myth and storytelling and in some hunts which themselves contain such moments, is thus not some atavistic disposition and capacity for mimicry, which leads the animal pantomime to don an animal skin and horns, sham its steps and affect its vocalizations. This sort of mimesis is focused more on the animal as other-than-human, whose imitation, through artful verisimilitude, highlights and celebrates the animal’s otherness. Mimesis among the San—as among other such animistic people—instead is focused on the animal’s same-as-humanness, which myths and beliefs declare and experience, in ritual, dance, storytelling (or painting) and hunting underscore, to varying degrees and through various forms of “becoming- animal” and “being-animal”, ranging from eland-feeling and springbok sensation and mystical and ritual routines of hunter-prey sympathy, through bodily tappings to fully formed animal transformation. Metamorphosis is the culmination, then, of mimesis which, having been set on its way as a being-transforming process through inklings and intimations of ontological merger of human with animal, ends with an affirmation of that merger, when a shaman becomes a lion, an initiand and eland and a hunter a kudu.

Identity and Alterity
Yet, as already noted, the metamorphosis is never all consuming: even at his or her most transformed, aspects of the transformed human’s
humanness are retained, as exemplified by the hare-animal of the /Xam's Second Order, who, after his ontological transformation from First Race Hare-Man, retained a spot of human flesh in the thigh of its hind leg or the elephant and quagga whose flesh retained its Early Race human fragrance.

It is the same for an animal transforming into a human; here, too, the transformed animal-human retains a part of its own discrete being. While less explicit and less elaborated in San mythology and storytelling than its human corollary, human-to-animal transformation, it is nevertheless implicit. We see it the human-transforming lion of the /Xam First Order we met in Chap. 1 in the preceding volume, who had devised a way to hide his transformation-resistant tail and in the leopard-person that reared his head in an earlier discussion of ≠Au//ei cosmology who, for all his personhood, sees humans as meat to be eaten. As a more fundamental mytho-cosmological theme, we find /Hanǂkasso s' statement that it was springbok of the First Order of Existence who changed into people of the Early Race. The residual springbok'ness of humans of the Second Order is evident in the special sensitivity of /Xam hunters to presentiments from this antelope species, which, in manifesting itself as “springbok tappings”, attest to a measure of ontological springbok-immanence in humans, traceable to Myth Time’s springbok progenitor.

And as for hunter-prey sympathy, which mystically links the two and may even constitute for the former an incipient form of zoomorphic transformation, that process is held in check by the ontological trajectory of such a transformation. This yields for the hunter a “perspectivist” appreciation of the animal, which keeps intact the latter’s autonomy of being. Instead of appreciating their “animal neighbors” in human terms of sociality, “empathy with animals was for them not a question of focusing on an animal’s humanlike characteristics but on assuming the whole perspective of the animal,” note James Suzman with reference to the Omaheke Ju/'hoansi. “To empathize with an animal”, he continues, “you couldn’t think like a human and project your thoughts and emotions onto it; rather, you had to adopt the animal’s perspective” (2017: 165). Hunter-prey sympathy (or empathy) of such a cast curbs anthropomorphic identification of the
human with the animal, which retains its integrity and autonomy throughout the sympathy encounter.

The transformed being, then, has enough of its own, identity and being-defining ontological substance left within himself, herself or itself to retain its species-specific awareness of self and perspective on the world. And on the rare occasion that transformation is complete—rare because an experienced shaman exercises self-control not to let this happen, as do people around him who monitor his state and attend to him if it escalates too far—and the human is fully absorbed into the animal’s being this moment is usually brief and tenuous and almost never permanent (and if it threatens to be so, as in /Xue vis à vis his hare-self, it is forcefully eschewed). He/she/it returns again to his/her/it own being, which becomes all the more defined in its discreteness and autonomy for having temporarily been relinquished.

This is the point of Elias Canetti’s chapter “Presentiment and Transformation among the Bushmen” in his Crowds and Power (first published in German in 1960), which draws insightfully on the Bleek-Lloyd archive (one of the first writers to do so). Canetti describes the various ways in which presentiments manifest themselves in a /Xam person’s bodies, usually through tappings of varying degrees of intensity, linking him or her to one or another human of his ken or to an animal, one either alive, to be hunted, or dead, after the hunt. Deeming these sensations “initial stages of transformation” (ibid. 106), Canetti’s discussion turns to that phenomenon:

The body of one and the same Bushman becomes in turn the body of his father, his wife, an ostrich’s, a springbok’s. It is of immense significance that he can be them all, at different times, and then each time again be himself. The transformations, successively experienced, change in accordance with their external stimuli. They are clean (saubere) transformations: each creature, whose coming the Bushman senses, remains what it is. He keeps them apart, if he didn’t presentiments would be meaningless. The father with the wound is someone other than the woman with the thong. The ostrich is not the springbok. His own identity, which the Bushman has relinquished, remains intact in the transformation. He can be this or that; however, this
and that also remain separate, for in between transformations he will always become himself again. (2002: 107–8, my translation)

And as for the hunter-transformed-springbok, //Kabbo’s favorite game animal, specifically its head bearing the animal’s species-specific markings (“horns, combining with the black parts – the stripes down the nose and the marks in the eyes”):

it is the Bushman’s own head and yet an animal’s at the same time. The man feels the black hair on his ribs as though he were wearing the animal’s skin; but it is his own skin. (Canetti 1984: 341)

A human transformed, into an animal being, springbok or ostrich, in this—“clean” fashion, whereby neither his nor the animal’s identity are altogether absorbed and its alterity dissolved, is of the same ambiguous ontological cast as the therianthropes of myth and art. It constitutes one of a number of ways myth resonates with and intersects reality, contributing to the experience of transformation, experienced as real rather than imagined.

Mimesis, a leaven for metamorphosis and its precursor in so many instances in San myth and storytelling, ritual, and hunting, too, balances identity with alterity. This is a key point for Taussig about mimesis and the “mimetic faculty”, that “in imitating we will find distance from the imitated” (1993: xix, my emphasis). This distance is kept as mimesis progresses toward, and becomes, metamorphosis and being A merges with being B. This kept distance is one reason that identities, while merged at transformation, are never dissolved. The lion-shaman, springbok-hunter, eland-girl and, to a lesser extent, also their many and varied human-animal counterparts in myth and art, each holds on to his or her identity while partaking of that of the non-human other, generating thereby reflexivity and enhancing understanding of self and other. In Chap. 6, in the discussion of Franz Kafka’s stories about ontological hybridity and metamorphosis we will find this ambiguity-and ambivalence-laden process, of identifying with and distancing from
ontological self and other, in full swing, especially so in the story of Rotpeter (Red Peter), the human-transformed chimpanzee.

Both the identity and the alterity of the human and other-than-human gain profile, discreteness and distinctiveness in the natural environment inhabited by both beings. As hunter-gatherers the San’s being-in-the-world experience is situated and grounded in that environment and their on-the-ground interaction with animals draws them into the social networks not only of the landscape’s other humans but also its animals (Dugatkin and Hasenjager 2015). As discussed in several contexts above, interaction and interconnectedness generate and sustain a being-defining process, through such intersubjective dynamics as the hunter-prey sympathy bond or mimetic and metamorphic moments in ritual and ludic dancing and transition rites. Yet, as also discussed, the animal is also “other than”, its autonomy and discreteness underscored not only by its objectification as meat-on-hoof-resource but also by its niche—its place and space—in the natural environment. Looking at niche from an ontological-phenomenological perspective along Uexküllian lines, we find each species and individual being enclosed within a self-defining umwelt “bubble”, interspersed over the veld, each “its own species-specific way ... frolic[ing] in, above, and underneath the grass”, bounded and isolated, its “checkered engagement” with other ontological bubbled beings held in check and prevented from intersubjective self-revealing through an inherent solipsism derived from ”representation within” isolation of self and being⁹ (Winthrop-Young 2010: 214).

Either way, as non-human persons with whom humans interact reflexively or as autonomous ontological others enclosed each in its own being-in-the-world bubble, animals, as we have seen throughout this book, are immensely and unceasingly fascinating for the San and other hunter-gatherers (such as the Inuit, as we will see below). In each being-mode—same as, other than—animals’ “attention-getting” manifests itself in different ways. This nurtures people’s relational, intersubjective identification with animals, qua resourceful, mind- and wit-exchanging prey animal-persons—and qua prey animal-meat. This is appreciated throughout the hunt, through ritual observance and somatic sensations of sympathy, and underscored and driven home when the carcass is cut up in preparation for cooking and eating its
flesh and in the butchering process the animal’s anatomical otherness apparent—yet, also tinged with sameness, in terms of morphological structure, number, kind and location of organs and the like.

We turn in the next chapter to the natural environment which for the San is pervaded with another sort of ontological ambiguity that confounds and conflates not the human-animal distinction but that between human and myth- and spirit-beings. They are a component in the “doings” of the hunting ground through which ontological beings and states deriving from the “extraordinary ontology” (Costa and Fausto 2010: 96; see also Guenther 2015: 305) of the World of Myth and of spirits impinge on people’s “ordinary” being-in-the-world. Their will-o’-the wispish presence and the ontological inconstancy it emanates leaves an imprint also on the San landscape, in addition to amplifying the hunting ground’s mytho-magical doings. And whenever they incarnate themselves in an animal—as human flesh in a hare’s thigh or a she-elephant’s breasts, as Gemsbok or Wildebeest People, as Eland or Porcupine Spirit Keeper—they underscore the ontological ambiguity of that ground’s real-life animal beings (as do lion-transformed shamans and eland-transformed principals and participants at girls’ initiation rites).

References


[Crossref]


———. 2015. ‘Therefore Their Parts Resemble Humans, for They Feel That They Are People’: Ontological Flux in San Myth, Cosmology and Belief. *Hunter-Gatherer Research* 1 (3): 277–315. [Crossref]


Doctoral thesis, Aalto University: School of Arts, Design and Architecture, Department of Art.


---

**Footnotes**

1 See also Lewis-Williams (2000: 271).

2 In this respect the accounts by these Ju/'hoan informants of their transformative experiences seem more emotionally charged and more graphically and literally metamorphic than what is generally reported by other ethnographers working among San people. This may be a reflection of the research orientation of the two ethnographers, which might have influenced their informants’ accounts in subtle ways, as well as their transcription and translation by the ethnographers. As noted in Vol. I, a similar influence might have been at play—albeit in a different ideological register, moral rectitude as opposed to psychic states—when Wilhelm Bleek and Lucy Lloyd collected stories from their /Xam informants, who might have “cleaned up their act” and removed the earthy elements from the stories they told (Guenther 1996; Wittenberg 2012). What is reported so fulsomely by the Kenneys is not unique; however, as seen from ethnographic snippets and vignettes by other writers (including the author; see Appendix 1), transformation is an intense experience for those undergoing it, as well as those witnessing it.

3 See Vol. I, Chap. 5.

4 There is a vast body of literature around this foundational question in anthropology that started with the Victorians and continued on from there: the modernist English (Evans-Pritchard) and French (Lévy-Bruhl, Lévi-Strauss) “alternate styles of rationality” debate, through its mid-modernist American variant around the emic-etic distinction and ethnoscience specifically the “God’s Truth-or-Hocus-Pocus” debate among some of its practitioners (Burling 1964, with commentaries by Hymes and Frake, in same issue, pp. 116–22) and its excesses such the Castaneda-triggered debate of the 1960s and 1970s around the actuality of shamanic flight and animal transformation. On it went, from the pre-postmodernist, postcolonialist exchange
between Sahlins and Obeyesekere on “how Natives Think”, Hawaiian-style, about Captain Cook, to the postmodernist, phenomenologist and posthumanist New Animists and their ultra-relativist offshoots, with considerations of such questions as to whether trees actually think (Kohn 2013) or human centenarians grow tails as they metamorphose into animals in their dotage (Forth 2018; Lyons 2018). Much of what anthropologists have thought in these writings about “how Natives think” is relevant to my discussion of San thoughts and feelings about the experience of animal transformation and is worth a re-read. For insightful discussions of these issues especially germane to my take on them see Duerr (1985, especially pp. 126–200, 1987) and Young and Goulet (1998).

5 And in Vol. I, Chap. 5.

6 The South African film maker Craig Foster describes much the same experience, and backs it with quasi-Jungian depth-psychology, which he felt while shooting persistence hunting sequences among the !Kô for his (and his brother Damon’s) film The Great Dance (2000):

we experienced strange things – this whole identification of the hunter to the prey is something that one is never really exposed to. What we experienced and actually saw in action was a hunter leaving his body and merging with the body of the animal he was hunting for very short periods of time. I personally experienced changing into an animal in trance, both witnessing and feeling that process. This is a common thing for any human being to experience while in trance. It seems like our bond with animals is deeply rooted in our psyches and we need them just as much as we need wild open spaces. We don’t just need them because they are pleasant – we need them for our survival. (Deacon and Foster 2005: 36)

7 This evolutionist notion was recently resurrected by the Canadian cognitive neuroscientist Merlin Donald (2001: 262–69).

8 Canetti distinguishes between different forms of transformation—“partial, or pseudo”, “failed”, “faked”, “false” and “clean”. The last is additive and reversible and does not dissolve the subject’s personality and original, single identity (See Brill 2006: 17).

9 Here again, we see the complementarity of “same as” and “other than”, manifested through two opposite, natural environment-situated modes of experiencing being-human and being-animal, which Winthrop-Young, paraphrasing von Uexküll, dubs “web” and “bubble” (Winthrop-Young 2010: 214–17).
5. The Enchantment and Disenchantment of the World of the San

Mathias Guenther

(1) Department of Anthropology, Wilfrid Laurier University, Ontario, ON, Canada

Mathias Guenther

“Things which old people thus said, they taught us children about them, of the hunting-field’s doings, of the things which we should be careful about.”

Diä!kwain (V-8.: 46171)

A correction to this publication are available online at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21186-8_8

It is evident from reading the /Xam texts that the landscape inhabited by the people, the /Xam-ka!au, the “hunting-field”, was for them more than a resource base and band territory for seasonal roaming and foraging, strategically attuned to its climatic and caloric vagaries (which, in the northern Karoo are challenging and demanding of investment of time and energy). The literature on Kalahari San, cast in cultural-materialist terms (Guenther 2017: 4–6), creates the impression that such was the relationship of these San people to the land and that there was little if any of the sort of sacralization of the landscape ethnographers report about Australian Aboriginal hunter-gatherers. While no doubt equally adept living on and off their land adaptively and efficiently (Hewitt 1986: 23–38, Bennum 2004: 296–
 hunter-gatherers also saw themselves connected to the myth and spirit world through the hunting ground, indeed, they were “bridged” to those worlds, in part through features of the landscape, such as water holes, rock fissures, and ringing rocks (or rock gongs), whirlwinds and mists (Lewis-Williams and Loubser 2014: 10–15; Lewis-Williams 2015a: 89–91; Parkington et al. 2008: 103–11). This point is underscored by the South African artist Eustacia Riley and student of the Bleek and Lloyd archive, in her evocative depiction of the /Xam “hunting ground and its doings”:

[T]he hunting ground was not merely the place where the common life of the /xam – which could imply simply the pursuit of food animals and the gathering of ‘veldkos’ (plant food) – played out. Instead, it was a frontier and theatre where a constant and mythic struggle for existence was enacted by extraordinary and often supernatural characters and which the /xam narrators portrayed as a place of lamenting, creating, killing and becoming. It is easy to imagine the landscape of the hunting ground merely in terms of brush, beast and shrub, but a more fitting portrayal would be ... a place where “reality” or temporal certainty, what one would regard as “real” time and “real” interaction of nature and common life, was constantly interrupted by beings and powers from another dimension and history. The early times constantly emerged into the daily lives of the /xam and it seems that they experienced these incursions of time and space not just as hallucinations or linked with the activities of people, living or dead, such as healers or rainmakers or game sorcerers, but in the daily lives of all the people. (2007: 292)

Apart from the general overlay of magic-mythic enchantment through “incursions” of myth time into real time, some mythic events were linked in /Xam mythology, either covertly through basic cosmological tropes and themes such as transition and tiered cosmos which manifested themselves in the landscape (Lewis-Williams 2010) or overtly through specific sites or features in the landscape that are referred to, or the setting of, certain myths or legends (Deacon 1986).
An example we saw earlier (Vol. I, Chap. 4) was the story by the Naro trance dancer, artist and storyteller Coex’ae Qgam (“Dada”) whose transformation story of the Early Race woman Qauqaua (!Au!aua) and her child the storyteller linked to a specific rock art site in western Botswana, explaining one of its images—human foot prints—and topographic features—a visually striking large and shiny boulder. Another is the /Xam storyteller Diä!kwain who, in an explanatory comment he added to his story “The Young Man who was Changed into Stone by the Glance of a New Maiden” that situates this myth in the real world, as part of the features and doings of the hunting ground:

“At /kwi n//eiri (“Paard Kloof”, or “Parra Kloof”, “Vulture’s Home”) is on this side of Schietfontein, and on the other side of Amandel Boom, between two places. It is the name of the place where the stone stands, into which the young man was changed.” (/kwi n//eiri is a high mountain, where vultures, crows, sleep, which is the reason for its name.) (LV. 20. – 5583 rev., explanatory comments by Lucy Lloyd)

Place Legends and Myths

Before turning to the connection between the myth and spirit world with the real world—the hunting ground, Karoo- and Kalahari-set—that renders aspects of that world mystical by virtue of its bridging of those worlds, we need to consider other, more mundane ways in which the landscape is rendered mystical. In addition to containing features that are linked to myth or spirit beings, such as a certain waterhole in which one of Khwa’s rain creatures is believed to reside, or a certain hill which is believed in myth time to have been one of the early race, or a certain nearby rock engraving depicting footprints held to be those of one of the early race woman’s footprints, significance or portent, ranging from social-cultural to mythic-mystical, may apply to features of the landscape also through human, social associations. Remarkable, memorable events that occurred here or there in the course of people’s rangings over the land are remembered and retold. These range from graves of either known or remembered persons (Guenther 1986: 182) or of “anonymous dead” (Schmidt 2014: 135) to more ephemeral
human and other-than-human events or moments: an uncanny lion encounter, a jackal barking incessantly, a bird landing on a hunter’s head chirping, a hunter treed by a Cape buffalo, a woman bitten by a mamba, a sudden thunder storm, a sheltering tree struck by lightning as people sat under it, a grass hut blown away as people slept in it, a place where one of a small group of men out on a hunt had a sudden, explosive-embarrassing bout of diarrhea.

As Tim Ingold argues in an article on “the temporality of the landscape”, much of what renders the landscape people inhabit over the generations salient and “story-worthy” is the interrelated activities they carry out on it. These constitute a “taskscape” that forms an overlay to the landscape, the features of which are interrelated in analogous fashion (1993: 158). Through it “the landscape tells—or rather is—a story”, notes Ingold, which “enfolds the lives and times of predecessors who, over the generations, have moved around it and played their part in its formation” (ibid: 152).

The Namibian Khwe storyteller Satau’s comment related to me (on 23 March 2018) by Chris Low can be seen as a footnote to this point:

Always a hunter is a story teller. When I get home enjoying the meat, I narrate the story of what happened. So hunting is part of storytelling.

Hunts, gathering expeditions, nomadic and transhumant movement of people in tune with climatic, ecological and social schedules by people, over seasons, years, decades and lifetimes, all such tasks and meanderings by mind—and purposeful people on their landscape “seed” the same with memories—using Guy de Maupassant’s words in the context of his protagonist Jeanne’s daily and day-long starry-eyed strolls through the countryside surrounding her family estate in Normandy—whose seedlings’ “roots last throughout the sowers’ lifetime” (1883: 23–24).

Apart from hunting very much else of what transpires on the hunting and gathering ground enters San storytellers’ narrative repertoire as people, over the years and decades, roam over there and their neighbors’ band territories and engage with its beings and features through activities which, given the people’s foraging lifeways,
are tied closely to the landscape. The list here is endless and expands over the generations as people leave their social and cultural footprint on their landscape, which, through a process Svend Ouzman calls “mindscaping”—“shaping the landscape culturally” (2001: 238)—becomes mapped through these salient events that become points of reference and orientation (Guenther 2006a: 244–45, 2007: 6–7).

As everywhere in the world, especially among people with rich oral traditions, these localized spots in the landscape also become legendized and as such, “place legends”, create not only a “web of story that floats above the physical landscape” but portals for entering, physically or virtually, the realm of the extraordinary and the world beyond, of myth time and spirits. The evocative phrase is from Irish folklorist Angela Bourke’s classic essay “The Virtual Reality of Irish Fairy Legend”1 which:

... floats like a web of story above the physical landscape, pegged down at point after point, as incidents are recounted of a piper lured into a cave here; a young girl found wandering mute on a hillside there; a lake where a cow emerged to give miraculous quantities of milk, and disappeared again with all her progeny when ill-treated; a hill where mysterious music could be heard after dark. (Bourke 1996: 7)

Bourke’s notion, of stories “floating” above the landscape resonates with //Kabbo’s oft-cited passage, about a story being “like the wind; it comes from far-off quarters and we feel it”. He added this wistful comment as an explanatory note to his nostalgic musings, to Wilhelm Bleek, about returning home:

Thou knowest that I sit waiting for the moon to turn back for me, that I may return to my place. That I may listen to all the people’s stories, when I visit them; that I may listen to their stories, that which they tell; they listen to the Flat Bushmen’s stories from the other side of the place. They are those which they thus tell (with the stories of their own part of the country too), they are listening to them; while ... the sun becomes a little warm, that I may sit in the sun; that I may, sitting, listen to the
stories which yonder come, which are stories from the distance. Then I shall get hold of a story from them, because they (the stories) float out from the distance. (Bleek and Lloyd 1911: 299–301)

//Kabbo’s explanatory interjection—“a story is like the wind”—appears at this point in the narrative, underscoring the integrative, intra- and inter-band effect of stories in the lives of the people and giving to stories an evanescent, mystical-meteorological physicality. Like the wind, which, in the Kalahari and Karoo, could be a manifestation also of the trickster or !Khwa, stories were in the /Xam-ka !au’s air, as part of the climate and atmosphere that pervaded the vanquished hunting ground.

Its climate contained another, more elemental feature which is a natural component also of stories: sounds and vibrations. These two acoustic underpinnings of stories were, as recently argued by Neil Rusch (2016), both significant components of the /Xam sensorium and of their expressive and symbolic culture, which Rusch finds to be rich in “sound analogies”. They are manifested mystically and materially, in the /Xam notion of “thinking strings”, a notion linked also to altered states and healing potency and their enactment through trance dancing, singing and shaking (Ouzman 2001: 243–44). An aural aspect attaches to presentiments, when these manifest themselves as “tappings”, or bodily vibrations (see also Parkington and Paterson 2017: 138).

Material sound manifestations, by means of “sound artefacts” (Rusch 2017), were, on the one hand, rock engravings some of which, as shown by Ouzman, were “hammered, rubbed, cut and flaked in order to produce sound” (Ouzman 2001: 237; see also 238–40, 44–48) and rock gongs that were sounded by people (Parkington et al. 2008: 103–112; Ouzman 2001: 240–42) and, on the other, the above-mentioned, mytho-magically charged musical bow, bullroarers and thumb pianos, along with the rest of San musical instrument, used in secular contexts (Passarge 1907: 97–8; Schapera 1930: 206–7; Olivier 2003; Vogels and Lenssen-Erz 2017). Rusch contends that this cultural, physical and somatic preoccupation with sound and vibration translates into an “acute interest and sensitivity to sound” (ibid: 12). It creates for the /Xam a soundscape, and auditory counterpart to the landscape, that
animates the latter acoustically, with sounds both heard and unheard—“acoustic potential provided by topography” which, as “unseen vibrations pass through time and space” (ibid: 2). All this honed the /Xam’s “musical intelligence” with respect to certain rock art sites, as experienced by Mary Lange, a South African visual anthropologist, communication studies and oral narrative and theater performance researcher when she visited, along with two fellow researchers and other project participants, Biesje Poort rock engraving sites in the Northern Cape (north-east of /Xam -ka lau). Applying a “multiple intelligence approach” with which she aspired “to read with the body and all the senses, to experience the physical space and genius loci of the place”, Lange and her coworkers found the rocks strewn over the site to be prone to producing a “hollow sound” when you jumped from one to another, a “sound that reverberated, clearly ringing out over the surrounding landscape”, at different frequencies, fuelling the researcher’s “active imagination of the place and possible human interaction with it” (Lange et al. 2014: 375).

In their study of the rock art of the northern Karoo—the landscape and hunting ground of the /Xam—and the people’s cultural place and space in that forbidding umwelt, John Parkington, David Morris and Neil Rusch, researchers who have spent months and years working on its archaeological and rock art sites and have developed a special attunement to the landscape, comment on how pervasively the landscape was animated for its /Xam inhabitants:

[The] animation of non-humans is extended to some of the other inanimate but significant elements of the landscape of /Xam-ka lau. Anyone who has spent time in the karoo will immediately think of the winds, the rain in its various forms, the rain-bearing clouds ... and the constellations that dominate the changing night sky. These were personified in order for the /Xam to begin a dialogue with them. (Parkington et al. 2008: 66)
Intersection of the World of Myth and Spirits with the Lived-in World

Animating the land- and taskscape in such ways, through its own natural features, can be seen as a “bottom-up” process of reality-myth intersection. Events from the ordinary world and real life percolate, through stories, memorates, legends and myths, into the extraordinary world of the First Order and the preternatural domain of spirits (while also filling the atmosphere, floating in the air or carried by the wind, from band to band). The process happens also in reverse, on a top-down trajectory, of myth and spirit beings entering the natural world. Its source being an imagined nether-realms, this trajectory of myth-world intersection is less concrete than its reverse, bottom-up process, which is more real, as the source of the mystical-mythical extraordinariness of a feature of the landscape is that actual landscape and its inherent wondrous “spell of the sensuous” (Abram 1997). By legendizing discrete features of the actual world—hills, waterholes, trees—another layer of and incorporating these, through stories, within the World of Myth, that world becomes that much more familiar—all the more so as the vector and voice of the stories are the wind, air and sounds of the hunting ground.

We saw the top-down process in action a few times in previous chapters (of Vol. 1)—therianthropic wildebeest people living in remote regions of Ju/'hoan Kalahari land, the trickster divinity roaming the veld and deceiving hunters and getting them off track in their eland or hartebeest hunt, the trickster deity appearing—and “bull-roaring”—in the nocturnal veld near the young Ju’hoan hunters’ initiation camp or lurking around the Naro girl’s menarcheal hut, !Khwa, as water-bull or eland appearing at her /Xam counterpart’s seclusion site. Other ways are through dreams or through vivacious embodied storytelling or, more directly and “really”, through concrete, physical means for mythic and spirit beings to make their entry into the natural world. One of them is through sounding rocks, especially so if their location is near rock art sites. Another “bridging” feature in the landscape is cracks and fissures on rock surfaces (especially if these, once again, are surrounded by and incorporated into rock art images). Through
physical landscape features of this sort “the spiritual realm intermingled with ordinary life”, note Lewis-Williams and Loubser (2014: 117), “and the two realms were bridged” (a “bridging of realms”, they point out that, “was a common, unavoidable part of San life, not a rare, esoteric phenomenon”).

The most important and portentous site in the lived-in world—one not from the natural but the social domain—for such brushes of that world with its mythic and spirit counterparts we saw to be the trance dance. During its hours- or night-long unfolding, in which trance alters the dancing shaman’s state of consciousness and transformation his state of being and during which ritual liminality fills the space and air and intensifies the extraordinariness of what dancers, singers and spectators experience, the trickster deity and/or spirits of the dead may make their appearance. They bring to the scene a further dimension of the extraordinary, myths’ First Order and the spirits’ preternatural realm, moving the beings from these respective worlds from imagination to reality, experientially intensified through liminality of space, transcendence of consciousness and transformation of being. If the trickster fails to make an appearance (which happens as often as not), he is nevertheless still a presence as the trance dancer may seek him out, through a “spirit journey”, sometimes by flight, into the preternatural world of spirits, beyond the dance fire in the darkness of the veld. When the dancer returns he may recount his experience, through narratives that may be (melod)ramatic, dwelling on his travels and travails while out in his spirit quest into the spirit world (Guenther 1999: 186, 2005: 214–16). Not only is this another source of stories to add to an already abundantly rich repertoire, but in featuring the shuttling shaman and trickster, figures who are seen to move between their respective worlds and realities, they are stories that intrinsically link the world beyond with the here-and-now. Such occurrences confound the difference between “people or spirits”, especially if the former—shamans—enter the world of the latter, and returning from that “other realm of existence … speak to the people about their mytho-magical exploits and experiences in that realm, such as catching the “water-bull” (Lewis-Williams 2015b: 59–60).

This convergence of altered states of consciousness and alternate states of being with beings from the spirit world and from myth time,
who interact with humans in the context of liminality, produced through a night-long, synergetic ritual, to chanted song and clapped rhythm, produces an instance *par excellence* of religion “danced out” and its incumbent “WOW”-effect, as per Birgit Meyer (see Chap. 2). This effect, intensified and altered through trance, transformation and the intersection of myth/spirit and reality, can bring that reality both to new experiential heights and to a different phenomenological dimension, beyond everyday, common-sense “ordinary reality”. This is the transcendent “really real” of Geertz’s “religious perspective” whose “aura of utter actuality” (1972: 112), now immanent, hovers over the dancers and attendants (as it does, with less intensity, over initiands and dancers at the girl’s and young hunter’s rites of passage and perhaps at certain ludic dances). It gives “existential immediacy” to mythic and spirit beings, that is derived both from the transcendental reality of the myth and spirit world itself and from the actual world of the dancers, initiands and hunters, within which these mythic and preternatural beings have become momentary presences and into whose awareness they have entered with drama and flair.

There is another way in which for San myth and reality are linked: through history. San myth and lore draws no clear distinction, in its *kukummi, n²oahnsi* or *hua*, between fact and fiction, that is, between stories about the First Race of Myth Time and real people (and animals) of the Second Order of Existence. “/Xam *kukummi* about the time when animals and stars were people, exist side by side with similar stories of contemporary San, appearing to be no more or less true”, notes Pippa Skotnes, adding that “other stories with strong suggestions of the supernatural are given the same emphasis as hunting tales, creation myths or personal histories. Indeed, these are often interwoven” (1990: 17; see also Guenther 1989: 36–37, 160) and (Wessels 2013).

The reason is, as noted in Chap. 2 of the previous volume, that these two worlds are not clearly separated, as beings from the one appear also in the other, such as sheep and dogs—one of which a man of the Early Race mistakes for a young lion (Wessels ibid)—in the First Order, and in the Second Order, Gemsbok People and their ilk, tricksters, spirits of the dead, on either the hunting ground or the ritual spaces of trance dancers and initiands. Likewise, rock art may comingle myth time with historical time, for example, through depictions of such
therianthropic domesticates as a cow (Guenther 2017: 7, 9) or a horse (Skinner 2017: 136)—and one chicken. The last, intended perhaps as a caricature in the spirit of a satirical “political cartoon”, is seen wielding a firearm and seemingly chasing a rifle-toting, pipe-smoking, hat-wearing Boer, whose running motion and stance Chickenhead seems to be mimicking (ibid: 131, Fig. 5.1). Figure 5.2 depicts another unusual domesticate-wild—“struthio-equine”—conflation, on one of the dolomite boulders in the Northern Cape, on a hill on today’s Arbeidsvreud farm (which, a century-an-a-half before, was /Xam-ka !au’s Bitterpits, //Kabbo’s and /Hanǂkasso’s home territory [Parkington et al. 2008: 58]).

Fig. 5.1 Chicken-therianthrope, Strandberg, Northern Cape. (Drawn from a photo by E. Wettengel in Skinner 2017: 131)
The immanence of myth and spirit beings in the landscape, most particularly on the hunting ground, can thus be sensed also in real time, through history, both remote and recent, colonial history, which, for the /Xam and other San groups, as seen in the next section, were troubled times. Irascible lions from the First Order threatening its Early Race denizens were conflated with the colonial trekboer baas vis à vis his Bushman laborers and Black or Oorlam herder-raiders were conflated with ticks living in sheep’s fleeces from which they attacked unwary First Race folk. Commenting on one of /Hanǂkass̩o’s myth-legends about The Early Race’s encounters with the Koranna (or !Ora), Nigel Bennum notes that

/Hanǂkass̩o ’s story was set simultaneously in the time of the First at Sitting People [the Early Race], when it was possible to disguise yourself by altering your shape at will, and the world brought about by the arrival of farmers of European descent. ... Koranna “war parties” ... had been visiting themselves on the
/Xam-ka !ei for more than a generation but in the oral tradition of the /Xam-ka !ei their violence was already located in the mythic past. This mythic past was not necessarily an ancient past .... The /Xam people conflated time and place, and landscape defined their culture; genocide and dispossession were leaking into myth because they were killing the past. (2004: 304, emphasis in original)

Bennum suggests a link between colonial history and the landscape with myth, rendering the latter more real for /Xam through this connection with actual time and space. Given that “the landscape dictated the culture that it supported” (ibid), the loss of the former to aggressive sheep farmers throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was, Bennum suggests, a “spiritual catastrophe" for several generations of autochthonous /Xam, which absorbed much of the people’s actions and thoughts, especially of their shamans, artists and storytellers, who drew in—and on—myths to make sense of the turbulence into which history was drawing them.

The Impact of the World of Myth on the Real World (and on Being-in-the-World)

The key question all this raises in the context of this chapter’s focus on experience is if myth and spirit beings from alternate worlds do actually impinge on people’s lived lives and being-in-the-world, lived from day to day, socially and practically (or vicariously, living and being recalled from history, through family lore and memorates, legends and myths). My answer is that the lived lives and being-in-the-world experiences of San people are, indeed, affected by such myth and spirits beings, but they are so to different degrees and in different ways, among different San groups (and individuals) in different historical situations (all caveats to be expanded on below).

Depending on the qualification to this question, we can assume varying degrees of awareness on the part of San men and women, when they hunt or gather in the veld, of its mythical and spiritual “doings” and the degree to which the myth and spirit beings are a presence for people in the natural world they inhabit. Varied as well would be the
degree to which, and the manner whereby, the perceived veld’s animals’—and other-than-human-beings’—identities, abilities and affordances are affected by the immanence in the natural environment of myth and spirit beings. Regarding the connections between a trance or ludic dancer and the giraffe or gemsbok he “feels” or mimes, or a hunter’s and his quarry through the sympathy bond, the intrinsic extraordinariness of this experience, as a mystical identity-altering cross-species encounter with an other-than-human being from the natural world would no doubt be enhanced were it to be referenced in different ways to spirits or to myth, specifically its therianthropic beings whose hybrid state of being is now also experienced, in a fashion, by the animal-transforming dancer and hunter. A few more basic questions, answerable with the same caveats, are: Given such instances of myth and spirit world intersecting, to what extent is this intersection actually experienced—as opposed to imagined through myth and belief and their enactment through ritual—by people living in that world, as they roam across their Karoo and Kalahari landscapes and live off its resources? Are the hunting ground’s doings mythic or real? Fiction or fact? Do “the things which we should be careful about”, as per Diàlkwain’s grandparents’ admonitions to “us children”, refer not just to real lions but also transformed ones?

In actual fact, it is not possible to answer such phenomenological questions as the people whom to pose them to and discuss them with are gone, with only their stories left. Reading these, combined with my discussion with Kalahari San a century later and living, as seen in the next section, in a less enchanted world, my sense is that the components of the /Xam’s dwelled-in world that are derived from the myth- and spirit-worlds and that are described above do have an impact on that world and people’s being-in the same. There is a reality to the beings and doings of those nether-worlds that takes them beyond myth and imagination. They can and have been seen by people, they may even be material and concrete, such as a hill, rock or tree that was once a First Order being, or a piece of First Order human flesh in the thigh of a Second Order hare. Tricksters and spirits may appear at trance dances or be heard in the distance by initiands, or they may be encountered in the veld, bodily in the form of an eland or a whirlwind. Among the Damara of western Namibia, who live beside the rock-art
covered Brandberg, the trickster Heiseb is believed to have left his imprint on the landscape, permanently and visibly, in the form of footprints that run along a flat rock expanse on the ground and the mysterious circles in the grass plain are held to be associated with spirits (a Namibian version of Celtic “fairy circles”\(^3\)). The rain divinity !Khwa, too, could be so encountered, by /Xam maidens during their menarcheal rite, to be appeased with buchu or by hunters, as and eland, to be killed and butchered, and dissolve into water and vapor in the process. Spirits, among Namibian Damara, as seen in an earlier chapter, are presences in people’s lives. Ju/'hoan hunters have come across—or are said to have done so—Gemsbok People in a remote stretch of veld hinterland. And so on.

This and previous chapters have noted more than a few of such discrete points and moments of intersection of myth and reality, two ontological realms—the “ordinary ontology” of everyday, practical, active life and the “extraordinary ontology” of myth, spirits and ritual (Guenther 2015: 305; see also Hultkrantz 1982: 179–80)—the San both recognize as distinct but also as overlapping and permeably bordered, the same way stories about the other world and this world are cut of the same narrative and imaginative cloth. The permeability of the boundary between the world of myth and spirits and the real world, the equivalence, in terms of narrative factuality, of myths about the former world and stories about the here-and-now world, the visibility and concreteness of some of its beings, to some people at certain moments, the nearness of the beyond-worlds through embodied storytelling and image making, on rocks that contain entrance points to those worlds all bring myth and spirit beings into experience, and they all undergird imagination and belief with fact.

Again, we need to qualify, with the same caveat that was applied to people’s belief about the reality of animal transformation—a qualified yes and no.\(^4\) The determining factors are much the same as for both of these phenomena: a person’s temperament and weltanschauung, his or her religious “musicality”, the “capacity for vicariousness” combined with the vividness of his or her imagination (especially in settings of ritual or storytelling performances), the drama of the ritual performance, the intensity of the myth being- and spirit-generating
experiences of tranceformation at a healing ritual or transformation as initiand, ludic dancer or hunter.

And these various individual temperaments regarding the extent to which a person will allow the world of myth and spirits to access her or his real world and life are held by individuals who think, feel and act within a cosmology of ontological ambiguity, in which humans and animals can both be and not be human and animal. As noted in a previous discussion of this point, this cosmological postulate allows for a wide spectrum of views on the question of the reality of the world beyond. Myths, stories and storytelling exploit this multiplicity and continuum of beliefs; as noted by Angela Bourke writing about Irish folk tales, “the essence of fairy-belief legend is ambivalence: a play between belief and disbelief”. She illustrates her point with the answer an Irish woman gave to the anthropologist who interviewed her about her “fairy faith”. Asked whether she really believed in fairies, the Irish woman is said to have answered: “I do not, Sir, but they’re there!” (1996: 12). This sort of “play between belief and disbelief” allows for “willing suspension of disbelief”, the mindset so essential for the World of Story, without which it cannot be entered and the Märchen —news or tidings—about it will not and cannot be believed. We find it at play very much also in the case at hand, San myth and lore, wherein it is given free rein, all within an encompassing epistemological and cosmological context of—and tolerance for—ontological ambiguity.

I observed the spectrum of views on the reality and significance of myth and spirit beings and the mystical process of transformation here reported among mid- to late-twentieth-century San, who had experienced, for three to four generations, pervasive social and cultural change. This was especially intense and focused at my field work site, a small village of San farm workers attached to a mission farm and church operated by a Gereformeerde, Dutch Reformed Church congregation in neighboring Namibia, the ministrations of which, among San village residents, left its mark specifically on people’s religious beliefs and practices (Guenther 1997b, 1999: 199–225). Comparing the northern Naro I worked amongs-, along with what is reported in the ethnographic literature about other Kalahari San groups during this time, with the southern /Xam, I have the impression that these San differ from the /Xam with regard to the extent to which
mytho-magical phenomena are acknowledged to affect their lives. Their allegedly “prosaic” mindset, in evidence especially in their adaptive, especially foraging practices, has, as noted in the last chapter of Vol. I, received repeated commentary in the Kalahari San ethnographic literature. A much-cited article on Ju/'hoansi “ethno-ecological” knowledge of animal behavior by two evolutionary biological anthropologists underscore this adaptive and pragmatic, inductive and strategizing mindset, along with, note the authors, “an advanced ability to observe and assemble facts about [animal] behavior and discriminate facts from hearsay and interpretation.” The last they underscore by noting, almost, it would seem approvingly, the virtual lack of “nonrational beliefs about animals”, which, the authors suggest, “seem to play only a small role in day-to-day life and in their interactions with animals” (Blurton-Jones and Konner 1976: 344).

This sort of mindset is quite different from what Bleek and Lloyd report about the /Xam, whose interactions with the animals of their landscape—a hunting ground aquiver with “doings” from not only animal non-human others, but also mythic and preternatural ones. We might wonder why the landscape the Karoo /Xam of the nineteenth century contained all this enchantment, as opposed to that of the Kalahari Ju/'hoansi’s terrain, of “brush, beast and shrub”, reportedly devoid of any such mytho-magical doings. I have dealt with this question elsewhere (2017: 12–13) and will in the section below elaborate on my discussion.

The Disenchanted—and Re-enchanting—Present

[T]hough our collection of Bushman folklore is far more extensive than our most sanguine expectations at the beginning might have led us to hope for, yet, from their own internal evidence and from glimpses which they allow us to get from myths and legends still untold, we had already become convinced that we have to look upon them as containing, as yet, only a very small portion of the wealth of native traditionary literature actually existing among the Bushmen. (W. Bleek (in Orpen 1874: 11))
Qing is a young man, and the stories seem in part imperfect, perhaps owing to him not having learnt them well. (Orpen 1874: 2)

Fifty years ago, every adult Bushman knew all his people’s lore. A tale begun by a person from one place could be finished by someone from another place at a later date. In 1910 I visited the northern part of the Cape Colony and found the children, nephews and nieces of some of the former informants still living there. Not one of them knew a single story. On my reading some of the old texts a couple of the old men recognized a few customs and said, ‘I once heard my people tell that’. But the folklore was dead, killed by a life of service among strangers and the breaking up of families. (Bleek (1929: 311–12))

The young folk hardly know any [stories] and even the old folk did not remember all the stories. The Naron tell a story so badly, that I had to keep asking which person the “he” refers to. (Bleek (1928: 44))

Unlike other more northern Bushmen the !Ko are not great story tellers … Mythology, which in other Bushman societies plays such a prominent significance is of very minor significance. (Heunemann and Heinz (1975a: 37))

As the story unfolded, De Prada-Samper had the impression that Magdalena [a South African story teller] was recounting a tall tale in the “shaggy dog” tradition. But as the narrative progressed, it became clear that this was no shaggy tale at all, but a folktale of which, until that very moment, only four variants were known: those told in the nineteenth century to Wilhelm Bleek and Lucy Lloyd by several of their /xam teachers. De Prada-Samper had serendipitously stumbled onto something extraordinary—living proof that Dorothea Bleek’s tidings of the demise of the /xam storytelling tradition were quite premature, as, of course, were the tidings of the demise of the /xam themselves. (S. Hall and J. M. de Prada-Samper (2016: 22))
As seen from the third and fourth epigraphs, the decline of stories and storytelling—enchantment’s font and mill—was reported not only among recent and contemporary Kalahari San such as the Naro and !Ko but also the /Xam of the northern Karoo, as reported by Dorothea Bleek when she visited the region in the first decade of the twentieth century, deeming the /Xam a doomed people, their folklore if not altogether “forgotten” (Bank 2006: 82), atrophied to “very few tales”, their quality, Bleek notes, “very poor, nothing to match the varied and fanciful stories of our men” (1923: viii). The latter refers to //Kabbo, /Han≠kasso, Diä!kwain and the other /Xam narrators at her father’s and aunt’s household whose labors on /Xam “traditionary literature”, Wilhelm Bleek felt, had only scratched the surface. And Orpen considered his key Maluti /Xam informant’s cultural competence on his people’s myth and lore to be “imperfect”, due to lack of enculturation to this aspect of Maluti expressive culture.

At that time other aspects of /Xam expressive culture had evidently declined as well, such as trance dancing and engraving, the art form practiced by the /Xam in the northern Karoo, onto dolomite boulders that are strewn across the landscape (Parkington et al. 2008, Deacon 2014, Skinner 2017; see Figs. 5.2 and 5.3). The former manifestation of disenchantment Lewis-Williams attributes to population decline during the colonial period, which, through effects such as genocide, expropriation, game decimation, disease and pauperization, reduced the size of /Xam social groupings, below the “critical mass” required for effective dancing and trancing (2015a: 61; see also Guenther 1999: 25, 196–7). The latter is attributed by Janette Deacon to a general decline, during these troubled times, of the /Xam traditional life style and beliefs, “in the face of a losing battle against colonial expansion” (2014: 213).
Its disintegrative effects on the southern San has been amply documented by generations of South African historians, from nineteenth-century George McCall Theal, who declared the Bushmen “fated to perish” (Penn 1996: 82), to twenty-first-century Mohamed Adhikari (2010), who attributed that fate to settler-perpetrated genocide. Here Nigel Penn’s study (2005) of events in the Cape’s northern “forgotten frontier” is especially relevant to the experience of the /Xam. This, as noted above, was for them a “spiritual catastrophe” that “leaked” both into their myths and into their art imagery, bringing to them elements of dread—black ticks, Koranna raiders, new monsters, the Boer baas—some of it conveyed through new, “eschatonic”, “apocalyptic” rock art imagery. Just as people’s lives became progressively unlivable throughout the ensuing generations of contact, so was their World of Story rendered bleak and its vitality and
creativity undermined—so much so that when Dorothea Bleek visited the region in the early years of the twentieth century she reported that “folklore was dead”.

The second-century Greek traveler Pausanias wrote this about another region and era of the world, the classical Graeco-Roman world:

The wide-grown wickedness of the world had brought it to pass that times were no longer as of old when Lykaon was turned into a wolf, and Niobe into a stone, when men still sat as guests at tables with the gods. (cited in Tylor 1920: 276)

This ancient’s observation about changing times of his world and the dislocations and disruptions deriving therefrom resonates with and underscores Bleek’s and the South African historians’ bleak reports about the lives and lore of nineteenth-century /Xam, and universalizes that bleakness—one of disenchantment of the magico-mythical imagination of a people, resulting from the world’s “wide-grown wickedness”. Pausanias is an example of what the German romantic poet Friedrich Schiller referred to “die Entgötterung der Natur”, a term and concept the American historian of ideas Morris Berman translates awkwardly as “the ‘disgodding’ of nature” (1981: 69), which a century later was borrowed, revised and generalized beyond its classicist context by the German sociologist Max Weber, as “die Entzauberung der Welt” (Weber 1922: 536, 554); (see also Gerth and Mills 1948: 51). My application of the latter term—“disenchantment of the world”—to the San context has Weberian echoes.

Nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Kalahari San went through much the same colonial contact experience as did the /Xam, albeit one reduced in scale and intensity (Gordon 1992, 2009; Guenther 1996, 1997a). As among the /Xam, political oppression, cultural suppression and demographic decimation and dispersal left its disintegrating effects on the symbolic and expressive culture also of some Kalahari Bushmen and D. Bleek’s and Heinz’s comments on the impoverished state of Naro and !Ko myth and lore may thus be partially attributable to these historical upheavals. Their disruptive effects affected people’s lives and minds, which during these trying times came to be concerned first and foremost with sheer, naked survival. There was likely little appetite in
people to engage in the spirited, light-hearted, fun-filled ludic dancing and playfulness that we saw in Chap. 5 (Vol.I). And in the process, as I have recently shown in the early colonial context of the Ghanzi and Omaheke regions of the western Kalahari (Guenther 2014a, b), sharing, egalitarianism and peaceableness yielded to competition, hierarchy and militarization, all of them “Spartan” social and existential conditions not conducive to the free-flow of the mythic, expressive and ludic imagination, nor to an earlier time when humans hosted, or were hosted by gods at table. Disenchantment can be expected to arise in such bleak times and lives, during which myths and stories, the depositories of enchantment, are edged out and displaced, along with values and beliefs, while, alongside these cultural erosions, people experience the loss of their land and its natural and mystical resources.

Also lost evidently were people’s stories, two or three generations after the deaths of these two narrators, as per Dorothea Bleek’s report. Indeed, even in their lifetime, the kukummi that //Kabbo, Diâ!kwain, /Hanǂkasso and the rest of the /Xam storytellers regaled Bleek and Lloyd with were, for all their richness, probably already on the wane, after several generations of acculturation, as well as adoption, by many farm-laboring /Xam, of Cape Dutch names and Cape Dutch language, snippets of which appear in the Bleek/Lloyd archive (Wessels 2013: 10–13). It became their lingua franca and was used by their descendants in the early decades of the twentieth century when telling stories to European interlocutors such as Gideon von Wielligh and Eugène Marais (van Vuuren 2016). In the course of this intercultural exchange some European stories or plot elements—such as /A!kunta’s tale about a Bushman woman who transformed herself into a lion (BI. I – 161–67)—also found their way into the /Xam folktale repertoire, via missionized Khoe Khoe as well as frontier Boers (Bleek 1864; Wittenberg 2014).

Because of this cultural continuity, between the /Xam and their Afrikaans-speaking /Xam descendants, the stories of old, Dorothea Bleek’s lamentations notwithstanding, have not vanished altogether. Some of them still “float in the wind”, to be told by the latter people living in its currents and activating their imagination and adding to the soundscape of the northern Karoo. Recent research by folklorists in the
northern Karoo, such as Ansie Hoff (1997, 1998, 2011a, b) and José Manuel de Prada-Samper (2016), among Afrikaans-speaking Khoisan descendants of the /Xam has revealed a rich and vibrant tradition—a “living heritage” (Hall and De Prada-Samper 2016: 24)—of stories and storytelling. Much the same is found among Khoisan peoples of Namibia, among whom Sigrid Schmidt has spent a lifetime collecting a seemingly inexhaustible store of stories. Few of these stories and story motifs overlap with those collected by Bleek and Lloyd a century-and-a-half earlier; for instance, Hoff’s informants remembered very little about /Kaggen. Nevertheless, Chris Low, in an article that seeks to locate /Xam beliefs and practices among contemporary Khoesan (Low 2014b), is struck, when reading the /Xam stories, by “how familiar the material seems – not only in the actual stories and themes, but in the way they are related, the thinking that seems to underpin them and even the language used in translation” (p. 350). The recent study of carefully traced linkages between /Xam orature and that of contemporary Namibian Khoisan by Sigrid Schmidt (2013), confirms Low’s impressions. And while the soundscape has changed in the Karoo—initiated by colonial contact through such “sounds of first contact” (Rusch 2017: 14) as horses, cattle and bells, along with rifles, revolvers and cannon, and, somewhat later, windmills, tractors, diesel pumps and trucks—rock gongs, called Boesman klaviere by local Afrikaner and Khoisan people, can still be found—and sounded (Fig. 5.3)—on the plains and hills, recalling and sustaining one of /Xam-ka !au’s more mythical and mystical sounds.

Turning from the Karoo to the Kalahari and their reportedly disenchanted mindset and landscape, here, too, there is more enchantment than meets the eye. As I have suggested elsewhere (Guenther 2015: 293–95, 2017: 3–4, 12–13), the portrayal of Kalahari San as prosaic, by writers such as Lee, Tanaka and Heinz, and their landscape as inhabited by exploitable non-human animal resources rather than relatable other-than-human persons, may be reflection of overly “materialist”—as opposed to “mentalist”—a theoretical framework. This placed the supererogatory and mytho-mystical aspects of hunting and the landscape in the analysts’ blind spot, as well as missed the multiple linkages between myth and reality, that is, trance (and recreational) dancing and rites of passage and, especially so,
hunting. While due to historical factors all of these elements are decidedly more subdued among the northern Kalahari San of today than of their southern Karoo and Drakensberg counterparts in the past they are not absent. Keyan Tomaselli, a member of Mary Lange’s above-mentioned Biesje Poort project in the southern Kalahari region of the Northern Cape, found strong intimations of what Lange and Dyll-Myklebust refer to as “spirituality” in the people-land connection (2015: 2), when he visited the area and talked to the Khoe-descendent “Kalahari People”:

The enduring blind spots in Western science are of cosmology, the spiritual and religious world, and of the ancestral realm. For our hosts, those whom we employed to participate as co-interpreters of our joint research survey/journey, this lack is puzzling. To dismiss this scared dimension where causation is attributed to other realms invisible to Western science is to dismiss their ontology, their ways of being, thinking and doing. (2013: xii–xiii, quoted in Lange and Dyll-Myklebust 2015: 9)

Twentieth-century Kalahari ethnographers with a less materialist bent, such as George Silberbauer, Lorna Marshall, Megan Biesele and Richard Katz have given wider play to these “superstructural” components of Kalahari San culture, in monographs on /Gwi “socioecology” (Silberbauer 1981), that already then, in the early 1980s, included penetrating discussions on two central themes of the new animism, anthropomorphism and ontology, as well as writings on Ju/'hoan trance dancing (Katz 1982; Katz et al. 1997), religion (Marshall 1999) and folklore (Biesele 1993). These works include accounts of transformation, hunter-prey sympathy and the antelope-wife conflation, three themes central to relational ontology and the theme of this book.

My most recent intimations from the Kalahari, about its myth-mystical doings reached me a year-and-a-half ago, not in the Kalahari as such but virtually, during an evening get-together in Toronto on 24 November 2016 with several fellow-Kalahari’ites, Richard Lee, Junko Maruyama, Renée Sylvain and Rockney Jacobsen, after a guest lecture at the university that afternoon by Maruyama. The diners traded stories
about fieldwork experiences over dinner, some of which I steered toward my current interest, preternaturally-tinged human-animal encounters. One (by Lee) was about the inter-subjective relationship the Dobe Ju/'hoansi have with lions, including one such encounter he was present at, when Ju/'hoan hunters came across lions who had just killed an animal and were eating their kill. I found out (from Maruyama) that the belief in lion transformation, by certain San individuals and cultural groups, is still alive and well in the Central Kalahari today and a dramatic lion transformation story was related (by Sylvain) about a powerful old and wizened one-legged ≠Au//eisi trance dancer from the Omaheke region in eastern Namibia whose power, in the mid-1990s, derived from his ability to lion-transform (notwithstanding the loss of his leg to a hyena, who had bitten it off when, as a young and inexperienced dancer, he was in trance). The above-mentioned Hyena People were featured in another transformation tale that related that these were-beings were, at the same time, in the 1990s, regular nocturnal visitors to anxious Omaheke Naro San provided (by Jacobsen) the evening’s highlight. The tale’s drama was intensified by the fact that it was told first-hand and in the first person singular: one of the nocturnal camp members visited that night, in his tent, by the were-hyena was none other than the ethnographer himself! What added to the mystic-ominous portent of the tale was the fact that his explanation the following morning that the visit by the Hyena man had occurred in his dream was dismissed by the Naro, who insisted that this had actually happened as some of them had allegedly had the same visit in their huts the previous night. (For a truncated account of this event see Sylvain 2006: 142–44.)

As regards Naro storytelling, which Dorothea Bleek found to be a dying art during her ethnographic field work among a group of them around Sandfontein at the Namibia-Botswana border in 1921, my own field work, in the late 1960s at D'Kar village in the Ghanzi District 200 km to the east, told a different story. I found storytelling to be an active expressive form among the Ghanzi Naro and ≠Au//eisi. And storytellers who were good at their craft were much appreciated by their fellows, both young and old, an appreciation that lay on a wide range of difference among people with regards to individual knowledge of, interest about and competence in telling myths and stories (Guenther
1989). Some individuals were indeed like Bleek found them to be at Sandfontein; however others were as interested and knowledgeable in hua—stories, especially about Myth and Old Times—and equally as skilled in telling them, as were //Kabbo and his fellow storytellers a century previous. Indeed, some 30 years further on when doing my project among the Kuru artists at the same village, I once again came across a couple of excellent storytellers (one of them the artist !Qwaa featured in Chap. 4 of the preceding volume). Other folklorists, anthropologist and development workers who have worked on contemporary San oral history and literature have likewise found both a strong interest among some of the people in their traditional stories and a range of narrative skill among storytellers. It is quite possible that Bleek was right in her dreary assessment of storytelling among the Rietfontein Naro; however, it is equally possible that she might have found skilled and animated storytellers among them had she spent more time than the 10 weeks she was there with the people and increased the number of informants she interviewed and depth to which they got to know them.

As regards the trance dance ritual among the Ghanzi Farm San, this feature of San ritual and expressive culture had both disenchanting and re-enchanting effects on the Farm San. They derived from what was a marked rise in incidence and intensity of trance dancing at the time (from the late 1960s and the following two decades), as well as of an increase in the number of participants and attendees at some of them (which could be 100 or 200). As described and argued elsewhere, this time was a period of considerable existential stress for the Ghanzi farm San, due to poverty, disease, hunger, discrimination and oppression. Trance dancing, through its synergistic healing, and boosting of sociability- and solidarity-generating cultural revitalization, helped people cope with these issues and was for this reason performed all the more and all the more intensively (Guenther 1976, 1999: 192–96). As seen above, in addition to these integrating prosocial effects, the trance dance was an occasion at which myth being and spirits might make an appearance, mitigating the advancing state of Götterdämmerung settling over the Kalahari and disenchanting its San inhabitants. Prehistorians working on San sites in South Africa (Dowson 1994, 1998) and Namibia (Kinahan 1991: 41–48) suggest that a similar
increase in incidence, intensity and socio-political significance of trance healing occurred in these regions at different times in history, as a reaction to oppressive settler contact. In reaction the !giten, the /Xam shamans, recalibrated his arcane, mytho-magical skills, of trance curing and rain-making, toward political ends, prime of them to consolidate his position of power and influence (Lewis-Williams 2015a: 205–9). Part of the consolidation of power was likely through enchantment-prone “celestialization”.

I observed such a process among Ghanzi trance dancers in the 1980s to 1990s among some of whom a similar process of a growth of political power and influence was underway (along with the proliferation of “invented” arcane props and ritual routines by some of the shamans), as part of the cultural revitalization energies trance dancing had elicited. However, as I observed as well (Guenther 2005), that process among some trance dancers followed an altogether different course, with the opposite—enchantment-averse—effect: the professionalization of the trance dancer and the commoditization of the trance dance which changed from a night-long mytho-magical, synergistic, inclusive and sharing-informed “ritual of solidarity” (pace Durkheim) to instrumental, rationalized, hours-long, fee-for-service curing sessions for paying clients and their kin, or for tourists or visiting political dignitaries or election candidates. It led as well to the banishment, from the collective imagination, and the dance circle—now no longer nocturnal but in bright daylight—of //Gaũwa, the trickster-god, along with the spirits of the dead.\(^1\)

What all this suggests is that the Kalahari San, one of forager studies’ exemplars of the prosaic and pragmatic, strategizing and maximizing hunter-gatherer, throughout several generations worth of “secularization” and Zweck-rationalization, too, much like the /Xam, their cultural cousins 1500 kilometers to the south and 150 years in the past, do in fact bring the mythic and spirit world and aspects of ritual and spirituality to bear on their interactions with the natural environment and its features and resources. They do so less fulsomely—with a reduced degree, generally, of conviction and cultural consensus—than the /Xam and more sporadically and fleetingly, as well as more selectively—for instance, as seen above, it is only the lion that is the ≠Au//ei shaman’s avatar when he undergoes animal
transformation and among the Ju/'hoansi it is only big game animals have now. As shown by Lorna Marshall and Megan Biesele, Ju/'hoansi of the 1950s through 1970s were aware of mythic presences in the veld and brought mystical-magical notions and practices to the hunt, which was also metaphorically and metonymically linked to the trance dance (as it had been also among Karoo San a century earlier). And while the new hunting techniques which Kalahari San have adopted through settler contact, mounted rile chase-hunts, have reduced or altogether eliminated mythical and ritual components from San hunting, as well as obviated the aspect of inter-subjectivity between hunter and prey, the latter has not vanished from a San hunter's purview altogether. Louis Liebenberg's field work on persistence hunting among the central Kalahari !Ko (2006) and by James Suzman on “classic” hunting among western Kalahari #Au//ei Ju/'hoansi were carried out in the last decades of the twentieth century.

**Conclusion: A “Sense of Place”**

It is heartening to end this chapter, that deals with the disenchantment of the San's world and umwelt, on a hopeful note: that, what seemed so inexorable and rapid a process of erosion of the mythic, mystical components of San cosmology and ontology which defined their sense of being in relation to mythical and spirit other-beings with whom they share that world and umwelt, is checked to some extent by a process of re-enchantment.

It is equally as heartening that this process, of cultural revitalization, seems to move in tandem with similar developments at the economic, social and political front. This front has witnessed a decades-long up-hill struggle by San—with many a setback (Saugestad 1998; Gall 2001)—for political rights, to land, employment, health, education, social justice and a political voice. This struggle may finally be on track, with improving prospects for San of today and of the future. Ju/'hoansi were successful, on balance, in post-independence Namibia in their grass-roots endeavors to gain control over their own land and lifeways through the conservancy model (Biesele and Hitchcock 2011) and there is room today for cautious optimism also for Botswana’s San people. My optimism here is based on the latest study
of this much-studied aspect of the culture, lives and lifeways of the San of southern Africa, by the legal anthropologist Maria Sapignoli, whose recent book on the matter ends with the following summative statement:

There is no doubt that San activism has raised their profile as a people who have been wronged by a misguided, even callously profit-seeking government. But even if we remain skeptical that the San of the Central Kalahari have achieved any of their goals in the face of the state’s powerful opposition, or any greater security in their subsistence and sense of place, they have at least accomplished this much: they have brought their hopes for the future to wide attention, challenged the stereotypes that limited their possibilities as a people, and forced the government to recognize them as rights claimants with unusual obstacle to prosperity and a powerful sense of place. (2018: 346–7)

“Sense of place” is a phrase that appears twice in Sapignoli’s statement on the struggle, aspirations and prospects of Botswana’s San people, attesting to the importance of land in that struggle. It was a burning issue for the Ghanzi San already in the 1960s, when I did my first stretch of field work, when the most frequently expressed demand and aspiration I heard from people was “we want our own place, a place for Bushmen”. “Sense of Place” is the title also of an article by George Silberbauer (1994), who had carried out an extensive, then-colonial government-contracted survey of the G/wi San of the central Kalahari that resulted, at Silberbauer’s recommendation, in the establishment Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR), which was to become one of the major sites of contestation in the San’s political struggle in Botswana (Saugestad 1998: 323–28; Hitchcock 2002; Zips-Mairitsch 2013). In his article Silberbauer argues that “place” and “people” are intricately entwined by the G/wi, in terms of their cosmology and world view, the cultural domain that framed his analysis. When Silberbauer carried out his field work identity politics were at a relatively low ebb in Botswana, notwithstanding the country’s —then Bechuanaland Protectorate’s—imminent independence. The
connection between place and group has since become politicized by San, as a land-identity-indigeneity equation—or, in Ghanzi San parlance, “for land, culture and a dignified livelihood” (Saugestad ibid.: 305)—that formed the core of their political aspirations.

One of its most eloquent expressions was by the Ghanzi San leader John Hardbattle (whose mother was Naro and father Scots) at a meeting with the Human Rights Commission in Geneva in March 1994. He spoke on the topic on San rights and identity, stressing the “importance of their ancestral territories, the wide-ranging use of wild plants and animals, the value of reciprocity and sharing to San peoples, and the crucial significance of San custom and tradition” (Sapignoli 2018: 128). Hardbattle opened his address, which was subsequently published by the Canadian NGO Plenty Canada in their journal Contact, (1994) in tone-setting fashion, dwelling on the connection between people and the land:

> Our land is our mother. It has brought us up and so gave us life. When you wake up in the Kalahari you hear the birds in the trees as they stir and sing to a new day. You hear the powerful wings of the dove as it flies off to drink water. And as you walk outside, the rain and wind touches your heart. As you walk along, you read the story of the night. You see the play of the night animals and your heart is happy. You will see the game animals lie like herds on the ground and even God will be happy. You see yourself as a small part of this and everything is on the ground. All the food and the tracks of people and animals. (Saugestad 1998: 289)

What runs through Hardbattle’s address, and underscored Silberbauer’s notion of “sense of place”, is something closely related and connected—a “sense of belonging” (Saugestad 1998: 308). This term appears in Sapignoli’s passage as well; indeed, “sense of belonging” is a recurrent phrase in her book (one warranting an index entry with multiple page references). Securing land for such a place is one of the two key aspirations of San today. Related to it is the second claim and aspiration, that to indigeneity, as the country’s “First People”, linking identity and place. While these claims and aspirations, to land, identity
and indigeneity, are today not as intense, unequivocal and contested\textsuperscript{15} as I found them to be in the 1990s,\textsuperscript{16} with identity politics astir in the region around the collapse of apartheid in South Africa and by extension Namibia, they remain priority issues for contemporary San. Even to Namibian San who were in fact granted control over their own land through the Nyae Nyae Conservancy: people are “still defending that land and its resources against a host of threats and problems” (Biesele and Hitchcock 2011: vii; see also LAC 2006). “Sense of place”, its vision and drive, is what secured these Namibian San people the land—and may do the same for their counterparts in neighboring Botswana and South Africa\textsuperscript{17}—and will drive them on to keep it secured in the future.

This chapter has considered an ancillary aspect of “sense of place”—rephrased in the language and idiom of this study of San cosmology and ontology as “being-in”, and “dwelling” (Ingold 2000) and “flourishing” (Hannis and Sullivan 2018: 280–81)—and also why this is “powerful” and why it can elicits a “sense of belonging”. This aspect is ecocultural and, even though its parameters lie outside the techno-economic, political-legal, bureaucracy policy domain within which land reform issues are generally considered by the powers-that-be, they are nevertheless active cultural forces that tie people to their place.

One of them considered in this book is enchantment—when a dash of it attaches to that place the sense of belonging will become all that much defined and sustained, with an added dimension of meaningfulness for the people that inhabit it.

\textbf{References}


\textit{Bank, Andrew. 2006. Anthropology and Fieldwork Photography: Dorothea Bleek's Expedition to the Northern Cape and the Kalahari; July to December 1011.} \textit{Kronos} 32: 77–113.


Berghahn.


———. 2014b. ‘With Their Backs to the Wall ... They Were Fighting Like the Cornered Mongoose’: Contextualizing Kalahari San Violence and Warfare Historically. Journal of Namibian Studies 16: 7–45.


———. 2017. “…The Eyes Are No Longer Wild, You Have Taken the Kudu into Your Mind”: The Supererogatory Aspect of San Hunting. The South African Archaeological Bulletin 72: 3–16.


Lange, Mary E., and Lauren Dyll-Myklebust. 2015. Spirituality. Shifting Identities and Social Change: Cases from the Kalahari Landscape. *HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies* 71 (1), Art, #22985, 11 pp. [http://dx.doi.org/10.4.102/hts.v71/12985](http://dx.doi.org/10.4.102/hts.v71/12985)


Anthropology 47: 1017–1025.


Saugestad, Sidsel. 1998. The Inconvenient Indigenous: Remote Area Development in Botswana. Donor Assistance, and the First People of the Kalahari. Tromsø: Faculty of Social Science,
University of Trømso.


---

**Footnotes**

1 I am grateful to José de Prada-Samper for directing me to this source.

2 These narratives, after trance and the shaman’s return from the spirit world are different from the “dialogue”-style narrative the shaman utters as goes into trance, which is more...
disjointed, consisting of phrases, sentence fragments and expletives, rather than coherent narrative (Wiessner and Larsen 1979; see also Guenther 2006a: 248–51).

Both of these mytho-mystical aspects of the cultural landscape of the Damara are documented in a short film (“Landscape Final”) by Chris Low, Andy Botelle and Silvia Diez filmed in Sör里斯 Sör里斯 in western Namibia in March 2016. It is available through the website of the “Future Pasts” research project carried out among Namibian Khoisan people from Bath Spa University and University of Edinburgh (http://www.futurepasts.net)

See Chap. 5, Vol. I.

Märchen, the German word for “fairy tale” (which has assumed generic status in folklore studies), is a diminutive of Mär (also Märe) an archaic German word glossed in Cassell’s German-English English-German Dictionary (London: Casell Ltd., 1978: 407) as “news”, “rumour”, “report”, “story”, “tidings” (as in Bach’s Christmas carol “Vom Himmel hoch da komm ich her, ich bring euch gute, neue Mär” — “From Heaven above I have come, I bring you good, new tidings”).

Yet, on the other hand, that loss of culture and land, for—and because—all of its devastating existential stress, may also have culturally revitalizing effects that curbed some of the disenchantment people were experiencing. One of them is to evoke in the people affected by existential stress and crisis conditions collective nostalgia, about a romanticized past and life, and a hunting ground invested with mythical and mystical doings. Such is the nature of “memory culture” and its impact on stories and storytelling is that it gives rise to eulogizing narratives about an idealized, essentialized and mytho-poeticized past, recently vanquished and vanished. Memory culture left its mark also on the narratives Bleek and Lloyd received from some of their storytellers. Two examples that come to mind, readily because of their iconic stature in /Xam orature, are /Kabbo’s “Intended Return Home” musings (cited above) and Diálkwain’s—wistful “Song of the Broken String”—the string that connected the /Xam to their spirit world (Lewis-Williams 2015a: 183–200). Like a number of other South African historians and commentators, Mohamed Adhikari deems Diálkwain’s song “a monument to a departed way of life: a southern African genocide” (2010: 94–96).

The German folklorist and Khoisan folklore specialist Sigrid Schmidt's has recently presented an exhaustive study of linkages between /Xam and Khoe Khoe folktales (2013), a number of which are of European origin.

century /Xam and twentieth-century Naro folktales.

9 See Chap. 7, Vol. I.

10 Both of these aspects of contemporary San orature were recently tapped by community development researchers, in the interest of fostering a positive image and identity of San among themselves and vis à vis outsiders as well as provide for both partiers an information source about the people’s traditional band territories and ecological knowledge (Le Roux and White 2004; Lange and Dyll-Myklebust 2015; Lange et al. 2013, 2014; Hannis and Sullivan 2018; LaRocco 2018). Some of this material, especially traditional myth and lore, history and indigenous knowledge has been used for school primers and books (Biesele 2009; Schmidt and van Vuuren 2014, Kuru D’Kar Trust n.d.).

11 Another factor, in Botswana, that contributed to this secularization of the San trance dance was its appropriation and cultural refashioning—and, in the process, bowdlerization—by the San’s Bantu-speaking neighbors, in the context of the popular, national and touristic form of entertainment, “traditional dance” competitions (Hermans 1998; Lee 2003: 201–5).

12 See also Thompson (2016), whose recent cross-cultural overview of the anthropological literature on the concept of “sense of place” among hunter-gatherers draws extensively on Silberbauer’s article.


14 As presumably it was to San in the past: !xoe, the term the /Xam applied to their home territory, meant “the place to which one belongs” (de Prada-Samper 2017: 119).

15 For instance, Botswana San today, in their protracted struggle with the Botswana government for land and occupancy rights to the Central Kalahari Game Reserve, may, for strategic reasons, include Bakgalagadi within their newly minted, politically motivated ethnonym “Peoples of the CKGR” (Sapignioli 2018: 250).

16 Ethnic identity, along with official recognition—as the “First Peoples of the Kalahari” (FPK) of the country’s indigenous people—shared first place, with land rights, to “our own place”, in San people’s aspirations when I carried out my field research on the Kuru artists in the mid-1990s (see also Saugestad 1998). Both of these issues were also themes in the imagery of some
of the artists (Guenther 2006b). Here I note parenthetically that the prioritization of
indigeneity and ethnic identity by San and San activists was very much out of step with how
some anthropologists viewed this matter at the time (Kuper 2003; Barnard 2006; Sylvain 2014,
2015). The former, the San, were wont to consider the latter's' debates about essentialism,
identity and indigeneity as both irrelevant and counterproductive to their aspirations
(Guenther 2006c). This became clear to me at a conference I attended in the mid-1990s and to
which San delegates had been invited. A paper, and its ensuing discussion, about it, on the
illusionary and delusional nature of the concept of “indigenous”, was listened to with a mixture
of consternation, impatience and annoyance, which one Khoisan delegate expressed
vociferously in the discussion.

17 Such as Khoe-descended, Colored “Kalahari People” north of the Orange River around
Upington and Kakamas and the Afrikaans- and Nama-speaking ≠Khomani of the Northern Cape,
in and around the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park, for whom “cultural identity, indigenous
ontology and spirituality are inextricably linked with land”. This is the theme of a recent article
by Mary Lange and Lauren Dyll-Myklebust (2015: 4; see also Lange et al. 2013).
6. (S)animism and Other Animisms

Mathias Guenther

[1] Department of Anthropology, Wilfrid Laurier University, Ontario, ON, Canada

Mathias Guenther

In the earliest times, when both people and animals lived on earth, a person could become an animal if he wanted to, and an animal could become a human being. Sometimes they were people and sometimes animals and there was no difference. All spoke the same language. That was the time when words were like magic.

Nalungiaq, Netsilik woman storyteller (Rothenberg 1972: 45)

A special class of shamans ... are the so-called bear doctors, shamans who have received power from grizzly bears, often by being taken into the abode of those animal – which appear there in human form – and who after their return to mankind possess many of the qualities of the grizzly bear, ... In some regions, as among the Pomo and Yuki, the bear shaman was not thought as elsewhere to actually become a bear, but to remain a man who clothed himself in the skin of a bear to his complete disguise, and by his malevolence, rapidity, fierceness and resistance to wound be capable of inflicting greater injury than a true bear.

Whether any bear shaman actually attempted to disguise themselves in this way to accomplish their ends is doubtful. It is certain that all the members of some tribes believed it to be in their power.

Alfred Kroeber (1907: 331)
The forest is a conscious ecosystem from which they [Amazonian hunters] are ontologically inseparable ... A ritual ecology is in place, one in which man’s ritual must conform to the relationship between the species to maintain an ideal balance between the beings that inhabit and constitute the forest.

Boris Wastian (2016: 48, 43)

When killing an elk or a bear, I sometimes feel that I have killed someone human. But one must banish such thoughts or one would go mad from shame.

Anonymous Yukaghir hunter (Willerslev 2007: 78)

This said, the man begun to disappear.

By slow degrees, and ended in a deer.

A rising horn on either bro he wears,
And stretches out his neck, and pricks his ears;
Rough is his skin, with sudden hairs o’er-grown,
His bosom pants with fears before unknown:
Transformed at length he flies away in haste,
And wonders why he flies away so fast.
But as by chance, within a neighb’ring brook,
He saw his branching horns and alter’d look.
He try’d to speak, but only gave a groan;
And as he wept, within the watry glass.

He saw the big round drops, with silent pace,
Run trickling down a savage hairy face.

What should he do? Or seek his old abodes,
Or herd among the deer, and sculk in woods!
Here shame dissuades him, there his fear prevails,
And each by turns his asking heart assails.

Actaeon’s transformation into a stag.

(ovid, Book the Third, 1815)

I have made my burrow habitable and it has shaped up well ...

What’s best about my burrow is its quietness. Admittedly, it can be misleading. Suddenly the quiet can be interrupted and it’s all over. For the time being it still surrounds me. I can spend hours moving through my passages and all I hear is the rustling of some small animal, which I put an end to between my teeth, or the some tickling of the soil, that signals the necessity for some sort of
repair work. Other than that it's all quiet. The forest air blows in, both warm and cool. Sometimes I stretch out and I turn around in the passage, filled all through with contentment. It is good in one's advancing years to have such a burrow, have a roof over your head as fall advances.

Franz Kafka ("Der Bau", online text, Projekt Gutenberg, my translation)

A correction to this publication are available online at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21186-8_8

The preceding chapters in this volume and throughout Vol. I on ontological mutability in San cosmology, as conveyed through the human-animal nexus, made repeated reference to other cultures, of people ranging from preindustrial hunter-gatherers to Westerners. The point of these allusions, that the San’s sense of connectedness to animals because of ontological mutability and the porousness of the species boundaries is not unprecedented, is the theme of this chapter.

This theme is vast and I will deal with it only selectively, starting with an uncommonly lengthy list of epigraphs more or less randomly selected from notes accumulated for this project that provide a cross-cultural sampling of snippets from the cosmologies of various cultures, different and distant from the San as can be, all on the theme of ontological mutability. The ontological instability of people of the Inuits’ “earliest times” is much the same as for their San equivalent, the Early Race during the First Order of Existence. Much like San shamans (and eland dancers at the menarcheal rite), Pomo and Yuki shamans of southwestern America can undergo animal—bear—transformation at both a metamorphic and a mimetic experiential level (and have the anthropologist express his doubts about such a phenomenon, despite his certainty its being real to “all the members of some tribes”). There are echoes from the San hunting ground and its mytho-mystical doings in the Amazonians’ forest and the Yukaghir hunter is as beset with the carnivore’s guilt over eating meat as is his San counter-part, and in the same state of denial over this act of quasi-cannibalism.
The “being animal” experience is the theme of the two Western examples in relation to two iconic animals in the Western imagination, the stag and the badger. The first excerpt dates back centuries and millennia in Western literature to the Roman poet Ovid’s *magnum opus The Metamorphoses* and features one of these metamorphoses, undergone by the hunter-voyeur Actaeon, who, on the trail of a wounded stag and deep into the woods, happen across the goddess of the hunt, Diana—“all undrest”—and her coterie of nymphs. She punishes him for his transgression by turning him into a stag, eventually to be chased and torn apart by the goddess’s hounds. Actaeon’s gradual, be-wildering transformation from human to animal resonates with the /Xam goura player, who was transformed into a tree, for his transgression *vis à vis* the maiden at her seclusion (even though here it was not he who cast the illicit glance but she).

The second excerpt is by a recent novelist who, via his imagination—backed, in general, by the then available zoological literature, on “*subjektive Biologie*” as per Jakob von Uexküll and, in particular, the then-popular, multi-volume zoological work *Brehms Tierleben* which the novelist had on the shelves of his personal library (Müller 2013: 43–45)—takes the reader into the mind of his somewhat paranoid therianthropic protagonist. This is a were-badger, with a glutonously predatory animal’s “wants and needs” and human “powers of abstract reasoning and introspection” (Weigand 1972: 152), as well as an active imagination and a penchant for vivid dreaming (Norris 2010: 26). He is obsessed about his sett and its safety from unknown enemies whose presence he senses, and dreams about, which he has spent years digging (adding “over fifty” passages in the process of ceaseless tunneling, driven by the human and specifically German, *gut bürgerlich*, urge to live in safety and at peace—with a “roof over your head”—in his subterranean world, something, it turns out, is as unattainable to him *qua* human as it is *qua* badger).

I round off this sampling from Western “metamorphosis literature” (Asker 2001) by turning once again to Charles Foster, whom we came across in the previous chapter, describing his own stag transformation experience (albeit along experiential lines quite different from those of Actaeon, except for being chased by a hunter’s hounds, an experience each underwent, with different outcomes). The excerpt is linked in
substance to the one above in that it, too, features a badger, with whom the ethologist-writer attempts with dogged determination to achieve a sympathy bond (of the sort we saw between a San hunter and his quarry) with the animal by living actually, for weeks on end, in a sett that he built (to human body size specifications). Here is how Foster describes his attempts at becoming- and being-badger:

I chewed, gagged, sniffed and waddled my way toward the badger’ world. Sometimes I felt that I came near, only to find that the conceit of that feeling meant that I was farther away than ever. We heard the real badgers every night as they crushed through the bracken and occasionally got a flash of head stripes in the dusk, or a darkening of a shadow as a badger lumbered into it. We’d often try to approach them, and got good at hearing them pause, then putting their fears to rest by loudly scratching ourselves. We put our front paws on trees and stretched as soon as we came out of our hole. We defecated on mounds chosen for their view of the hill. We acquired thick patina of scent .... (Foster 2016: 74)

In addition to the last aspect of behavioral transformation—“a thick patina of scent”—I note parenthetically that the author also acquired a taste for earthworms, developing in the course of his project a connoisseur’s discriminating palate project for this mustelidian staple and delicacy (manifested in an ability to taste-distinguish different types according to local provenance).

This chapter will elaborate on the first case, the Inuit of Canada’s eastern Arctic, and on the last one, from Western culture, with a third case in between, namely, Bantu-speaking neighbors of the San. While living in a vastly different environment and culture, Inuit and San share certain economic, socio-political and, as we will see, cosmological and religious features, all of which to a degree warrant comparison of the two cosmologies, albeit cautiously and provisionally. What makes the second set of cultures comparable is geographic contiguity and mutually acculturative interaction: the culture-carriers are people who, in some instances, have interacted with each other for centuries and in the process adopted and adapted cultural traits from each other. These
interactions impacted on San cosmological and ontological notions (as well as on those held by their Bantu-speaking neighbors).

The point of the third comparison, of the classic “us”—“them” cast, is to suggest that, notwithstanding profound and complex ecological, social-structural, religious and cosmological differences, as well as different historical contexts and trajectories, we find enough significant similarities to San cosmology and ontology to warrant and make meaningful what seems at first glance an excessively far-stretched, gratuitous comparison.

“Foraging for Ideas”: The Impact of Bantu-Speaking Neighbors on San Ontology

(At this place) I saw something very interesting and quite remarkable, which I will not forget easily. Every evening the local inhabitants danced and played in a circle formed in the sand. They were clothed in garments that they had made from different kinds of animal skins, and these were made in such a way that they looked just like the animals themselves. One could see a Bushman in a jackal’s skin, complete with head and ears, and one could see one of the big Kaffers clad in the skin of an elephant’s head with trunk attached. Others, again, were in the skins of the wild cat, lion, hyena, or wild dog, while some portrayed the buffalo, leopard, rhinoceros, kudu, zebra, gemsbok or springbok.

A group of them took up position on the outside of the circle, and the appearance of a number of young girls who began to clap their hands was the signal for the start of a kind of dance, and each dancer mimicked the animal that he represented and also made noises corresponding to those made by that animal.

It was truly strange to see the goings on as they know the nature of the animals well and imitate them closely – running, jumping, stamping, skipping, screeching, roaring and going mad. It must surely represent a kind of play, and in fact the only difference between their play and that of civilized people is that
they reenacted the lives of animals instead of the lives of other people. (Izak Bosman, n.d.)

Folklorist Sigrid Schmidt’s life-long research on Khoisan folktales included the component of mutual, Khoisan-Bantu borrowing, with respect to the Damara and Nama of Namibia (2007) and the /Xam (2013: passim), while literary critic Helize van Vuuren, in her research on Gideon von Wielligh, the Afrikaans writer of Bushman folktales he collected among Afrikaans-speaking /Xam descendants, points to Nguni and Swazi elements von Wielligh found in the material he collected (2016: 59). A recent examination of bird symbolism as a metaphor for gender identity assignment and negotiation considers mythical texts from Venda and /Xam orature (Dederen and Mokakabye 2018). The “symbiotic interaction” and “sharing [of] symbols” between historic San and their Nguni and Sotho neighbors—as well as Tswana ones (section epigraph)—has been the research interest of the South African historical archaeologists Pieter Jolly (1996, 1998, 2005, 2015), Francis Thackeray (2005: 9–12) and Sam Challis (2009), as well as other researchers such as Frans Prins and Hester Lewis (1992), David Hammond-Tooke (1998) and Gavin Whitlaw (2009). Cultural symbiosis and sharing is a feature of Khoisan research conducted by other researchers in other regions of southern Africa vis à vis other Bantu-speaking or “creolised” neighbors (Challis 2012; Lange and Dyll-Myklebust 2015: 5–7; Skinner 2017; Biesele 1993: 31–34; Köhler 1989; Fisch 1984; Kubik 1988). My discussion of this “symbiotic-symbolic” aspect of San ontology—an instance of San people’s penchant for “foraging for ideas” (Guenther 1999: 86–93)—will draw on this work.

Starting with my own ethnographic observations I once again turn to the lion transformation discussed in Chap. 5 of the previous volume and described in Appendix 1. This metamorphic experience, set in a quintessentially San ritual, was replete with features derived from the Ghanzi San’s Bantu-speaking neighbors. The dancer himself was part Kgalagadi and had a Tswana name, while the dance song’s singers included among the San women a Kgalagadi and a Herero woman. A century earlier, some 400 kilometers to the north east, the trader Izak Bosman’s description of a spirited San animal mimicry dance—of the kind dealt with in Chap. 6 (Vol. I)—he witnessed when trading
northeast of the Okavango included a BaTawana dancer among the thrall (section epigraph). As Jolly notes in his discussion of therianthropes as animal-masked or costumed ritual functionaries (2002: 89–94), there were other Bantu-speaking neighbors in southern Africa to the San who “masqueraded as animals” in the context of ritual performances, especially Zulu praise-singers or Nguni diviners. In addition to using animal skins, a Nguni diviner shared a number of other cultural traits with San shamans, with whom, note Prins and Lewis, the Nguni diviner was “symbolically fused” (1992: 138). As was noted earlier on in another chapter (Chap. 4, Vol. I), another symbolic imprint on southern San expressive culture that derived from contact with their cattle-keeping was the depiction in rock art not only of cattle and horses (Vinnicombe 2001: 147; Jolly 2015: 224–31, 319–20; Skinner 2017) but also of bovine and equine therianthropes.

They are the most prominent motifs of what some researchers have dubbed “contact art” (Jolly 2015: 220–81). It included one visually striking instance of mutuality, of cultural borrowing, as reported by Marion Walsham How among the Phuthi of Basutoland (now Lesotho) in the early 1930s after How, the colony’s administrator’s wife, had met two old Phuti men who told her that they had learned to paint by San people (Jolly 2015: 307–10; see also Lewis-Williams 2015: 167–68). One of them was the 74-year-old man Mapote, who was knowledgeable in San paint making and painting and actually created a painting at her request (1962: 33–38). The surface painted on was a rock slab and the pigment used by Mapote contained ox blood, in lieu of what he said was the required ingredient—eland blood—which was not available to him at the time he produced the painting.3

Moving about a thousand kilometers to the north-west to the middle banks of the Kavango river in northern Namibia we find the “Kavango tribes” (Kwangali, Shambyu, Gciriku, Nyembo and Mbu Kushu) who derive much of their subsistence from hunting and fishing and have bands of Kxoe and !Kung San attached to their villages as serfs with whom some Kavango people interact extensively, as well as intermarry (Fisch 1984: 109; Malan 1995: 35). This contact is reflected also in certain mystical beliefs and ritual practices of these Bantu-speaking peoples about animals, such as antelopes, crocodiles and jackals. Individuals in possession of “strong magic” can become
transformed into animals after death (Fisch 1979). A hunter who comes across such a spectral were-human when out hunting is in grave peril. Diviners ("Zauberer") can assume the guise of lions, leopards or hyenas (Fisch 1979).

The last sort of transformation, into “Hyena People”, is a dreaded mystical skill ≠Au//eisi in the Omaheke of eastern Namibia attribute to their Herero and Tswana neighbors, as related by René Sylvain in a goose bump-raising ethnographic vignette that involved her husband Rockney Jacobsen when he encountered one of these ominous beings during the night in what he concluded, when waking up in the morning, must have been a dream, notwithstanding the experience’s gripping realism (2006: 142–44). While being told “vehemently” by the ethnographers’ informants that “Bushmen would never degrade themselves by transforming into such lowly scavengers,” in substance and modus operandi ≠Au//ei shamans’ own transformations, into “powerful animals – especially lions and leopards”—is not dissimilar from that of their Bantu-speaking neighbors.

A further example, again from Namibia, comes from the “bantu’ized” (bantuisiert) “Daman Bushmen” in northern Namibia, who appear to be linguistically linked to the Hai//om, according to Viktor Lebzelter who briefly visited this enigmatic Khoisan people in 1926 and attributes a number of their cultural traits to their Ovambo neighbors to whom some Daman bands were enserfed. These traits included certain hunting rituals that may have contained elements of transformation (1934: 10–13). And further to the north, among Angola !Kung, Dorothy Bleek, on her research trip to the area, came across “fetish sticks”, animal blood-smeared, forked poles planted upright near huts, to hold hunting weapons and implements, which, by virtue of the animal’s blood, confers luck to a hunter (1927: 124). Bleek attributes the cultural origin of these items to neighboring Bantu-speakers.

I mention a final Bantu-derived item of myth and ritual that involves animals and their mythical and mystical link to humans, specifically to their descent-based social organization, totemism. A version of this relational-ontological schema—one “most unusual … from a Khoisan point of view” (Barnard 1992: 125) as it is associated with segmentary descent groups, especially clans, which are not a feature of San band social organization—has found its way into the
belief system and social organization of some San groups, in particular, those in close contact, over generations and centuries, with Bantu-speaking neighbors in the Okavango and eastern fringe areas of the Kalahari. Along with such Tswana-derived ritual patterns as male circumcision and mortuary practices (Dornan 1917: 50, 51), Dornan describes this pattern among some of the eastern and northern San groups—“Tati Bushmen (Masarwas)”—he encountered in the first decade of the twentieth century, calling it “a slight form of totemism”, among San groups with “a little clan organization”. These refer to themselves by their animal clan names, such as the group at the Sansokwe River Dornan encountered who “call themselves koha /kee, or zebra clan” (1917: 53). Among southern San, too, Bantu-derived totemistic-like pattern have been noted among the AmaThola, a colonial, multi-ethnic, creolized San group of the south-eastern Drakensberg. They feature “‘totem animals’ of a kind” (Jolly 2015: 275), the baboon and the horse, whose protective powers and resourcefulness in the face of colonial oppression the people expected to harness through collective mystical identification. Archaeologist Sam Challis describes how the “creolized raiders” represented and integrated these two animals—one indigenous and the other imported—on rock art:

The rock art shows dancing groups changing into baboons and horses. Horses were seen to be “like” baboons in that they have the same running gait, and carry juveniles in the same “jockey position” ... and also carried one out of harm’s way. The creolized raiders believed they could appropriate, in ritual, the protective powers of the baboon and by association with the horse and thus remain unharmed on mounted raids into the colonies. When individuals of different cultures came together in the face of the nineteenth-century colonization, they were able to creolize around a shared belief in order to survive on the colonial frontier. (2009: 106)

While integral to San cosmology and ontology, as part of their hunting lifeways and therianthrope- and transformation-informed mythology and ritual, animal mimesis and metamorphosis thus has to
be considered also in the context of San people’s contact with Bantu-speaking peoples. These also hold such beliefs and ritual practices—including even so iconic a San figure as the mantis, myth- and omen-laden (Schmidt 2018)—and they have been close neighbors to San, in some cases for centuries, such as in the south-eastern Cape and Natal (Jolly 2015: 143). Two-way cultural borrowing would happen as a matter of course through such sustained contact, even in those regions in southern Africa where the period of active social contact and acculturation between Bantu-speakers and San in their social and cultural orbit was “comparatively short-lived and fluid, perhaps lasting only for a decade or two” (Lewis-Williams 2015: 52). What is San and what Bantu, and which cultural group derived which elements from whom and when, are questions that may be impossible to unravel. Moreover, it is a problematic that belongs to another era in anthropology when such questions were active and pressing concerns of the discipline.

**Other Hunter-Gatherers: Eastern Arctic Inuit**

the times when animals were just as often human beings as they were animals, and sometimes lived together, all kinds of animals, in one big house, which could suddenly turn into a cave or a lair of beasts. (Anonymous Caribou Inuit storyteller (Rasmussen 1930: 92))

My father was once out hunting caribou, and had killed four. He was just cutting them up when he saw four men coming toward him. They came over the crest of a hill, and he thought at first it was caribou. But they came closer, and he saw that they were *ijirait*, two men with their grown-up sons. One of the sons was quite a young man. All were big men, and they looked just like ordinary human beings, save that they had nostrils like those of the caribou. (Aua, Iglulik shaman (Rasmussen 1929: 205))

There was once a man who had married a wild goose. It had flown away from him, and so he wandered off alone and came to a village where there live gulls and ravens in a double house
This study of San ontological mutability—as manifested in a confounding of the human-animal species divide and a conflating of species through mythic therianthropes or real-life transformation, either partially or fully, through mimesis and metamorphosis, respectively—has made more than a few references to other recent hunter-gatherers, from the Arctic to Amazonia, as well hunting cultures from the prehistoric past. Philippe Descola’s work *Beyond Culture and Nature* (2013) has examined extant hunter-gatherers comprehensively, the cosmologies of some of whom—those in his “Animism” schema—approximate that of the San. The same schema is the topic of other comparative works (Brightman et al. 2012; Halbmayer 2012; see also Costa and Fausto 2010).

None of these comparative works on the New Animism make reference to San hunter-gatherers—except for one, by Descola, to the Ju/'hoansi, which is somewhat off the mark in its treatment of the ethnography (2013: 34; see Guenther 2015: 306, foot note 21). This is one reason for bringing a comparative perspective to this book to help fill a gap. Having dealt with this matter in general terms elsewhere (2015: 280–83, 30), I here focus on just one hunter-gatherer culture, the Inuit of the Eastern Arctic, for no particularly compelling reason other than that, as an Arctic hunting people living in an extreme environment that makes physical survival a challenge, they differ markedly, in terms of their socio-cultural infrastructure and structure, from the San, whose southern environment, notwithstanding periodic droughts and food shortage, is more hospitable, allowing, in fact, for the sort of “affluence” that some anthropologists have ascribed to “simple” southern foraging peoples with a “generalized foraging” and “immediate return” subsistence economy. As for their symbolic culture, there are some striking similarities between these northern and southern hunting peoples, as well as dissimilarities. I will deal with these after my account of Inuit myths and their expression of human-animal hybridity and transformation, in an attempt to explain Inuit-San convergences and divergences in cosmology and ontology, along vaguely ecological lines.
I am uncomfortably aware that I am stepping outside my own sphere of expertise in this section of my book and that perhaps should for this reason refrain altogether from doing so and stick to my lasts. The danger of misrepresenting the subject matter I now find myself writing about is ever present, lacking, as I do, the requisite knowledge and field and library research background for such an undertaking. The immediate impetus behind the same is my reading, as part of the background preparation for this project, of a recently published book by the Arctic scholars Frédéric Laugrand and the late Janic Oosten (2015). The two things that drew me to this work was its title—*Hunters, Predators and Prey: Inuit Perceptions of Animals*—and its theoretical framework of relational ontology. The book’s very rich ethnographic information is derived in part from the authors’ own field work, on oral history among Nunavut Inuit elders, and, in large part also on Knud Rasmussen’s equally rich corpus. This the Danish explorer gathered on his Fifth Thule Expedition to the Iglulik and Netsilik, Caribou and Copper Inuit of the Eastern Arctic from 1921 to 1924 and published in a number of fine-grained ethnographic reports (1929, 1930, 1931, 1932). In reading these I was amazed by the wealth of first-hand information, on Inuit lifeways, cosmology and, especially, mythology, much the same way I was decades back in my own field, at my first reading of the /Xam archive. To me, an outsider to the field of Inuit Studies, Rasmussen strikes me as something of a Bleek and Lloyd of the Inuit! What also struck me were the many resonances in the mythology and cosmology of these two culturally diverse hunting peoples, living in different continents and in different climatic zones and ecosystems.

What I present here are the reactions and impressions of a Khoisanist reader, primarily of the published Rasmussen texts. I do so in conjunction with Laugrand and Oosten, whenever these specialists on Inuit myth and cosmology amplify one point or another made by Rasmussen, my primary source.

I refer to another work in this foray into Inuit cosmology and ontology because of its relevance both to Rasmussen and to an important point about transformation made in the San context in an earlier chapter (in Vol. I)—about animal skins and its wearers’ ontological state. The work is the Canadian literary scholar Keavy
Martin’s book *Stories in a New Skin: Approaches to Inuit Literature (2012)*. I begin with the cover illustration for the last work (Fig. 6.1) and its caption by its author. This reads:

‘Shaman Revealed’, a 2007 lithograph by the Cape Dorset artist Ninqeokuluk Teevee ... depicts a woman who has unzipped her human skin, clothing and all, to reveal the head of a fox. Inspired by the story of Kiviuq’s fox wife, she says, “I wanted to show how people could change from one thing to another, but still be the same person.” (Martin 2012: 7)
The comment by the artist on this remarkable image, so strikingly resonant with San relational ontology, will provide the framework for this impressionistic account of San-Inuit similarities, as well as the differences with respect to cosmology and ontology.

The image’s explicit theme—animals wearing their skin much as humans wearing skin clothing, who, through this animal-to-human skin contact merge identities—appears as a trope in Inuit myth and belief, as well as in practice. We find it, for example, in one of missionary and Inuit Studies scholar Father Maurice Metayer’s Tales from the Igloo, titled “Kidnapped by Wolves” (1972: 73–77):

The man and woman were engaged in constructing more scarecrows when a male wolf came up to them. He had taken off his skin and left it behind some rocks. He looked like a man. The only difference in his appearance was that he had the feet of a wolf, but the couple did not notice this.

Putting on and taking off skins to hide or to reveal ontological identity from other species appears to be a theme more integral to Inuit cosmology than to that of the San and more integrated into their lifeways. It also seems more explicit and pervasive in the Inuit version of a connective cosmology and unstable, ambiguous ontology (a point to which I will return). This is evident in Ninqeokuluk Teevee’s image and her commentary, in a way that resonates closely with the San view of the world: that this identity merger, of human and animal, skin-to-skin, is not complete and neither identity nor alterity are fully forsaken—in changing “from one thing to another”, people are “still the same people” (both human and animal ones).

A case in point from the Netsilik of the eastern Arctic is a special type of therianthropic preternatural being they call “seal-men” (tuutalit). These were-beings obtained their ontological hybridity in Myth Time when the first of these creatures, a human baby, had his human mother “draw” the skin of a newly born seal cub over her newly born child. She taught her seal-clad child to swim who, in the course of growing up into a boy, attained a seal’s ability to live in the sea
Rasmussen (1931: 247, 365–66). The seal skin he wore made possible this transformation and, in the process, created “an intermediate category between humans and seals” (ibid) that conflate the identities of each and obscure their otherness. These beings are still around today in the Netsilik’s (preter)natural world and in their imagination and their dreams.

As for human mothers and babies today, Laugrand and Oosten report that babies might be cleaned with the skins of such birds as ptarmigan, golden plover, goose, owl and others so that the child would grow up identifying with the bird with whose skin his mother had rubbed him (2015: 99). Infant boys are sometimes dressed in garments made of raven feathers, thereby transferring the raven’s skill “of always finding something” to the boy, helping him to become a good hunter when he grew up (ibid: 93).

A San-like corollary to essence-transferring animal skins people wear, through which two ontological identities could be partially merged, is that these skins, revitalized through such a merger—or perhaps having never been quite dead when the animal they clothed before they were killed and skinned by a hunter but retained some of their animal vitality—were able “to come alive” (as did /Kaggen/s antelope-skin kaross and leather sandals). One instance reported by Rasmussen among the Iglulik occurred during a shamanic séance when clothes “fly around the house above the head of singers sitting with closed eyes” (Rasmussen 1929: 125). Laugrand and Oosten report how “one man’s seal skin pants started moving on their own” (2015: 256). A shaman’s clothing made from caribou—the Inuit’s most important game animal, one as myth-, ritual- and symbol-laden as the San’s eland —was especially prone to this process of revitalization, especially for young shamans whose powers were not yet fully developed. One such had the unsettling experience of having his caribou shamanic coat not only come alive but climb up a precipice. Its frightened owner, not yet in possession of much power and unable to control the errand coat, “killed it by throwing stones at it” (ibid: 251). Caribou clothing was worn also by people generally; the animal “provided human beings with a second skin that allowed them to survive in the Arctic climate” (ibid: 259).

Moving from caribou skins to the animal itself and its position in Inuit cosmology, Laugrand and Oosten dwell on the “strong connection
that existed between human beings and caribou” (2015: 259), which fed—and clothed—both their bodies and their minds, much, as just noted, as the eland does for San. Laugrand and Oosten devote a detailed chapter to this animal and describe the myriad ways in which this connection is manifested at the infrastructural, structural and superstructural levels of Inuit culture (ibid: 209–64). Through this connection ontological identities and boundaries can become blurred, for instance, when, as just seen, caribou skins, revitalized and reanimated by the somatic and spirit vitality of its human wearer, return to their animalian life, or when hunters’ wives engage in seductive dancing directed not at the men but at the caribou (ibid: 225). Origin myths connect deceased humans to caribou as the animals’ “owners” who may assist hunters in their caribou hunting endeavors (ibid: 259).

The blurring of human and caribou identities is displayed to its fullest extent by a powerful group of preternatural spirits called Ijirait by Iglulik Inuit (Rasmussen 1929: 204–8, Laugrand and Oosten 2015: 253–59). They are the Mountain Spirits, earth-linked spirit humanoids who live inside hills, into and out of the cracks and fissures of which shaman may see them moving in wraith-like fashion (reminiscent of the rock fissures through which /Xam shamans shuttled between their and the spirits’ worlds). They hold a deep antipathy to anything having to do with the sea, compounding their irascibility. In this they are always unpredictable and capable of both malevolence and beneficence, which is why the Ijiairit are feared by people. They are usually visible only to shamans; however, hunters may on occasion encounter them out on a hunt (section epigraph). Such encounters may end badly for humans, as attested to by legendary stories about men being held as captives by them and of women abducted. Their moral ambiguity is matched by their ontological constitution which, morphologically fluid but essentially human (their ontological “default” state), may assume the shape of caribou, transforming either their entire body or just their head or snout. When encountered by humans and seen from the distance, they may be taken for caribou, but when seen up close, they turned out to be “just like ordinary humans”, except for faces with caribou-like muzzles. As humans, they dress in caribou skins. Their being-caribou state notwithstanding, they hunt these animals with
alacrity, outrunning them even in full flight, “strong as wolves” and, having killed “a caribou, they run home with it, slinging it over their shoulders just as a wolf does with its prey” (Rasmussen ibid.: 205).

In reading about these therianthropic beings in Rasmussen’s texts my sense of having read much the same thing before, in another ecological setting and cultural garb, became especially acute. The ontological volatility of these beings of the preternatural realm is reminiscent of /Xue of !Kung Myth Time, and their subtle, indeterminate blending of ontological identity—human with seal or caribou, again, by wearing the animal’s skin, and even with wolf—is reminiscent of San Myth Time’s Early Race. Blending wolfness into this now chimerical hybrid being underscores the other conflation it contains within its being, that of predator and prey: the latter, caribou, has blended within its ontological makeup the two beings that prey on it. This was dealt with in the San context, the account of the menarcheal rite in which the maiden-eland becomes both hunter and hunted and in the discussion of the moral conundrum—for San and Inuit hunters alike—of meat eating, for which the caribou-human-wolf chimera is a striking example.

While ambiguity and fluidity inform the being of numerous other animals in the Inuit Umwelt (such as seal, whales, ravens, lemmings), in no animal is it as pervasive and striking in its manifestations than in nanuq, the bear, arguably the Inuit’s most mythologized and anthropomorphized animal. In a number of ways the bear is the equivalent to the San’s lion (and the Amazonian’s jaguar). It is also different in one significant way, with ontological implications and ritual repercussions: it is both a predator—a “fellow hunter” whose quarry may be humans—and it is a prey animal for the Inuit, who hunt the animal and use its flesh and fur for food and clothing (something unthinkable for San hunters). The two “central themes” of the Inuit “bear cult” are concerned with this ambiguity. One, “propitiation of the animal lest its soul avenge itself on the hunter” (Laugrand and Oosten 2015: 180), is linked phenomenologically to the animal’s status as predator, while the other, “care taken so that the bear can be reborn again and killed again by the hunter” (ibid), is linked to its status as prey.
Compounding this ambiguity is the cosmological notion, manifested in myth, ritual and experience, of the bear’s ontological status as “human-like.” Myth holds the bear to be “an ancestor of human beings” and stories tell of women transforming themselves into bears to take their revenge on unfaithful husbands. Experience reveals a number of anatomical and behaviorally similarities between bears and humans such as standing on their hind legs and hunting seals like human hunters do at breathing holes or killing them with blocks of snow or stones. Indeed, it is humans who imitate the bear as hunter (as they do in other ways such as igloo building). Their skill as hunters—along with other powers, especially the “capacity to think like humans”, thus rendering the bear more intelligent than any other animal—is why Inuit men see in the bear “a superior level of humanity” and refer to bears using kinship terms. Bears, in turn, have their own term for humans, whose activities they observe and monitor, whose language they understand, whose girls they may woo and whose children they may adopt (as humans adopt bear cubs). The animals follow similar ritual observances when killing their prey as do humans: bears will not break apart the skeleton of a hunted and eaten seal “so as not to offend the seal’s spirit or … the goddess who is the mistress of life”. Bears can transform into humans, and even without so striking a display of humanness, their innate humanity is lodged in a bear’s body, which “is like human flesh”. The danger surrounding the eating of the bear’s flesh, because of its powerful soul, now on a vengeful track because its being or having been eaten, is thus magnified because the flesh is itself human-like. The danger here is when humans eat such flesh there is the potential danger that they will develop a craving also for human flesh; indeed, humans who may have eaten the latter, perhaps during famine times, are not allowed to eat bear meat ever again, lest it raises the craving for human flesh to uncontrollable levels (Rasmussen 1929: 189). A vast array of respect rules and food proscriptions surround the hunting, butchering and eating of this portentous animal (Rasmussen 1929: 188–89; Laugrand and Oosten 2015: 192–96). These are much in excess of similar observances by the San, who are not troubled by any such perilous meat-prey-predator conflation and whose own center-fold predator, the lion, invested with much the same mythological,
mystical and anthropomorphic portent and is referred to with respect terms, is never eaten.

Another ritual domain that is concerned with bears is shamanism. It is most dramatically displayed in the shaman's transformation into a bear—echoes again from the Kalahari where we saw lion transformation to be the feature of a San shaman's ritual performance of greatest experiential impact. The Igulik shaman may be linked to the bear in another way (one not found in San shamanism) through his interaction with the bear's helping spirit whom he may enlist to assist him in a task. Ontological ambiguity is magnified in this aspect of Inuit shamanism as this powerful and dangerous spirit being is itself, in some of its forms, therianthropic. In one account he is a huge, humanoid and hairless, except on the tips of its ears, at his mouth and on his tail; in another the spirit being is a partially (incompletely?) transformed bear-man—"like a creature split in two, one portion being like a man and the other like a bear" (Laugrand and Oosten 2015: 201).

The prominence of the bear, as an ontologically ambiguous and fluid therianthropic creature, is enhanced through such ritual processing, through proscriptions and regulations, shamanic transformation and spirit replication. As noted above, the bear, as such and in its were-bear state, is also found in Inuit mythology. Myth, a sounding board for cosmology, resounds with and amplifies the cosmological theme of ontological mutability, expressed in the hybridity of Myth Time's therianthropic denizens, as well as their ready penchant for transformation. As we saw in the case of the San, such amplification, through myth, also leads to magnification and exaggeration.9

The section on myths and stories in Rasmussen’s Iglulik monograph about “the days when all sorts of unbelievable things might happen”—which, as discussed, may or may not have been in Myth Time—leads off with a bear transformation tale. It features a girl as the protagonist, who gradually transforms into a bear—in a process reminiscent of the Dawn Heart wife's transformation into a lynx of /Xam mythology—after her cruel father had imprisoned her in an unheated snow hut to let her freeze to death. Instead, she grows hair on her body, incrementally, at first on her calves and hands—“hair like that of an animal”—then on her body and finally her face. In the process she changes from a timid, pleading human girl into a ferocious bear, who
kills her father in an act of revenge and retribution. Transformation is the theme of a number of other stories, one of them about bears in human form switching back and forth between human and bear beings, another about “owl people” who talked like human beings and another about a shaman who visited a fox in human form.

The last has a striking perspectivist twist that appears in a number of other tales: arriving in his walk-about at what he deemed a human village, the shaman went inside one of the houses where he found a sick old man lying on a bed. The man’s wife asked the shaman to treat her husband in return for two caribou skins. The patient recovers and the shaman returns home at night to his wife, with the two caribou skins, leaving them in the passage way to his snow house. Waking up in the morning and remembering his prize he asked his wife to go outside to fetch the two caribou skins he had brought home last evening. She did so—“but all she found was two lemming skins”. Puzzled, the man went off with his wife, backtracking his way: “They came to the spot where the village and the house had been; but all they found was a fox’s earth [den?]; there was nothing else. The shaman had visited foxes in human form” (Rasmussen 1929: 269–70).

There are other such stories in the Rasmussen corpus that confound the protagonists’ and antagonists’ ontological identity through subtle switches of perspective. One of them features a bear “in human form” who, when stealing up to a village of humans, which to him were “stand-uprights, one of those creatures that stand straight up like a tent pole”, knocked over one such tent pole and in the process killed a human. The narrator at this point in the story, perhaps aware of his interlocutor’s puzzled look, offered this explanatory comment: “By ‘stand-upright’ and ‘tent pole’ the bear meant a human being, because human beings walk upright” (Rasmussen 1929: 273). The storyteller was evidently not asked by the explorer—as he might have been by a Vivieros de Castro—whether the bear, “in human” form, himself manifested that form. Quadrupedally!? And if so, how would that constitute “human form, for the bear”?10 Some chapters back (in Vol. I) similar questions about onto-anatomical conundrums arose in the context of the /Xam’s Early Race of therianthropes of Myth Time.

The Inuit World of Story features much the same beings in the same volatile ontological state as the Early Race of San Myth Time. The
stories or legends about them, set in in a place and at a time in Inuit orature that merges myth and legend, history and fact, are grist on Inuit storytellers’ mills. One of them was discussed above, the story about the “seal-men” who were created by a human mother when she enveloped the infant into the skin of a new-born seal pup. Other stories are about such human-animal confounding events as bears in human form visiting a human village, about humans visiting bears, who live in large igloos and take off their bear skins when inside wearing them only when outside hunting (Martin 2012: 7), about men who came across wolf people, about a woman who, with her baby, visited wolves in human form and another woman who nursed a larva in her armpit. Finally, the story about men hunting musk oxen who spoke to them. Rasmussen’s collection of Caribou Inuit stories (1930: 92–97) contains tales reminiscent of the Ju/'hoan hunter’s encounter in a remote southern region of the Kalahari veld who talked to him, admonishing him not to hunt or kill them as they “are not Gemsbok”. These Inuit tales are about “the times when animals were just as often human beings as they were animals, and sometimes lived together, all kinds of animals, in one big house, which could suddenly turn into a cave or a lair of beasts”. They include such plot elements as children turning into willow grouses, a salmon man (“ugly to look at with a uvula so big that it came far out of his mouth and hung down between his legs”), a man who came across a “place where there lived wolves and wolverines in human form” and about a man who married a vixen (and who himself undergoes transformation into a fox). Two other stories are about the universal animal-wife motif that was examined in some detail in its San guise above. In one story two small girls who “played father and mother” made pretend-husbands out of a whale shoulder blade and a falcon’s leg. Both animals came alive and took their respective wives into their domains, the whale-man into the water and the falcon-man on top of a high cliff. Another features a girl making a make-belief husband from a walrus bone. It became revitalized into a walrus, who claimed the girl as his wife.

An especially intriguing tale in a classic “Old Animism” cast is about “the soul that lived again in all animals” (Rasmussen 1930: 112–18). The narrative is replete with ontological entanglement and confusion on the part of the were-soul-subject, whose spiritual immateriality
blends with bodily materiality. In the story we find the soul—of a human—in a wolf, into whose body it had recently “transmigrated”. Being unused to its recently incarnated animal host and its muscular and physiological workings, the soul is unable to keep up with the other wolves when they give chase to prey animals. As a result, the soul-wolf gets no food and “is starving to death”. He asks one of his wolf-wolf pack mates for help:

“Great wolf”, said the soul, “do show me how to run”.

To this the wolf answered: “The way to run is this: when you are galloping you must stretch your backbone in such a fashion that your back forms a straight line, and the long hairs on your belly must touch the ground when you stretch your legs out; your breath you must draw in deep breaths, snifing the air in through your nostrils”. (ibid: 117–18)

This story, about the travels and travails of Tylorian “transmigration of the soul”, by a were-being that cannot readily sort out either its ontological or material state, resonates with San being-myths (even though the notion of “soul” is vague in San spirituality and that of “transmigration” absent). The story is as much about transmigration as about transformation, especially its experiential dimension for the subject as he or she are in the grips of this process. As were the young woman and man of the Early Race of /Xam Myth Time, whom we saw transform into a lynx and tree, and as is the Inuit soul in the story at hand, who has not as yet quite “found his feet” in his wolf transformation, finding the process taxing, confusing and perilous.

There are other similarities in these two Myth Worlds, less so, as one would expect, in specific plot details or motifs than in general themes: the prominence of animal characters, alongside human ones; their ontological ambiguity and inconstancy manifested in hybridity and transformation and anatomical and behavioral anthropomorphism (with a perspectivist slant); extensive interaction between the early humans and animals, in the form of inter-visits, inter-marriages, out-adoption of one another’s children and mutual help.

There are also differences. On the basis of my reading of Rasmussen’s ethnography and therefore a limited and selective
knowledge base, two differences strike me the most, both with
significant cosmological and phenomenological repercussions. The one
is that the World of Myth of the San is less defined and differentiated
from the spirit and actual world than is the case among the Inuit. The
other is that the manifestations of ontological mutability in Inuit myth
and cosmology, belief and practice are more overt and fulsome, as well
as more striking and unrestrained.

Having, by way of preamble, noted that his Inuit informants do not
remember many stories any longer nor tell them much nor well (1929:
251), Rasmussen also notes that, in doing so, people regard all stories
—including myths, which to Rasmussen are stories that have over time
become more and more and more fictionalized and fantasized—“as
history, and as referring to actual happenings which once took place”.
The “once” may be vaguely recalled and refer to a narratively
unelaborated “earliest times”, at the dawn of time and of creation (ibid:
252–57), when the first two humans appeared (“they came from
hummocks: they were born so”), when humans did not hunt but “ate
only earth”, when houses were alive (because they “had spirits”) and a
woman married a dog whose offspring were the ancestors of Indians,
white men and Mountain Spirits. Or it may be some temporally
indeterminate never-ever “early times, when all sorts of unbelievable
things might happen” (1929: 257) such as humans and animals
donning one another’s skins or transforming into each other, taking
each other’s women to marry or children to adopt or speak each other’s
language. This is the setting for most of the stories as opposed to the
San in whose myths most stories are about the “First Race” who lived in
the mythic First Order of Existence (a race and world, however, that
would now and again impinge on today’s people and world).

Thus, in the Inuit version of the San “First Order of Existence” of
creation and chaos, hybrid- and monster-breeding ontological
mutability and social amorphousness is less set off from the real world
than in that of the San.\(^\text{12}\) As for the trickster, this domain’s principal
agent and “embodiment of disorder” in San Myth Time (Guenther 1999:
101–9, 2002), I could find no evidence of such a figure in the
Rasmussen texts.\(^\text{13}\) While all this inchoateness could in San mythology
spill over into the “Second Order of Existence”, of humans and the
hunting ground and of preternatural spirits in its remote and marginal
regions, especially through the antics of the trickster who made frequent appearances into people’s lives and affairs, Myth Time confined its rampant state of disorder and chaos to its own temporal-ontological domain. With respect to the Inuit it appears not to be constrained in this way; we find only the one world—which R. R. Tolkien refers to as the enchantment-charged “endless” “World of Story” (1966: 88)—which is intertwined with the real world, the stories about which blend into those of the story world. Because of this overlap that “naturalizes” the extraordinariness of mystical or “unbelievable”, doings of the Inuit’s lived-in world also become all the more unconstrained.

All this renders the human-animal boundary even more porous in Inuit myth and lore than among San and the ontological integrity of humans and animals more precarious; moreover, the mythic-mystical aspect of animals, as well as animal spirits, is more direct, more real and palpable. Whether it is animal skins that enfold the human body and may absorb his or her being, and that may revitalize themselves, or animal wives seducing their human husbands and being seduced, with even more fervor, by animal suitors seeking to marry them and take them to their animal places, or anthro-morphed bears, seal-men and caribou people, all of these mytho-mystically informed instances of ontological mutability are charged with an all-stops-pulled-out intensity, more so than among San where ontological mutability, for all its extravagance, especially in its imagery in the therianthropes of rock art, is nevertheless more restrained and less overt.

The same applies to the preternatural, ontologically variegated beings that inhabit the Inuit hunting ground, who are more diverse and surreal, more looming, more dangerous in the Arctic than they are in the Karoo or Kalahari. Rasmussen presents a veritable field guide of these spirits (1929: 204–26), along with illustrations, a dozen of which an Iglulik shaman drew for Rasmussen (who provided pencil and paper): “tangible earth-bound” ones (akin to Danish trolls and gnomes), the above-encountered Mountain Spirits (human-like, caribou-muzzled), Sea Spirits (human-like, wearing seal skins), “Shadow Folk”, spirit-personifications of such “dissimilar” things as fire, stone, a precipice, a feasting house and many more. The San spirit world is more sparsely inhabited—tricksters, antelope-people in remote veld
regions who, or whose tracks, a hunter may encounter on an extended hunting excursion, or hyena-men entering one’s nocturnal hut (and/or dreams) and here and there, now and again, spirits of the dead (especially around new grave sites). Moreover, while occasionally encountered in the veld, such appearances or presences occur primarily at ritual sites and performances, trance dances and initiation rites. Where abundance, diversity and extravagance of other-than-human beings—such as therianthropes—in an other-than-real world are given full rein among San is in the World of Myth, as well as the creative imagination of (pre)historic and contemporary San artists (who may also draw on myth in some of their images). For the San Myth Time’s therianthropic beings and its state of ontological inconstancy make themselves felt in the real world in the minds and bodies of ritual ludic dancers, initiands and hunters.

How can we explain this difference in the degree of mytho-magical profusion and ontological confusion in these two hunter-gatherer cosmologies and ontologies and worlds? I am not sure and, given the tangential nature of this brief foray into the Inuit World of Myth and of thought, will merely conjecture, along ecological-cultural lines, without exhausting the theoretical potential of this important question.

Given that hunter-gatherer cosmologies and ontologies are deeply and pervasively connected to the landscape (as seen in the previous chapter), an ecological take on the question suggests itself. In this I follow the lead of my principal source on the Inuit, Knud Rasmussen, who grounds his chapter on “Religion and View of Life” of the Inuit in the land—“a land where the struggle for existence is more acute and merciless than in other regions of the world” (Rasmussen 1929: 54). The chapter’s sub-title is “we do not believe, we fear”. The reasons are the myriad dangers of the Arctic landscape, deriving from natural and supernatural forces and beings.

The answer to the question on the relative degree of mytho-magical and ontological profusion may lie in these perils, which render being-in-the-world a struggle, “acute and merciless”. The mainstay of the subsistence economy of the Inuit on which their survival depends is animals, who inhabit the same forbidding environment. In adapting to its challenges the latter have developed intelligence and wariness and, in prefirearms days, were difficult to hunt as well as capable of self-
defense (and attack), and thus dangerous, especially some of the marine mammals. And the polar bear: a predator itself whose hunting skills Inuit appreciate—and fear, as they may themselves be the hunted in the human hunter-animal prey relationship. This sort of cheek-to-jowl, “rough-and-tumble” (Pickering 2013) interaction with animals, both prey and preying, in an environment that is replete with other dangers, both climatic and mystic, may sharpen and broaden people’s awareness of animals, as sentient subjects. This provides the basis for both anthropomorphizing and mythologizing animals and investing them with mystical and spiritual portent. This includes as well assigning the animal a soul. It is the component of the animal integral to its being that most closely connects animals to humans—all the more as souls also transmigrate from one animal species to another, as well as to humans. So much so that a soul, after an eco-eschatological journey in the course of which it inhabits “the bodies of all the beasts”, becomes human again (Rasmussen 1929: 59–60). The kinship with animals derived from such soul-sharing is, as we saw in Chap. 2, also beset with dangers as each soul resents the killing, butchering and eating of the body it is one with. Given that most of what Inuit eat is animal flesh and that, in consequence, “human food consists entirely of souls”—danger is all around. As is fear.

Applying this sort of cultural-ecological to San cosmology and ontology, specifically the aspect of human-animal relations, might explain these differences in the context of these hunting people, that is, why the anthropomorphization of animals and their spiritualization is more subdued, and the element of fear, of ubiquitous unpredictable spirits in all of the hunting ground’s nooks and crannies, and of animal spirits—and souls—is all but absent. The hunting ground’s doings are not menacing to its San inhabitants and do not add that other dimension of fear to people’s lifeways that it does for Inuit. Instead, these doings are intriguing, adding enchantment to their being-in-the-world experience and connecting them to world beyond, of myths and spirits.

Before ending this tentative foray into Inuit cosmology, specifically its take on ontological mutability, I note a number of other points of comparison between the Inuit of the North and the San of the South, through which ontological aspects of cosmology and experience are
manifested. And, once again, the difference is one of degree rather than kind; matters are more extreme in the north than the south.

One difference is shamanic ritual practice by the *angáikut*, full-fledged shamans who are much more specialized ritually than their San counterparts. Furthermore, they are more important socially, as well as economically, as it is largely through the ministrations of the *angáikut* that the dangers of their “merciless” environment are coped with and controlled, more or less.

A feature in both ritual complexes is that shamans create images of the spirits they encounter, which, in the imagination and execution by an Inuit shaman, are even more surreal than are the therianthropes painted on or engraved on rocks by their San counterparts. Rasmussen’s informant, the Iglulik shaman Anarqãq, made drawings of encountered spirits on paper given to him by the explorer, of basically humanoid figures, with odd appendages, some of the figures amorphous without any recognizable human or faunal referent, at odd places and angles on the figure’s body—“long tongue hangs out between the eyes”, “two tails, one big ear that only seems to be joined to a fold in the skin, and teeth as gross as a walrus’s tusks”, “ears on its nose” (or “on stems, which resemble horns”) and so forth. As amorphous anatomically as they are ontologically, these figures are wildly surreal and more extravagant and diverse in their conflation of features, mostly of no recognizable species provenance as they are drawn from an alien spirit world, than are San images of therianthropes. These, for all their sparkle, are more restrained: each is a variation of the same theme, of human-animal hybridity and transformation, as opposed to the Inuit representations which seem to follow no basic body form or prototype.

An example of the dozen or so drawings Anarqãq produced for Rasmussen is seen in Fig. 6.2. Depicted are spirits the shaman encountered, one of them when hunting caribou and the other “while out wandering”. The drawings, and Rasmussen’s detailed annotation based on the shaman’s exegetical commentary, reveal a wide ranging assemblage of disparate, anatomical and ontological features, such as Quarajaitjoq, “the hole animal” whose “head merely consists of jaws, one of which extends into the creatures one arm”.

1) Nimeriarjuaq, or the hairy worm; moves by writhing its body sinuously; lives both on land and sea; smaller and narrower than the bearded seal, is very fast and only has hair on back and belly; acts as helping spirit, heals the sick; can also be used as defender. 2) Sigqulik, or snout animal; big, melancholy eye, ears on its nose; very keen sense of hearing; short tusks in the mouth; heals the sick. 3) Nuatqe, the water-man, is now a human being, now a dog, but always without a belly and with three tusks in the mouth; it has an excitable mind and split open his forehead at their first meeting; otherwise it is a very effective soul-seeker, can easily find stolen souls and is therefore good at healing the sick. 4) Umingmánguaq, the spirit of the musk-ox. No eyes, senses everything through its ears which are on stems and resemble horns. He met it first while hunting caribou; it spoke like a human being and said it was simply looking for a shaman whom it might serve. It would always follow him, he did not need to turn round to look for it; for then it would disappear. Good for healing all ailments. 5) Qarajaitjoq, the hole animal; the head merely consists of jaws, the opening runs backwards; has only one arm in prolongation of the lower jaw. The hand is formed as a loop; the eyes look like loose rings, one being on the back, the other below the lower jaw. He met it while out wandering and it became his helping spirit; its speciality is helping women who have difficulty in bearing children. Drawn by Anarqaq.
Also more extensive and elaborate in Inuit shamanism than among San is the use of hunting magic, including “magic words” which, according to Rasmussen, the Inuit hold to be “survivals from myth-time when animals could talk” (1929: 157). And when, as seen in the chapter epigraph, words were themselves magic, forging thereby another mystical human-animal link between shamans and animals. Hunting magic includes amulets, a wide array of them obtained from animals which, through the magic of “contagion”, effect a transfer of essence from the animal to the human and a sympathy bond between the two (for instance, through excrement of ermine placed into a stocking to touch the wearer’s skin thereby making him a better walker). Food taboos and regulations are imposed by the Inuit more widely than by the San. They pertain primarily to the processing of animals (Rasmussen 1929: 183–95), especially caribou (“its taboos ... and all the special rules associated with it are extremely complicated”). Some of them appear to be based on sympathy criteria—“a woman may not eat an animal whose foetus is pierce by a hunter” (ibid: 196)—and some are referenced to myths or stories. Yet other seem to be entirely arbitrary; “widows are never allowed to pluck birds” (ibid) is one example of many. The seemingly limitless abundance of these animal-related rules and regulations is once again different from the San where they are more restricted. Moreover, they don’t make reference to myths nor are they arbitrary; instead they are always based on the sympathy bond that links hunter to prey.

This foray into a non-San hunter-gatherer cosmology over, let us embark on another, into a cosmology that is closer to the mind and experience of the reader than that of the Inuit but a good deal further from that of the San. Yet, as we will see, there are also resonances throughout.

**The Animal Turn in the West’s Two Cultures**

How instinct varies in the grov’lling swine,
Compar’d, half-reas’ning elephant, with thine:
“Twixt that, and reason, what a nice barrier;
For ever sep’rate, yet fore ever near!
Remembrance and reflection how allied;
What thin partition sense from thought divided:
Without this just gradation, could they be
Subjected, these to those, or all to thee?
The pow’rs of all subdu’d by thee alone,
Is not thy reason all those pow’rs in one? (Alexander Pope, 1733)\(^\text{14}\)

... I looked at her/and felt her watching:
I became a strange being.
Still, I had my right to be there with her,
Her nimble shadow trotting
along the sky-line, she
put back her fine, level-balanced head.
And I knew her.
Ah yes, being male, is not my head hard-balanced, antlered?
Are not my haunches light?
Has she not fled on the same wind with me?
Does not my fear cover her fear? D. H. Lawrence, 1917\(^\text{15}\)

While the Western view of ontology, especially its arguably paradigmatic and dominant Cartesian conceptualization with a “directive role in the organization of the sciences” (Descola 2013: 87), is in some ways profoundly different from the relational pattern of the San and cultures like them, it does nevertheless today contain—indeed, has always contained—features that resonate with preindustrial hunter-gatherers. These “Premoderns”, in Bruno Latour’s language, are, with regard to their ontologies and cosmologies, not nearly as different from “Moderns” as their “Great Divide” postulate would have it. It is actually an “illusionary” postulate, argues Philippe Descola in a discussion of Latour’s hypothesis (ibid: 86–88), as an intellectual dualism “that masks a practice that contradicts it” (ibid: 87). Moderns, notes Descola paraphrasing Latour—“neither do what they say nor say what they do” (ibid: 86). Anthropologists’ recent ruminations on the Great Divide and its inherent contradiction is what triggered the “ontological turn” in their discipline (and others).
With respect specifically to human-animal relations, it has triggered a parallel “animal turn”, which, as argued by historian Harriet Ritvo in her essay with that title—“On the Animal Turn”—has occurred in Western thinking in all disciplines, as part of a yet broader turn toward posthumanism. In that discussion she notes that “assumptions of extreme difference – for example, that animals lack souls, intelligence, or even feeling – have traditionally coexisted with implicit acknowledgments of similarity, even identity” (2007: 119). As seen in the first epigraph, even so “enlightened” a thinker as Alexander Pope we find commenting, in his philosophical poem “Essay on Man”—paean to the Enlightenment of his age—on the “thin partition” between “sense” and “thought”, rendering humans and animal “separate … yet near”. We hear resonances in this statement, on the “thinness of the dividing line” between humans and animals (Cartmill 1993: 98), with the San postulate of ontological ambiguity dealt with throughout this book, that the two are both “same as” and “other than”.

This sort of fluidity of species boundaries, manifested in transformation and ontological hybridity, are matters that have fascinated Western storytellers and writers throughout history and the notion that humans share identity is not foreign to Western—especially evolutionary—science and humanities, notwithstanding certain strong voices to the contrary, especially in its Enlightenment phase. This is remarked on by literary critic David Asker in his study of Western “metamorphosis literature”:

> We may look at the concept of animal metamorphosis … not as an older, superseded type of metaphor-saturated narrative, but as an original and enduring type of Ur-expressiveness. … The extent and penetration of modern metamorphosis stories attests, I think, to its enduring power and appeal. … Rather than gradually receding as scientific reality takes over, metamorphosis is stronger today than it has ever been. (2001: 7–8)

I shall deal with a dauntingly vast topic cursorily and selectively, drawing on writings by scholars from other disciplines and another disciplinary domain, scholars who, arguably, are better equipped
intellectually for this undertaking than most anthropologists, disciplines such as history, especially intellectual history, literature and philosophy. The reason for including the topic at all in this book on San—and hunter-gatherer, specifically Eastern Arctic Inuit—cosmology and ontology is that so much of the literature on Western animal-human relations, with a few exceptions\(^\text{17}\) has not included preindustrial cultures within its purview, except for prehistoric ones—the cave painters of Europe’s Upper Paleolithic, who, in addition to their status as ancestors to Western people and culture, are also deemed stand-ins for preindustrial hunting folk in general. By including Western ideas on the human-animal nexus in this book on the non-Western, preindustrial perspective, Western thinkers on the matter may perhaps be drawn to it, remedying their limited, Eurocentric understanding of the same. Another reason is that the thinking and writing in this field, in both branches of Western intellectual endeavor, the humanities and the sciences, has recently taken the above-noted “animal turn”. This, in a number of ways is also an “animism turn”, so that preindustrial cultures and cosmologies like the San gain a relevance to Western thought that had rarely been appreciated before (outside anthropology and comparative religion). These Western writers could gain new insights by reading about the cosmologies and ontologies of hunter-gatherers. The same is the case vice versa—which is the reason I venture into these writings, not without some trepidation as much of this literature is for me \textit{terra nova} (and \textit{incognita}).

As historian Harriet Ritvo, in her above-noted article, points out, “learned attention to animals is far from new” (\textit{2007}: 118) in Western thought; moreover, for all of its Cartesian polarizing and dichotomizing, this attention also included awareness of “conjunctive blending of the human-animal divide” and that in the human-animal relationship, “continuity and discontinuity were inextricably intertwined” (ibid: 120). This notion is central also to San cosmology, who, as we saw earlier, blend human and animal identity by seeing themselves – and them – as both “same as” and “other than”, in the conceptual and phenomenological context of a connective cosmology, with porous and overlapping species boundaries and categories.

There is a long history of Western literary figures who have written in relationalist-animist terms about animals, attributing to them, \textit{contra}
Descartes, subject status and sentience, more or less—as the above-mentioned Alexander Pope, who “bridged the gulf between man and beast ... by invo[king] the ancient notion of the great chain of being” (Cartmill 1993: 98). As argued by the Canadian political scientist and historian of ideas, Rod Preece, the Enlightenment-steeped exceptionalism of the Great Chain notion of “animal continuity” was blunted by Pope’s German contemporary Johann Wolfgang von Goethe by means of yet another philosophical poem, the “Metamorphosis of Animals”. Based on the poet’s own zoological research, Goethe countered the Enlightenment idea of “animals as incompletely formed humans” and proposed instead that each animal was autonomous in its being—“Zweck sein selbst”, that is “a purposeful whole, an end in itself” (2002: 180). This “new emphasis” on the Great Chain concept “elevated the status of animals” (ibid) as a concept of animals as ends in themselves discouraged the Cartesian notion of animals as “instruments of human purposes” (Preece 2005: 324).

A third poet, lyrical rather than philosophical in his poetry and aware of the animal’s autonomy, consciousness and being’ness, is D. H. Lawrence. His “animal poems”, as noted by the literary critic Deborah Brassard, “trace the speaker’s development of mystical awareness by his growing ability to comprehend animal consciousness” (1984: n.p.). The poet’s comprehension operates through what Lawrence refers to as his “blood-consciousness”, a version of “the animistic mentality” which, according to the literary scholar Jane Costin, he came to appreciate through reading Frazer’s Golden Bough and Totemism and Exogamy (2012: 153). The “anti-anthropocentric” tenor of these remarkable poems rings through “A Doe at Evening” (second epigraph) at the point in the poem when the poet is in the thrall of an encounter moment with the deer he sees appearing in the nearby distance—all of it with much the same degree of absorption and beguilement, as well as intersubjectivity, as a San hunter might by the sight of an eland or kudu.

A propos San echoes, in terms of expressive style and tone and of narrative content, I here mention a personal favorite, namely Edward Lear, the English painter of birds, for scientific publications, and rhymster of quixotic non-sense poems for young and old. Its style and spirit the poet’s biographer Jenny Uglow refers to as a “dizzying sense of the overlap between animal [in particular birds] and human” (2017:
the outcomes of which are reminiscent, in benignly bowdlerized fashion, of San therianthropic representations. Indeed, in doodles that adorned his letters, Lear was wont to present himself in avian form:

[L]ean[ing] forward with his frock coat flung out like a tail, and his long nose a beak; he hovers in the air, a rotund bird with feathery wings and tiny legs; he swims solemnly on with geese...; he nests in a tree, or struts and bends his head as if to peck. (Uglow 2017: 57)

Especially significant in Western literature that deals with ontological inconstancy is Franz Kafka, the leading figure in “metamorphosis literature” (Asker 2001; Harel 2013; Müller 2010; Lucht and Yarri 2010), a branch that has been on the Western literary scene ever since Ovid’s *Metamorphoses* and which was expanded exponentially through this “most ambivalent of authors” who, at his own admission, had “hardly anything in common with myself”. Are Kafka’s stories, about ontological ambiguity, by an ambivalent humanized animal subject—or animalized human subject—who tries to come to terms with this basic issue about his being, a reflection perhaps of this self-disclosed inner personal ambiguity (as “the ultimate ‘disaffiliated pariah’”)? It is a thought—by an outsider to literary, specifically Kafka studies—that is as tempting as it is moot; whatever the answer, the stories he has created in this state of personal “disaffiliation” resonate with /Xam and !Kung stories, on the same theme, by storytellers whose world view is shot through with ambiguity and ambivalence about ontological “affiliation”.

Best known is Kafka’s story “The Metamorphosis”, about the human-animal transformation one morning experienced just after waking up from sleep, by the salesman Gregor Samsa, into an insect—some sort of indeterminate beetle or bug (not a mantis!) While this story holds iconic status in this sub-field of Western literature, near the end of his life Kafka wrote a number of other, less well-known stories about human-animal—or animal-human—transformation or hybridity.

One features the human-transformed chimpanzee Rotpeter who, having in his “human-becoming” ("Menschwerdung")—a “reverse 'Metamorphosis'” (Norris 1980: 1243)—acquired the “educational level
of the average European” (Kafka 1919: 564), is seen in the story lecturing to academics about how and why this transformation happened, and how, his anthropomorphizing notwithstanding, he has not altogether shed his apeness (Affentum). This is something he is conflicted about and struggles with throughout his talk and tries to hide, through astute display as well as mimicry of human intellectual capabilities (Norris ibid.: 1246–48), by means of human speech, which he has both acquired through five-years’ worth of “human-becoming” training by five human mentors Yet, notwithstanding these efforts, his simian nature displays itself in occasional emotional outbursts or unguarded asides and lapses throughout his lecture—a mimetic performance of “‘aping the human” (Norris ibid.). One was over a deep and abiding resentment about having been named after his capture in Africa and arrival in Germany on the Hagenbeck zoo’s animal acquisition ship after a recently “krepiert”—“croaked”—famous trained performing ape¹⁹ (ibid: 559). One bodily sensation that reminds him of his Affennatur are ticklings—“tappings”?—in his heels, vestigial residues from his simian past which, the pongid-human lecturer suggests to his learned human audience, are felt by not only “the lowly chimpanzee but also the mighty Achilles”. He holds forth on his simian-anthropic perspective on life that he has acquired through it, including on humans—one of ambivalence and occasional loathing sufficiently intense to bring about an urge to vomit (Brechreiz) (Kafka 2000: 335). Less ambivalent emotionally—yet ambiguous ontologically—are his discreet comments on love-making, with a “partially broken-in female chimpanzee” with whom, at home after work at the cabaret, “I allow myself to find pleasure, in the apish way” (nach Affenart). Yet, this he can do only at night, as “I do not want to look at her in the light of day as she has the insanity in her eyes of the bewildered, trained animal, which only I can recognize, and I cannot bear it” (ibid: 560, my translation).

Rotpeter’s musings, about the uneasy blending of his Affentum with his newly acquired humanity, bring to mind certain stories in the /Xam archive, for instance, human/Xue’s schizoid dialogue with the hare-ness that to his consternation also constitutes his being and that he tries to eschew, with only limited success. Another resonance with the San process and experience of transformation (which was noted above in
Chap. 4) is that in both cases mimesis precedes metamorphosis, and entails the same and manifests itself incrementally, from simple imitation, by an ape, to a—“no-longer just animal”—“self-determined subject”:

The process of human-becoming (*Menschwerdung*) unfolds in several phases. At first the ape resorts to pure imitation. “Spitting” and “smoking” ... come easily to the ape. With both eager enthusiasm and disgust he learned to drink from the liquor bottle. ... And beyond all of this he learns language. Finding language is equivalent to “subject-finding”. The ape is now no longer just animal, but develops into the “self-determined subject”. (University of Bonn 2012: 2, my translation)

Other stories by Kafka about hybrid beings deal not so much with their transformation as they do with how they experience their own hybrid—therianthropic—being and on their relationships with other beings; again there are echoes here from the Karoo and the Kalahari (for instance, //Kaggen and the Magic Bird and the Early Race lion and the field mouse). One is “Investigations of a Dog”, featuring a ruminating dog protagonist, who relates with only dim awareness to his human master, who to him, a quadruped close to the ground, is only some vague sentient presence six feet above him from which food issues forth twice a day. Ignored or only dimly sensed from his caninist solipsist perspective, the dog relates not to humans but, in anthropo-canine terms, to other dogs to whom he compares himself favorably, in terms of his build, the slenderness of his legs, the sheen and color of his fur, his frontal aspect and angle of his head. The dog protagonist’s musings encompass other feature of his *umwelt*, rendered salient or thought-worthy to him through his unique dog-person’s perspective. A highlight of his life, with existentialist repercussions eliciting a species identity crisis in his hybrid being, is when, as a young dog in his formative years, he happens across a vaudeville performance by seven small dogs which consisted of his fellow-canines walking upright. In so doing they had “transgressed the law”—having “jettisoned all shame, these miserable creatures carried out both the most ridiculous and
most unseemly that one can think of: walking upright on their hindlegs. *Pfui Teufel!* (my translation\textsuperscript{20}).

In one of the chapter epigraphs we find much the same perspective, by an autonomous humanimalian subject on his faunally experienced umwelt, in another animal, a badger. Or perhaps he is a mole, as some commentators hold the protagonist of “Der Bau” to be; much like Gregor Samsa, this therianthrope is as ambiguous in his faunal aspect as are some of the San and Inuit hybrid beings. It is a subterranean umwelt through which he digs countless tunnels in search for food, safety and peace of mind that helps define the animalian component of his being, much as it does for the /Xam First Order Anteater or Ticks, whose ontological identity comes into focus through these Early Race therianthropes’ doings in—and being-in—the world they inhabit, the former digging underground and the latter inhabiting sheep’s fleece.

There are at least three other genres of Western literature that deal—with “learned attention”, more or less—with the human-animal relationship, children’s literature (including fables, written original for adults, before entering their children’s World of Story), graphic literature (comics and novels) and folklore, in particular fairy tales, a sub-genre especially resonant with San orature (as well as Inuit, as seen above).

A characteristic that lessens the resonance of the first two genres with hunter-gatherer animal tales is their anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism. This is unrestrained, unabashed and unselfconscious in most of these stories, say Beatrix Potter’s Peter Rabbit or Kenneth Grahame’s Badger or Rupert Bear’s best chum Bill Badger, the latter badgers two bona fide humans in mustelidean get-up whose creators have made no attempt to “perspectivize” their anthropomorphized, supposedly animal subjects. Other writers of children’s animal stories find a creative challenge in depicting their animal subjects as such, theri-centrically. An example that comes readily to my mind—because the book was repeat being-read-to fare to my two sons Daniel and Stephan when they were young—is Richard Adam’s rabbits in *Watership Down*. These anthropomorphized rabbits have their own “lapine” terms for body functions—*silflay*, passing *hraka*—and for dangers specific to their lives and world, such as being hit by a *hrududu* (motor car) or stalked by a *lendri* (“badger”). The latter
mustelidioanthrope brings to mind—again from book readings to my young sons—one Trufflehunter, C. S. Lewis’s were-badger readers of the *Narnian Chronicles* meet in *Prince Caspian*, who is another animal character whom his creator has made a creative effort to subjectivize in animalian terms by giving this orthograde, speech-possessing Old Narnian his own “curiously husky, earthy voice”. Yet, on the whole, Western writers for the young (and their readers) seem for the most part content to depict animals anthropocentrically as “humans pretending that animals wear clothing”. Notwithstanding his idiosyncratic idiolectical speech patterns (“I tought I taw a puddi-tat”), and arbitrary ones that sound not like a bird-infant but a human one, notwithstanding a pair of mouse ears or a duck beak, neither Warner Brother’s Tweety Bird nor Disney Corp.’s Mickey Mouse or Donald Duck are anything other than mid-century middle-class Americans. The same applies to the myriad of other such therianthropes of Western popular literature and culture (although I have come across one or two that engage with perspectivism in interesting ways).

Celtic and Nordic folklore’s Faiërie and Elfenland, and its literary remake, in Midsummer Night’s Dream and the other-worlds of Middle Earth and above-noted Narnia, as well as numerous others in the Western collective imagination, are not at all unlike the San First Order of Existence, inhabited by ontologically unstable therianthropic denizens. Included in their ranks are trickster figures, such as the ontologically volatile Puck—“sometimes a horse ... sometimes a hound, a hog, a headless bear, sometimes a fire”—from *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*. Another animist figure we encounter here, because of his shamanistic leanings, is, once again, the badger: Moritasgus, the “Great Badger” of Celtic myth and lore, who journeys between the worlds above and below, “shuttling like a sewing machine stitching the world together; making it whole; giving it an integrity it would otherwise have lacked” (Foster 2016: 70).

Yet another category of ontologically ambiguous beings of Western folk and literary tales, picked up and elaborated by online fantasy games, are “elementals”. These spirit embodiments of the four elements were first concocted by medieval alchemy and, having entered folklore and popular culture, as Melusine, Undine, Rusalka, the Little Mermaid and through superheroes such as DC Comic’s *The Elementals*
characters in fantasy games, these animalistic were-beings were elaborated by storytellers, writers, playwrights, opera libretto writers and composers (such as Antonín Dvořák, whose opera “Rusalka” was referred to in the introduction to Vol. I, along with its superb stage production by Marion Zimmermann who, some years before, had written and produced a play based on Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*).

Turning now to the sciences, it is in ethology, the scientific study of animal behavior, that we see the animal turn at its sharpest, in particular, in its recent branch of “cognitive ethology” (Ristau 1991). As noted by Virginia Morell in her review of this new direction of the discipline, “for most of the twentieth century animal minds were off limits for serious scientists” (2013: 14). These included in their ranks the field’s founding fathers, Konrad Lorenz, Niko Tinbergen, and Karl von Frisch, all of “who[m]”, notes Morell, “ruled out attributing mental desires or motivations to what animals do or how they behave” (a view that was underscored in America by Skinnerian behaviorism). This couldn't be more different today—“the tide has turned”, noted Carolyn Ristau already in 1991 in the introduction to her anthology of the then newly formed branch of animal studies:

> cognitive ethology, animal cognition, the minds of other animals, particularly as these minds deal with real world problems of their species, have gained a stronghold in the minds of an ever increasing number of scientists. (1991: 311)

Not only are mental and emotional aspects of animal behavior the central focus of contemporary ethologists, such as, inter alia, Frans de Waal, Cynthia Moss, the late Donald Griffin, Marc Berkof and Gordon Burghardt, but these researchers feel they now “know that animals think and feel” (ibid, my emphasis), “as minded, emotional and intentional actors” (Sanders and Arluke 2007: 68) each with its—his/her?—individual personality (Trillmich and Hudson 2011), including, in some animals, moral feelings, emanating from an animalian capacity for “theory of mind”-derived empathy (Morell ibid. 88–89; Herzog 2010: 62–64).

The *that* no longer in question, the concern now is the *how* of animal cognition, a research-driving interest shared by researchers in
an array of other behavioral disciplines, such as neurologists (Sapolsky 2005), zoologists (Serpell 1986; Foster 2016) and psychologists (Herzog 2010), along with anthropologists (Mullin 1999) and archaeologists (Russell 2012; Hill 2013, Watts 2013). Around all this collective research endeavor has formed a new multi-discipline, Human-Animal Studies (Roscher 2012; Kalof and Fitzgerald 2007), or Anthrozoology (Bradshaw 2010, 2018), with its own university programs, professional organizations and conferences (Herzog ibid.: 15–35). In exploring the above-noted “how”, these researchers find it necessary to eschew previous disciplinary de rigeurs of the scientific methodological discipline, embodied in Cartesian “mechanomorphism”. They do so by employing “such tools as introspection, reasoning by analogy, interpretive analysis and intuition” (Sanders and Arluke 2007: 67). Even anthropomorphism, the “cousin of projection” and the ethological Old Guard’s greatest bug-bear, is an arrow in the methods quiver, seen as a “useful heuristic device”; indeed, as “critical anthropomorphism”, it constitutes the “middle ground” in the debate between the Old Guard innatist animal behaviorists and the new cognitive ethologists (ibid). Their special interest is in “companion animals”, in particular dogs, and the “human animal bond” this establishes between the humans and the animal, especially through empathy (Bradshaw 2010: 28). The research procedures that derive from so intuition- and empathy-based a research goal can bring about “human exchanges with nonhuman animals” in a researcher, “that involve knowing, relating to, shaping interactions with, and responding to the interactional moves of the animal-other” (Sanders and Arluke 2007: 68). It is here, in “systematically studying these social exchanges”, that these researchers find “a major ‘window to animal mind’” (ibid.).

It is here also where readers of this book find the closest rapprochement of Western researchers with San and hunting peoples like them, to a connective cosmology, situated in a lifeway that is embedded in nature and closely attuned to animals toward whom hunters, along with shamans, dancers, image makers, storytellers and listeners, are connected through a sympathy bond.

The researcher in this camp who has taken this new, intuitive, interactive, intersubjective ethological approach further than anyone else I am aware of is the British expert on medical law and ethics as
well as certified veterinarian Charles Foster. As seen above, his research method—enacting “sense-based empathy acts” (2016: 174)—had him eating earthworms or “brambles, ivy, nettles, sorrel and many species of moorland grass” and live for six weeks in a badger sett or spend days and nights on end in different types of woodlands to come as close as he could, through his body and senses, to being a badger or a red deer (as well as, through other such “becoming-animal acts” in other ontological guises and ecological terrains, as otter, fox and swift). The link of this ethologist to posthumanist and post-Cartesian ethology is reflected from how Foster describes his project as a “sort of literary shamanism”:

Nature writing has generally been about humans striding colonially around, describing what they see from six feet above the ground, or about humans pretending that animals wear clothing. This book is an attempt to see the world from the height of naked Welsh badgers, London foxes, Exmoor otters, Oxford swifts, and to shuffle or swoop through a landscape that is mainly olfactory or auditory rather than visual. It is a sort of literary shamanism. (Foster 2016: 1)

Without elaborating, I note that, all these efforts notwithstanding, Foster had to admit to himself that he failed in his efforts, as he was not able in the end to shut off his human’ness, especially his “own drearily self-referential eyes” (ibid: 132). Or, when, qua badger, lying in a comatose half sleep in his sett, whiling away the day hours, his mind and imagination dormant, trying to “live in the same world” as “his” animals (ibid: 216) and failing as he was unable to bracket out thinking and imagining.

Baron von Uexküll: “A Kind of Biologist-Shaman”
I make note here of another biologist, the fin de siècle Baltic German biologist and biosemiotician Jakob von Uexküll, a figure in Western human-animal thinking who bridges the West’s Two Cultures—he counted among his personal acquaintances and friends the scientist
and fellow-ethologist Konrad Lorenz and the lyrical poet Rainer Maria Rilke (Winthrop-Young 2010: 230–33)—and whose phenomenological take on ethology and the human-animal relationship has made him a prominent figure in posthumanism and critical animal studies (ibid: 213–24). Von Uexküll, I suggest, in some ways also bridges Western and San hunter-gatherer cultures’ ideas on the human-animal nexus.

Jakob von Uexküll, a century before Foster and his more restrained cognitive ethologists and anthrozoologist confreres, wrote about animal behavior not in the then-current instinctual, mechanistic terms but with reference to the animal’s intentions and purposes, specifically with respect to its surroundings. These this precursors to cognitive ethology referred to as the animal’s Umwelt (pl. Umwelten), the German language’s term for “environment” to which von Uexküll gave his distinctive phenomenological spin. He differentiated an animal’s Umwelt—a specific “animal’s perceptual life-world” (Sagan 2010: 2)—conceptually from its Umgebung (“surroundings”), the total, overall environment that includes all of its features, rather than the ones that constitute the reference frame of a specific organism or animal. It is also the arena for the dynamics of natural selection and adaptation, ecological niches and networks. But Umgebung matters, about animals’ ecological relations in terms of mechanical, cause-and-effect dynamics in relation to their environment and to one another, were not von Uexküll’s primary concern.

Instead, as noted by Eduardo Kohn in an application of von Uexküll’s Umwelt concept to Amazonian Runa “transspecies engagement” (i.e. relational ontology), animals’ relations with the environment “are the product of the interaction of the phenomenal worlds ... that are particular to the perceptual and bodily dispositions, motivations and intentions of different kinds of beings” (2007: 4–5). As opposed to the Western anthropocentric and solipsistic perspective, von Uexküll “supposes an infinite variety of perceptual worlds”, at the center of each of which, “lie familiar and, at the same time, remote little beings called Echinus esculentus, Amoeba tenticola, Rhizogtoma pulmo, ... Anemonia sulcataea, Ixodes ricinus and so on ...”. Each of these animalian beings—“the sea urchin, the amoeba, the jellyfish, the sea worm, the sea anemone, the tick (these being their common names)”—lives within its own, species-specific Umwelt, all of them, to humans,
“unknowable worlds ... because these creatures’ functional unity with the environment seems so apparently distant from that of man and the so-called higher animal” (Agamben 2004: 40). The “autonomy, intentionality, and a point of view of the same nature as those of humans” Descola sees as deriving from Uexküll’s umwelt, “a lived and “acted” world, characterized by whatever the animal in question is capable of doing in it with the physical advantages at its disposal” (2013: 283). “It is this ability to perceive, in a subjective fashion, a world that extends their own organs and needs”, Descola continues, “that converts animist entities into subject” (ibid.).

We see from the above references to Kohn and Descola that Umwelt has become part of the conceptual toolkit of anthropologists of the New Animism paradigm. The term has also cropped up repeatedly in this book, in which it is conceptually employed in a basically Uexküllian sense (devoid of its semiotic aspects), that is, the idea of animals as subjects with species-specific dispositions and activities, which leads them to perceive and act on the environment each in its own way.

These animals, to von Uexküll, include also humans, who, in addition to appreciating bodily their own “self-in-world” ontological Umwelt “bubble”, are also able to extend that appreciation to other-than-humans through their “mind’s eye” (von Uexküll 2010: 43). This the biologist did through zoological observation, analysis and deduction —qua scientist—as well as through intuition. These different cognitive processes can be seen at play in the biologist’s mind in an opening passage to his A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans:

We begin such a stroll on a sunny day before a flowering meadow in which insects buzz and butterflies flutter, and we make a bubble around each of the animals living in the meadow. The bubble represents each animal’s environment and contains all the features accessible to the subject. As soon as we enter into such a bubble, the previous surroundings of the subject are completely reconfigured. Many qualities of the colourful meadow vanish completely, others lose their coherence with one another, and new connections are created. A new world arises in each bubble. (von Uexküll 2010: 43)
In a recent critical evaluation of von Uexküll’s *Umwelt* concept the American essayist Orion Sagan characterizes von Uexküll’s theoretical vision and analytical *modus operandi* as “shamanic” because “at one and the same time Uexküll is a kind of biologist-shaman, attempting to cross the Rubicon to nonhuman minds, and a humble naturalist, closely observing and recording his fellow living beings” (*2010*: 20). This Western biologist’s interest in and engagement with animals moves along the same epistemological lines as that of the San, especially San hunters, whose “same as”—“other than” appreciation of animals fosters both a “scientific”, observation-based and a “shamanic”, empathy-based intellectual stance to these beguiling others.

Sagan’s reference to shamanism echoes Foster’s description of his own project as “a sort of literary shamanism”. This and the other chapters of this book have fleshed out Foster’s virtual—Western, posthumanist, armchair—shamanism of which he felt occasional direct intimations, throughout his fascinating project, by describing actual, on-the-ground shamanism in the context of the cosmology of two hunting people for whom seeing the world from an animal’s perspective is less of an effort, given that cosmology’s a priori premise of human-animal continuity and intersubjectivity.

As I suggested earlier, that perspective, the attainment of which is the core goal of cognitive ethology, as well as of writers and poets, from Ovid to Kafka and Lawrence, might be more readily attained if these writers were to immerse themselves in the literature on these non-Western cosmologies (as Lawrence did when reading *The Golden Bough*).

Or better yet, talk to the people who subscribe to and live by such cosmologies. This would not only provide new insights, along new and unfamiliar intellectual pathways, but make the new, post-Cartesian, posthumanist ethnologists less self-conscious about their posthumanist and post-Cartesian research endeavors, deemed “too weird to be convincing to most” of their less venturesome, more hide-bound colleagues. And in so doing, attempting to “enter that non-human other’s body”, expand as well the limits of our ability “to imagine another creature’s experience”. This would include “seeing the world as the animals see it”—not as an academically trained and minded researcher but as that other-than-human fellow-creature.
References


Harel, Naama. 2013. Investigation of a Dog, by a Dog: Between Anthropocentrism and Canine-

Herzog, Hal. 2010. Some We Love, Some We Hate, Some We Eat: Why It’s So Hard to Think Straight about Animals. New York: Harper Perennial.


Lange, Mary E., and Lauren Dyll-Myklebust. 2015. Spirituality. Shifting Identities and Social Change: Cases from the Kalahari Landscape. *HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies* 71 (1), Art, #22985, 11 pp. [http://dx.doi.org/10.4.102/hts.v71/12985](http://dx.doi.org/10.4.102/hts.v71/12985)


Trillmich, Fritz, and Robyn Hudson. 2011. The Emergence of Personality in Animals: The Need


Footnotes

2 Von Wielligh published these in Afrikaans, in four volumes between 1919 and 1921. They were recently translated by into English by Philip John (von Wielliegh 2016). An unpublished German translation (of 38 tales) by Heinrich Vedder can be found in the library of the Frobenius Institut in Frankfurt (document no, LL IV 281).

3 The painting is on display at The Origin Centre museum of the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. See Jolly (2015: 310) for a color photograph of the painted rock slab.

4 Arguably so, whether or not this instance of San totemism is Bantu-derived and borrowed or aboriginal, to the San, or to both groups, has been an issue of debate ever since Dornan first reported the pattern a hundred years back (see Barnard 1992: 125–26).

5 Along with the “foraging mode of production”, and its elaboration as “optimal foraging strategy”, “hunter affluence” was one of the key issues of research and theoretical debate in hunter-gatherer studies in the latter quarter of the twentieth century (Sahlins 1972; Lee 1968: 40–41; Burch and Ellanna 1994: 147–49; Kelly 1995: 14–19). For a recent reconsideration of forager affluence in a San context see Suzman (2017).

6 This is a widespread phenomenon among circumpolar hunting peoples generally, manifested in the so-called bear cult (Hallowell 1926), with roots deep in prehistory as far back as Neanderthal horizons. The bear species varies regionally; brown, grizzly or black bear in sub-arctic regions, polar bear in the Arctic.

7 My account of this ursine aspect in this paragraph is derived from Laugrand’s and Oosten’s chapter on the bear (2015: 179–206, especially pp. 181–84).

8 Rasmussen describes one such transformation that he was witness to (1929: 39–40), with the classic Western cultural outsider’s perspective of skepticism about the “reality” of what he saw, reporting that it was a shamanic performance “not produced with any superlative art”. Rasmussen attributed the persistence of this aspect of Inuit symbolic culture to the shaman’s being able to rely on “the credulity of others” (See Guenther 2018).

9 A classic instance of what Andrew Lang referred to as a “universality of the mythopoeic mental condition”, which is at its most unrestrained level of operation in the symbolic-
expressive domain of myth and, as such, may “intrude” on religion, which is more restrained and staid (1901: 15–16).

10 Questions of this sort might have been on poet Ogden Nash’s mind, in his ontologico-existentialist musing about the octopus: “Tell me, O Octopus, I begs, / Is those things arms, or is they legs? / I marvel at thee, Octopus; / If I were thou, I’d call me us.” (Cited by Marlene Zuk in her review of Peter Godfrey-Smith’s 2016 book on octopus consciousness [2017]).

11 See Chap. 5 in Vol. I.


13 In their section on the raven, Laugrand and Oosten do mention this being’s trickster-like traits—“always ambiguous he is a bringer of light and an eater of eyes” (2015: 93)—in a few of the Eastern Arctic Inuit myths (especially so in “The Raven as a Husband and Suitor”, pp. 100–102). However, the authors also note that this being, in that persona, is much more developed and prominent in the mythology Western Arctic Eskimos (ibid: 83–84; see Serov 1988: 242–43).


16 The ones I have read, and recently re-read, are White Jr. (1967), Thomas (1996), Cartmill (1993), Berman (1999), Preece (1999, 2002, 2005), as well as Willy Ley’s popular and highly readable Dawn of Zoology.

17 Rod Preece has included substantial discussions of preindustrial cultures in two of his books on the subject (1999: 163–98, 2002: 3–21). In literary studies, the Derrida-inspired volume—by his “la pensé de l’animal” notion of “thinking about” and “thinking” animals—on “animality” in Western literature includes an important essay (by Rosalind Morris) on /Xam mythology and cosmology, as mediated, via //Kabbo, by Elias Canetti. Also noteworthy is the recently launched “Palgrave Studies in Animals and Literature” edited by Susan McHugh, Robert
McKay and John Miller, which includes a volume (Woodward and McHugh 2017) that engages with non-Western narrative and imagery, including chapters on San myth and art.

18 The quotes are from an anonymously authored review of Benjamin Balint’s *Kafka’s Last Trial: The Case of a Literary Legacy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2018) in *The Economist* (January 12th, 2019: 76–77).

19 Whose name was Peter, a “star of the European stage – the Folies-Bergère in Paris, the Palace Music Hall in London” (Radik 2019: n.p.), who, in 1909, the fiftieth anniversary of Darwin’s publication of *The Origin of Species*, made his debut in New York, starting his American tour. As recently shown by the literary historian Gregory Radik (2019), this particular ape, obliquely referred to by his literary namesake, was the inspiration for the same, by his human creator, Kafka.

20 The quotes from Kafka’s writings here all refer to texts from these stories that are readily available online at various public-domain websites.

21 An example is the *Blacksad* graphic novel series by Juan Díaz Canales and Juanjo Guardnido, in which not only the protagonist—a Marlowe’ian sleuth anthro-feline—is a therianthrope but all other characters, including anonymous crowd figures, are such, each with its species-distinctive profile. As this, however, is based on human-held stereotypes of each animal, some derived from proverbs and adages, others from fables, perhaps the most anthrocentric genre of Western animal literature and folklore, the novels, for all these creative effort of therio-centrizing their therianthropic subjects, end up anthrocentric.

22 They are two of dozens of other similar nether-land entries in Alberto Manguel’s and Gianni Guadalupi’s marvelous *Dictionary of Imaginary Places* (“a Baedeker or traveller’s guide to some of the places of literature, including maps”), attesting to the ubiquity and tenacity in Western myth, lore and story of alternate worlds, many of them inverted worlds of “chaotic topsy-turvydom” (Koepping 1985: 193).

23 A close second, in a project as novel as Foster’s but not nearly as sophisticated conceptually and thorough in its ethological-ethnographic approach and execution, is by the English designer Thomas Thwaites (2016) who, having “goatified” himself with prostheses that allowed him to move quadrupedally and outfitted himself with an ersatz-rumen so that he could munch on grass while mingling with a herd of goats in the Swiss Alps, spent three days living “as a goat” with the herd (and another three on his own, digesting the experience, along with, it is to be hoped, the munched-on grass).
This elegant description of von Uexküll’s *umwelt* concept is from the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s book *The Open: Man and Animal*, a work on “the foundational distinction in Western thought – that between man and animal” (Bradley 2007: 502) that “explores ontologies that allow for the fraternal and non-hierarchical coexistence of all forms of life” (Seri 2005: 1, 2). Agamben draws extensively on this non-anthropocentric German zoologist in his treatise, as well as his compatriot contemporaries to whom he had both intellectual and personal ties, the philosopher and poet Martin Heidegger and Rainer Maria Rilke (from whom Angamben derived the concept of “The Open” in the title of his book which he uses to refer to the particular way each living being exists in and experiences the world).
7. Conclusion: Ontological Ambiguity and Anthropological Astonishment

Mathias Guenther

I conclude this book on the preceding chapter’s final note—on the mutual advantage of a cross-cultural dialogue on the human-animal relationship—with musings on how such a dialogue might be formulated, in a manner that fruitfully combines the discursive modes on the topic of Westerners and of hunter-gatherers (as per the San and, tangentially, the Inuit). Is this possible? How reconcilable are these two discursive modes? Are they the two solitudes and polarities epistemologically that Western thinkers (some of them anthropologists) generally hold them to be? The ontological—specifically animal—turn in anthropology has rekindled interest in this problematic—one of long-standing interest to anthropologists—and filtered new wine into old bottles. And, in the process, has raised critical voices. It has also raised a number of new questions, of the “for further research” kind appropriate to a book’s concluding chapter. Most of the questions are of a phenomenological cast and most of them I will only raise for consideration without much attempt at answers, as this book is almost at its end.

Elizabeth Marshall Thomas is a writer who, at the beginning of her writing career, spent time among the Ju/'hoansi, in the company of her
mother, father and brother Lorna, Laurence and John Marshall. One of her two books on this hunting-gathering people’s lifeway and world view includes discussions of how Ju/'hoansi related to animals, especially in pre-contact times, when people followed what the author calls “the Old Way”. This is the title also of a profoundly perceptive essay—first published in The New Yorker in 1991—on human-lion-human relations (which was discussed in Vol. I, Chap. 3). Some years later on she wrote two books about the human-animal relationship in a Western context, one about cats, the other about dogs. An excerpt from the latter work (that resonates with the preceding chapter’s concluding note) sets the tone for the present chapter:

Like most people who hunger to know more about the lives of animals, I have always wanted to enter into the consciousness of a nonhuman creature. I would like to know what the world looks like to a dog, for instance, or sounds like, or smells like. I would like to visit a dog’s mind, to know what he’s thinking or feeling, to have another dog look at me and see not something different but something the same. (Thomas 1993: 120)

It is tempting to speculate that her book on human-dog-human relations, based on ethological “field work” with the pack of dogs that free-roam the Marshall New Hampshire summer estate grounds, and her motivation for and approach to that project—“to visit a dog’s mind” and perceive the world, including humans, through its eyes, ears and nostrils—was influenced by the author’s ethnographic field work among the Ju/'hoansi, specifically their Old Way of interacting with and relating to animals.

The same way Lorna Marshall’s musings at the introduction of this book (in Vol. I), about whether or not there were any mimetic and metamorphic aspects to the Ju/'hoansi Giraffe Dance, opened up its exploration of San human-animal relations, ontology and cosmology, so her daughter Elizabeth’s ruminations, half a century on, about The Hidden Lives of Dogs and her own and humans’ lives within those lives, will serve as the book’s conclusion. Thomas’s passage deals with the “sense of astonishment” felt by humans—San hunter-gatherers and many others—as they engage with animals, intellectually and sensually.
And, most significant, relationally attuned, simultaneously and ambivalently, to one another’s ontological sameness and otherness.

S(animism) and the “Re-animation” of Western Thought

A good place to start, for a Western researcher visiting the San to learn about the matter of a cross-cultural dialogue regarding human-animal relations, is the hunt. This, as we saw in Chap. 7 (Vol. I), is the arena that brings humans into cheek-to-jowl proximity with animals, which, in some forms of hunting, may become relational and intersubjective. Yet, as we also saw, in addition to this mystical-intuitive element, inherent in the sympathy bond between hunter and prey, hunters also go about their business in an instrumental-empirical fashion, and do so with great efficiency. The two modes of hunting, as argued in Chap. 7, are complementary and synergistic. We see this in James Suzman’s account of ≠Au//ei tracking, based on recent ethnographic field work in the Omaheke in eastern Namibia:

To be a good tracker requires engaging in a constant physical dialogue with the environment and ultimately an ability to project oneself into the animal that left its tracks. ... Tracking required an ability to read between the marks and infer the maker’s moods, circumstances, and intentions. To do this required a lifetime of practical experience and an intimate knowledge of the animals that made the tracks. (2017: 166–67)

What is seen in this passage is a coupling of what Western philosophers and psychologists generally deem two “incommensurable perspectives on the world” (Jack 2014: 27). The experimental philosopher and cognitive neuroscientist Anthony Jack refers to these as the “empathic” and the “empirical” “modes of understanding”, the one based on engaged empathy and intuition and focused on the social-moral world, the other on detached observation and analysis, with its focus on the physical-mechanical world (or a social-moral world so reduced).² Jack suggests that “complete understanding”, in terms of a blending of these two perspectives, is difficult and possible only through, firstly, full
immersion in one or the other of these “distinct perspectives”, and secondly, precariously bridging the chasm between the two through “something like juggling”. This juggling act brings about a more “removed perspective”, Jack argues, allowing a “partial reconciliation” between “the personal world of experience and the impersonal world of mechanism” (ibid. 27).

The tracking San hunter, whose mindscape and world view lie outside any of the discourses on Cartesian-rooted Western philosophy and neuroscience and its enrooted “conceptual dualism” (Jack 2014: 27), shows us that it is possible to engage both modes of understanding simultaneously and synergistically (that is, fully “reconciled”, rather than partially): attuned to his as yet distant quarry wounded with a slow-working poison through a sympathy bond and intuiting its likely moves, while also fully alert sensuously, to the track, more or less visible, the terrain ahead, the direction of the wind, calls of birds and countless other sensory clues and cues to which he is attentive and which he processes via his “empirical mode of understanding”. Both modes work in tandem, at equal strength and degree of engagement and each is fully focused.

The suggestion that “scientific” ecological and ethological insights can be garnered from indigenous knowledge and perspectives on animals and nature has been widely debated among anthropologists working with hunter-gatherer populations in other areas of the world (Inglis 1993; Fowler and Turner 1999). It is an offshoot of one of anthropology’s dozen or so classic Great Debates, this one on “alternate styles of rationality” (as noted above, Chap. 3). The debate has moved outside academe in recent decades, having become especially active in the context of North American hunting people where this matter has assumed political and advocacy overtones because control over resources vital to indigenous communities, such as seal skins and fur, or fresh water fisheries and forest resources, is frequently contested or claimed by hunter-gatherer minorities, whose spokespersons, too, participate in the debates at committee hearings and around government or NGO tables. The literature here is too vast, and too far outside the scope of this book’s concerns to cite. A good sense for it is provided by the debate between John Knight (2012) and Paul Nadasy (2007) over the latter author’s insistence that Westerners—such as
wildlife managers, as well as anthropologists—not dismiss indigenous conceptualizations based on relational ontology as mere “cultural constructions” but acknowledge and accept them as an “alternate ethological theory”, on an equal epistemological footing as Western Cartesian theory that attributes neither sentience nor sociality to animals.3

In a discursive essay around the two related questions “Are animism and science irreconcilable?” and “Is an animistic openness to the world the enemy of science?” Tim Ingold backs up his answer—“certainly not!”—with a rationale that, based on science’s classic, tried and tested Baconian sine qua non-component observation (or empiricism), is as persuasive as it is eloquent4:

all science depends on observation, and all observation depends on participation – that is, on close coupling, in perception and action, between the observer and those aspects of the world that are the focus of attention. If science is to be a coherent knowledge practice, it must be rebuilt on the foundations of openness rather than closure, engagement rather than detachment. And it means regaining the sense of astonishment that is so conspicuous by its absence from contemporary scientific work. Knowing must be reconnected with being, epistemology with ontology, thought with life. Thus has our rethinking of indigenous animism led us to propose the re-animation of our own, so-called ‘western’ tradition of thought. (2006: 19)

Much of what Ingold says about the epistemology of general and generic “indigenous animism” resonates with the specific case at hand, San cosmology and ontology, specifically their knowledge of and abiding interest in animals. This, as just noted, is attained by hunters through both the “empathetic” and “empirical” mode of understanding, of beings that are to them as much meat-on-the-hoof as they are other-than-human persons—four-footed in the Second Order of Existence, upright, more or less, in the First—whose consumption, by humans, elicits moral qualms and calls for conscience-salving rationalizations. The account of therianthropes and transformation provided in previous
chapters underscores the personhood of animals, through the experience by a human of animal’ness, either vicariously and virtually, through identification with trance-forming shamans or humanimalian myth or spirit beings, who all are potential or real presences in the *umwelt*, or directly and actually, through mimesis or metamorphosis, in ritual and play. The way San know and understand animals is an instance very much of Ingold’s “reconnections”—of knowledge with being, epistemology with ontology and thought with life—as well as of the privileging of openness over closure and of engagement over detachment.

The ratcheting up of “engagement” with animals, to “a sense of astonishing” applies as well. Animals are immensely fascinating to San, as noted earlier; they share with other hunting peoples a “fundamental fascination with the wild species they share their world with” (Kover 2017: 443). So fascinating may an animal be to a hunter that, when out on a hunt, some unusual physical or behavioral trait may so captivate the observing hunter or hunters that they do not think of shooting the beguiling creature until it has run away, out of arrow range or out of sight. (Blurton-Jones and Konner 1976: 337–8). Hunters know animals and it is that snow-balling, self-feeding knowledge, rather than the animals’ usefulness as food to eat or share, that generates their interest. Animals, indeed, hunting, is “part of storytelling”, this oral culture’s most hard-worked expressive form, as well as, as we saw above (in Chap. 3, Vol. I), of rock (and easel) painting and engraving. Animals for the San are very much what they are for Amazonians: “extra-human prototype of the other” (Vivieros de Castro 1998b: 472). That quality, along with its inherent ambiguities and ambivalences over human sameness and otherness with respect to these “extra-human prototypes”, renders these beings’ being and behavior intrinsically—and endlessly—interesting. And frequently also more than a little astonishing—at moments, when, observed by the hunter or related in stories, one of them appears or behaves in a manner that somehow is sameness- or otherness-transgressing. Such “counter-intuitive” behavior elicits soundings not only of “attention-demanding” ontological and epistemological dissonance à la Boyer (2001), but also from Myth Time and its ontologically ambiguous beings and states.
“The Anthropology of Ontology”: A Surfeit of Wonder?

There is at least one anthropologist who worries about a surfeit of “wonder”—a cognate of Ingold’s “astonishment”—in the discipline’s ontological turn, namely Michael Scott. In an article (2013) sub-titled “the anthropology of ontology (religious science?)” and presented as “a mini-ethnography of wonder discourses in the anthropology of ontology”. Scott muses about whether wonderment has perhaps gone too far in this branch of anthropology and needs to be curbed. The proneness of its subject matter—“diverse experiences and understandings of the nature of being itself”—for eliciting a sense of “wonder in the face of the unknowable” in anthropologists may lead, notes Scott, also to a proneness on their part to veer from the path of “science” to that of “religion”. “Something arguably religious runs through much of this anthropology of ontology”, Scott suggests. Indeed, he expands, “this type of anthropology is not only an aspect of the anthropology of religion; it is often also the anthropology of religion as religion—a new kind of religious study of religion” (ibid: 859, his emphases). Beguiled by the “wonder-friendly ontology in non-Western contexts”, anthropologists—given their penchant for romanticist, escapist othering, a tendency that has been noted especially in San studies, as suggested by its “revisionist” critics in the “Great Kalahari Debate” of the 1990s—are themselves personally attempting to embrace that ontology “and live it”, as well as, Scott suggests, “commend it to others as a mode of being with the potential to revolutionize anthropological practice and even save the planet from ecological apocalypse” (ibid: 860). Scott concludes his article with something of an indictment:

Some anthropologists want furthermore to encompass science within this existential take-up of relational non-dualism. They seek to obviate the religion-science dichotomy altogether and reposition anthropology within a new hybrid religion-science that is both an investigative response to wonder and the ethnographic engendering of limitless new wonders. (ibid: 860)
Engendered as well would be a host of new questions, for the ontological anthropologist with such epistemological inclinations. Ones that arise in the context of this book are phenomenologically tinged and revolve around the James’ian take on the nature of religion and “the religious experience”, as well as the “convincingness of the human ontological imagination” about the “reality of the unseen” (James 1997: 55). Is it this, the “unseen”, that renders religion the “really real” that conveys to the “religious perspective” the “aura of utter actuality”, using the words of another classic researcher of the symbolic and experiential aspects of religion (Geertz 1972: 112)? Does the real world, in an animistic, connected cosmology, require such underscoring, from the mytho-mystical unseen, given that being-in-the-world, earth- wind- and weather-grounded, is in and of itself, immanently wonder-full, by virtue of its inherent “spell of the sensuous”, as per David Abram? All the more so as in the San animistic context being-in-the-world contains its own, intrinsic mystically charged features, such as lion transformation, being-eland, tappings, essence transfer, n!ow and n/om potency, activated in the context of the mind- and body-absorbing and altering experience of trance and its ensuing experiences of extra-body travel and magical flight. Is it actually here, in the lived-in, sensuously experienced world—within Taussig’s “true real”, “coarse and subtle”, as opposed to the “constructed real” that constitutes language’s signifiers—that religion’s “really real” is located, rather than deriving from myth and spirit beings and their numinious, unseen world?

These questions all have a will—o-the-whisp’ish epistemological quality to them that take an anthropologist out of the mainstream of his/her discipline and into the slip-stream of theology and such sub-disciplines of philosophy as ontology and epistemology and phenomenology, as well as of existentialism (Jackson and Piette 2015: 19–25). Yet, for all of that theoretical obscurity and elusiveness, San cosmology and ontology, and that, arguably, of the Inuit and other “simple” hunter-gatherers, with its mystical interconnectedness between human and other-than-human beings, provide a suitable ethnographic context for their consideration.

Because of that interconnectedness between human and other-than-human beings much of the source of wonder, in such animistic
cultures, is located in that lived-in world. It is so, however, also in tandem with the world of myth and spirits, whose beings and states, as noted above in Chap. 5 and to be discussed again below, are presences in that lived-in world as well that underscore its inherent aspects of wonder with their own mode of being and brand of enchantment (especially in the past, before disenchantment reared its head, in colonial and modern times). To this myth- and spirit-derived enchantment some individuals are more attuned than others, charging what is an intrinsically wondrous experience—say a hunter’s “tappings”—with an additional level of experience and meaning—of mythic therianthropy and connectedness to the First Order. Because of these individual variations in mythical and spiritual sensitivities and because the “spell of the sensuous” is intrinsic to an animist cosmology and generative of enchantment, the domain and beings of myth and the preternatural are in such a cosmology not as necessary and/or sufficient a condition for people’s experience of a sense of wonder as for people with theist cosmologies.

In many ways San ontology thus falls in line with an anthropology of ontology, as an “anthropology of life”, pace Ingold, whose “mast bears the insignia of life” (2013: 248). Much of what is wondrous and enchanting to the San is intrinsic to the their being-in-the-world state—on the hunting ground, in endlessly intriguing animals, in sympathy bonds and essence transferences from humans to animals, as well as plants and trees, waters and winds, sun and stars, all of it within a connective cosmology. Being “existentially there” obviates some of the “need to invoke words like religion, ritual, or belief to define it” (2015: 12), using the words of “existential anthropologists” Michael Jackson and Albert Piette—who, I note parenthetically, in their own phenomenological take on “existentiality”, commend Ingold for “advocating an anthropology of life”, by “reintroducing ‘life as lived’ in anthropology” (ibid: 24). This groundedness in earth, life and being gives to the aspects of wonderment that an anthropologist might come across in her or his ethnographic study of relational ontology among a hunting people like the San a “secular”, if not “existential” cast (in turn inhibiting a Scott’ian veering toward spiritual religiosity in the ontological anthropologist he or she might derive from the that sub-discipline’s tenor of wonderment).
The “existential turn” that Jackson and Piette recently noted in the discipline would seem a more likely trajectory, especially in its relational, intersubjective aspects (pace Jackson). All the more so if animals are included within that paradigm’s purview. While not receiving much attention from either of these two researchers, whose existential schema is human-focused, the place and role for animals in their project is nevertheless evident in the two authors’ “mission statement”, around “phenomenography”, their methodological and analytical modus operandi for describing and understanding a “human being’s modes of presence”:

Phenomenography involves analyzing the act of existing, insofar as it goes beyond the social dimension of the person. It thus seeks to observe human beings in their modes of presence, as well as other beings who coexist with human, such as animals, to better understand what is specifically human. (2015: 19)

**San Studies and the “Ontological Turn”**

In the field of San studies only two researchers, Thomas Dowson and Chris Low, have explicitly addressed themselves to relational ontology and its applicability to San symbolic and expressive culture and religion, the one more (Dowson 2007), the other less (Low 2014) approvingly. The key reason for the limited, as well as restrained use of this paradigm in San studies, and absence of the sorts of ideological excesses it is prone to that Scott has pointed out, is, I suggest, the prominence, as well as, to a certain degree, eminence, of the work of the preceding generation of “Sanologists”, that dealt with caloric in-puts and out-puts vis à vis plant and animal resources rather than their mystic same-as and other-than relationality, counterbalancing and grounding onto-phenomenological questions and issues emanating from the New Animism paradigm. This earlier “materialist” approach, a point to be noted again below, draws attention to and documents profusely the empirical, reality-grounded, techno-economic interaction of people, especially hunters, with animals, as objectified, exploitable resources, complementing and balancing the ontologists’—and this book’s—“mentalist” concern with their status as intentional subjects.
ontologically close to humans, who may, even as hunters, partake of their identity. The presence of, rather than bracketing out, and constant referencing to, these classic, top-rate ecological San studies within the present-day researches on their cosmology, ontology and spirituality prevents the latter from taking the ontological turn too sharply, onto an Alice-in-Wonderland path of “limitless new wonders”, in the terms of its kindred discourse, around a “new hybrid religion-science”.

The one researcher in San studies who comes close, in style and substance, to this sort of discourse the American psychological anthropologist and “creative therapist” Bradford Keeney, whose work on the San blends academic anthropology—cybernetics pace Bateson (Keeney and Keeney 2013)—with New Age spirituality, two discursive domains that do not readily blend (Scott’s point). The latter is most evident in his recent book (with Hillary Keeney and Keeney 2015), which, while rich in ethnographic information, reads like a spiritual and cosmological manifesto on “the way of the Bushman”, much of its told in the words of “the tribal elders” (words that, because of their uniform rhetorical style, seem edited). Some of the elders, Keeney reports, taught him trance dancing when he started his field work in the early 1990s; indeed, “certified” him as such, as a “‘heart of the spears’, someone who has mastered the Bushman healing and spiritual way” (ibid: xiii–xiv). All this is interesting and some of the “teachings” presented are as novel ethnographically as they are arresting. I see Keeney’s ethnography as both an instance of New Age meeting and attempting to liaise with New Animism and, less critically, as an exemplar of what three decades back Michael Jackson extolled as “radical participation”, or “radical empiricism” on another culture’s “extraordinary experiences” which its members believe in, which the ethnographer immerses him/herself in rather than distancing themselves with Eurocentric epistemological disdain and suspiciousness (Jackson 1989). Yet, having in my academic career lived through the debacle around Castaneda—dubbed by a contemporaneous issue of *Time* magazine in his 70s’ heyday the “Godfather of the New Age”—I am also aware of the potential problems and perils entailed in this sort of methodological radicalism (see Young and Goulet 1998: 9–12, 303–15). Given their unorthodoxy as
regards discursive and descriptive mode and style, I thus draw selectively on Keeney’s publications on the San.

As I try to show in this book, which has taken the ontological turn to San studies, if taken with measured steps, it is a turn and path is worth exploring. Sharing identity with animals is indeed wondrous (all the more so if the latter share identities also with beings from mythical and preternatural domains). And, if tempered by reflexivity the wondrousness of the human-animal encounter grows in significance and experiential range as reflexivity is a relational perspective that redirects, as well as expands, relationality from a human-animal onto a human-animal-human trajectory. Throughout this process each other being’s alterity and integrity are kept intact, safeguarding one another’s autonomy and integrity.

All this, as noted in Chap. 7 (Vol. I), gives new vistas and expanded scope to anthropological reflexivity and adds a range of intriguing posthumanist parameters to this enduring concept and practice of postmodernist anthropology.

**San Ontology and Perspectivism**

Perspectivism, the element of relational ontology and the “New Animism” paradigm brought to it by Vivieros de Castro in the context of Amazonia (Vivieros de Castro 1998a, b; Costa and Fausto 2010: 96–99), is conducive to reflexivity of this expanded, posthumanist kind. Perspectivists present animals as intersubjective agents in a human cast, their humanity manifested in the idiom of their species-specific animality, such as jaguar, peccary or tapir. As such each will see a human as that human will see the respective animal, from, say, its jaguar-human perspective, as prey, of the meat-on-the-five-toed-flat-foot kind. The animal-human/person’s attention to human-human-others goes beyond their gustatory and nutritive appeal and is generalized to a pervasive, multi-faceted interest in these related and relatable others, an interest that may border on fascination.

In terms of San cosmological and ontological ideas, is this fascination with the species-other—by human-shamans, artists, storytellers, hunters—reciprocated, that is, extended from other-than-human animal-persons to humans? The question was raised earlier, in
the context of Inuit notions of human-animal relations, in which this is a prominent element, especially with respect to the Polar bear. How keen is the Kalahari lion’s interest in humans when the animal observes their actions and listens to their talkings around their nocturnal fire and roars at them in a certain manner at certain moments? Or baboons eavesdropping on human conversations? Or stalked antelope looking intently at the crouched hunter and walking toward him, muzzle extended and ears pricked, held forward and swiveling? Or—a presently (29 March 2018) current news item reported on television and the internet—of a cheetah who having just jumped into the back of an open tourist game drive Landover looks at its frozen human passengers, the latters’ gaze averted, as per urgent and stern instructions from the ranger-guide: “whatever you do, do not look in its eyes!”?

While touching on such questions here and there in this book, and dealing elsewhere with its ethological dimension (Guenther 2017: 5), I have not dealt with this aspect of relational ontology nearly as much as have Amazonian researchers, as well as Siberian ones (such as Willerslev among the Yukaghir). When I did my field work among the Naro in the late 1960s and collected my information on their myths and lore, beliefs and world view, I did not think to ask questions along those lines as hunter-gatherer—especially San—studies were then in the grips of a cultural materialist paradigm (and animism existed only as a baggage-laden residue from anthropology’s early theoretical history).

Turning to San ethnography in an attempt to fill this gap in my own field research, I found only one perspectivist piece of writing on Kalahari San, by Elizabeth Marshall Thomas, in the above-noted 1990 New Yorker essay (see also Guenther 1999: 71). Further information on a perspectivist slant is available on southern San, in the Bleek-Lloyd archive. Explanatory comments and asides by the storytellers suggest that the /Xam held such animals as eland and springbok antelopes, baboons and, most especially lions, to be intentional subjects and agents, with an abiding interest in the affairs of humans. We might assume this interest to be based on certain key similarities the two ontological sets of beings shared with each other. Family structures and customs of some animals were held to mirror those of humans, along with language (including, in the case of lions and baboons, speaking to
members of their own species “like humans” as well as the ability to speak to and understand humans). To the Ju/'hoansi lions were “among the most human-like of all animal-people”, reports James Suzman (2017: 194), while the Hai//om of northern Namibia “considered lions to be their closest kin in the animal world” and the lions in their territories to be “co-owners” of the same (ibid: 195). “They are like people but people who are different ... strangers”, one /Xam informant told Bleek (Hollmann 2005: 7), each people-species living within its own life sphere and with views of and interests in the world and *umwelt* and its other beings from its own species-specific animal perspective (or, as per Vivieros de Castro, its “particular human” perspective). These other beings include humans, toward whom baboons, elands and lions are especially attentive and whose actions and behavior they monitor and respond to, rewardingly or punitively, each in its own fashion (Hollmann 2005: 5–92). Implicit in such a view of animals, that ascribes to them sentience and intelligence, intentionality and agentivity, self- and other-awareness, is a relational ontology with a perspectivist slant.

Just how explicit and developed this aspect of /Xam and San relational ontology is, and whether perspectivism is as developed an aspect of relationality as among Amazonian animistic hunting people (or, as seen above, among Inuit), would require further research, both ethnographic and ethnohistorical. My sense is that perspectivism of this sort, that attributes not only personhood to animals but also humanness (in its own, distinctive, species-specific idiom), while, as just seen, not absent from San world view, is not developed in San ontology to the same degree as among Amazonians or Inuit, or Siberian hunting people.

The reason may be that in the San-animist view of things identity and autonomy, of the human—as well as animal—subject is never fully relinquished. This is an ontological and experiential circumstance that obviates a transformed human’s or animal’s assumption of any clear-cut perspectivist projection of personhood on the animal—or human—other. Its otherness is not sufficiently defined to allow for a clear-cut projection or reflection of an Other-perspective.
Ontological Identity and Alterity: Ground—and Grounding—of the Sense of Wonder

A point made repeatedly and in different contexts throughout this examination of San ontology, in this chapter and this book, is that identity and alterity are conjoined, in transforming and transformed beings whose being, while mimetically or metamorphically transforming or transformed, each also retains its integrity, more or less, depending on the context- or situation-linked extent of transformation. The lion-shaman, gemsbok-dancer, kudu-hunter, eland-girl, and, to a lesser extent, also their many and varied human-animal counterparts in myth and art, each holds on to his or her identity while partaking of that of the non-human other, generating thereby reflexivity and enhancing understanding of self and other. The human, in such moments of ontological merging, does not “dissolve or disappear”—a critique by existentialist anthropologists Jackson and Piette of ontological anthropologists whose “analytical focus is not on human beings but on exclusively nonhuman beings (gods and animals) or the dead” (2015: 21). In the context of San ontology humanness is retained in the transformed or transforming therianthrope (the same way animalness is held on to by the zoomorph, transformed or transforming into the opposite direction). His or her scope for reflexivity—other-engagement, intersubjectivity, self-knowledge—is thereby vastly expanded, by a human vis à vis a non-human.

Gained from the perspective of human others over a century-and-a-half of ethnographic field work, the last, reflexivity, is one of anthropology’s most significant and enduring post-modernist insights. It will serve the discipline well as it opens up new, posthumanist, therianthropological vistas. Ethnographers’ insights about such an Anima(l)-Other in this sort of mind- and awareness-expanding exercise will expand understanding of the “human condition” not only of anthropologists but also of evolutionary biologists and ethologists, as well as literary scholars (especially in the field of “metamorphosis literature”, specifically its “Kafka Studies” offshoot).

Moreover, the “sense of astonishment” entailed, as per Ingold, in an animistic schema for seeing animals, and the natural environment
generally, derives, I would argue from this fundamental conjoining, as this sense’s epistemological and ontological ground and being. As noted above, astonishment—as well as beguilement and fascination—in animals is something deeply felt by San, not only hunters but also storytellers, image makers, dancers, men and women generally, old and young. As suggested above, this abiding fascination with animals derives not only from these other-being-persons’ immensely intriguing inherent biological otherness (as it did for Westerners, especially in pre-Darwinian, pre-transformationalist times). More than that, it derives from the animals’ ontological ambiguity: that they are both same as and other than us. In their otherness, as transforming or transformed beings—even mythic therianthropes, although these beings’ ontological make-up is more ambiguous and entangled—they retain their own identity. This fundamental ontological ambiguity, that both merges human with animal and keeps the two apart, is unceasingly intriguing through this inherent disjuncture.

Its ambiguity is accompanied by ambivalence, as in addition to interesting it is also both disturbing and reassuring. The shaman or hunter, when “entering into the consciousness of a nonhuman creature” and immersing himself into that being’s being, is also reassured by his beliefs and world view, that doing so does not hold the threat to him of self- and species identity-dissolution. That is, most of the time (compounding his ambivalence): the animal identity may be irreversible, such as for an inexperienced trance dancer who may not come back from being a lion and be killed by other lions out in the veld. This potentiality adds further portent and peril to the permeability and breachableness of the human-animal divide.

It is this ontological ambiguity and affective ambivalence, which, even though it adds an element of fascination with animals that derives in large measure from these beings otherness, also acts as a reality check on that beguilement. Alterity is held in check by identity, drawing the transforming/transformed human back to his or her human’ness and the social realm and reality within which he or she lives and works, thinks and feels as a human being. As discussed earlier, it is this sort of reality check that allows a hunter and the people he hunts for to dispatch the prey animal to whom he is mystically, as well as emotionally and somatically linked, and to cut up, cook and eat its flesh.
A San’s—or arguably any other hunter-gatherer’s—humanness and embeddedness in reality, that is never quite absent, or for long relinquished, is what tempers the “sense of astonishment” of such non-Western pre-industrial people about their world and umwelt. It obviates an excessively mytho-magical reading of San or other shaman-animistic people’s cosmology and ontology, as some sort of Eliade’ian *homo religios* (Saliba 1976) living in a myth-, spirit- and dream-pervaded world to whose animal denizens they are linked, in some “pre-logical” mental fog, through ties of “mystical solidarity” (or, related to Eliade’s concept, “participation mystique”, as per Lévy-Bruhl, both of them thinkers and relational concepts that in some ways prefigure the New Animism10). The /Xam hunting ground, while “enchanted” with mythical and mystical beings and spirits, was to these foraging people also a skillfully exploited resource base.

The wonder- and astonishment-prone mytho-magical, surreal proclivities of the empathetic mode that informs these foraging people’s relational-animistic world view and its integral feature of ontological mutability are held in check through people’s tasks and activities—hunting, gathering, visiting, preparing camp—that ground people in the landscape. The hunting ground’s preternatural doings are thereby counterbalanced by natural ones: lion-transformed lions by real lions, mystical Gemsbok People and Hyena Men by actual gemsboks and hyenas, eland-embodied trickster spirits by real elands, whirl-winds or “dust-devils”, whose real dust-wind element is kept separate from its mytho-mystical trickster-spirit element, which, for the time being, while the wind is whirling and people are worrying, becomes altogether sidelined by the wind’s audible roar and palpable force, the imminence of the rain storm it portents and people’s mounting concern about the flimsiness of the camp’s grass huts or roofs liable to be blown apart.

As any reader of San ethnography knows all too well, these foraging people are highly efficient hunters and gatherers, whose exploitation of their natural environment is based on consummate practical skill, logistical, energy-efficient, risk-managing planning and an “empirical” grasp of animal and plant morphology and ecology (Guenther 1999: 71–72, 231–32). This, as mentioned before, has been emphasized again and again by ethnographers who have studied the adaptational,
technical and social operations of the San’s foraging economy and been impressed by its efficiency and ability to afford these foragers an “affluent” lifestyle.

It is important to read or reread these earlier works, on cultural ecology, “optimal foraging” and the “foraging mode of production” and other techno-economic practices of the San that exemplify these forager’s “empirical mode of understanding”, in conjunction with this book and other recent work on San and other animistically inclined hunting people. These studies are superb ethnographies that are grounded in a rich data base on San lifeways as efficient hunters and gatherers. This early “materialist” work complements the later “mentalist” studies, as a counter-weight to potential mytho-magical, mystic-mental, ecotopian excesses, of the kind—New Animism in bed with New Ageism—that worry Michael Scott. This sort of thing happened about half a century back, in the anthropological study—and to the detriment of—of shamanism and Altered Sates of Consciousness (viz Neihardt, Castenada, Harner).

It would be regrettable if it happened again, through—and in—anthropology, by selective, uncritical marshaling of information on hunter-gatherer cosmology and ontology from ethnographies in Hunter-Gatherer Studies, not only by anthropologists and archaeologists but also by writers in other academic disciplines, especially New Age writers,11 especially those with a Deep Ecology12 leaning. To do so could jeopardize the quality, integrity and credibility of the new posthumanist scholarship, to which both of these latter two Western ethical-ecological movements—along with ethnography and ethnoarchaeology—have made significant contributions. Such missteps could all too easily take the New Animism into a tangential direction, defined by current, tempo-centric and likely short-shelf-life notions, the paradigm’s future baggage. This happened a century ago, to the Old Animism, through evolutionism and “patronizing primitivism” (Stringer 1999: 542), along with an overdose of “intellectualist” Cartesianism.

All this would undermine, rather than undergird, what is sound and lasting, about the revisited and revived animism: appreciation of and engagement with indigenous perspectives, theoretical concern—much of it of phenomenological bent—with cosmology, specifically ontology
and relationality, much of it in the context of hunting, via the hunter-prey relationship.

To this list of strengths I would add reflexivity. In its ontological manifestation, through intersubjective, interspecies relationality, and in combining and balancing identity with alterity and anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism with their therio-counterparts, intersubjectivity is extended beyond species boundaries, to other-than-human Others. This expands not only the scope of reflexivity but also the vista of anthropology and ethnography.

I close with Eduardo Kohn’s eloquent statement on these new vistas:

How other kinds of beings see us matters. That other kinds of beings see us changes things. If jaguars also represent us – in ways that can matter vitally to us – then anthropology cannot limit itself just to exploring how people from different societies might happen to represent them as doing so. Such encounters with other kinds of beings force us to recognize that fact that seeing, representing, and perhaps knowing, even thinking, are not exclusively human affairs. (2013: 1, cited in Hannis and Sullivan 2018: 285)

References


Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.


———. 2017. “...The Eyes Are No Longer Wild, You Have Taken the Kudu into Your Mind”: The Supererogatory Aspect of San Hunting. The South African Archaeological Bulletin 72: 3–16.


Footnotes
1 And revisited by the author in her book on “cats and their culture” (Thomas 1994, see also 2003), a year after “the hidden lives of dogs”.

2 For a critical examination of the epistemological relationship of these two distinct modes of thought—or “orientation to the world”—that questions their distinctiveness, in terms of a “revisited” Lévy-Bruhl, specifically his conceptual pair, “participation” and “causality”, see Dawes (2014).

3 Mentioning just two of many indigenous voices (in the 1990s), arguing on occasion very much along the same lines, there are Chief Robert Wavey of the Fox Lake First Nation of northern Manitoba, Canada (1993) and the Aleutian scholar and activist Ilarion (Larry) Merkulief (1994) of Alaska. The most recent of many works that deal with San land claims issues, in which San are among the official spokespersons at judicial hearings, is by Maria Sapignoli (2018). The input and relevance of indigenous knowledge about wildlife, environment and ecology of San is addressed specifically by Annette LaRocco, in the context of the Ghanzi San of Botswana (2018).

4 I note parenthetically at this juncture an important question that is raised by Ingold’s comment, for another researcher and another project and discourse: just how might one operationalize such an epistemology into a plan of action, that is, formulate implementable policies, say for wildlife, fisheries or forestry management?

5 Lévi-Strauss made that point decades back in The Savage Mind, in his discussion of “the science of the concrete” that he deems that mind’s epistemological underpinnings: “Examples like these [of pre-industrial people’s consummate and supererogatory interest in animals and plants] could be drawn from all parts of the world and one may readily conclude that animals and plants are not known as a result of their usefulness: they are deemed to be useful or interesting because they are first of all known” (1966: 9).

6 And others (of an Ingold’ian cast): How (in)dispensable in an animistic cosmology and world view for bringing about “being-in-the-world” is the myth-spiritual component? Is there a place and space for mythical beings and spirits in a cosmology—or “lifeworld” and “taskspace” (Ingold 2000: 14, 1993: 153, respectively) whose inhabitants “are not embodied agents but living, breathing beings” whose “life depends on respiration – that is, the constant interchange of materials across the convoluted and permeable surfaces of what we call ‘the body’” (Ingold 2013: 248–49)? What is such meta-vitalistic beings’ effect, phenomenologically, on an “ecology of life” (ibid: 18–20) and on a “sentient ecology” (ibid. 24–25)? Do they add to or subtract from Abram’s above-noted “spell of the sensuous” that the ecophenomenologist sees pervading of “the animate natural world in all its visible and invisible aspect” (2005: 1025) and the “earthly web of relations”? All the more so as it is a web that includes humans who are aware of their inclusion by virtue of their “primordial mode of perception” a mode, pace Merleau-Ponty, of
embodiment and embeddedness (ibid: 1023) that *sui generis* makes humans deeply aware of nature’s inherent wonders.

7 The archaeologist (and student of Thomas Dowson) Robert Wallis has applied the New Animism paradigm to his doctoral study of the Namibian rock art site of Twyfelfontein in the late 1990s, contrasting his “animic” approach to rock art studies critically with Lewis-Williams’s trance hypothesis, which he dubs “neurotheology” and deems “biologically reductionist” (2013: 313). A relational ontology-couched account of ≠Au//ei hunting was recently presented by the anthropologist James Suzman (2017: 161–74).

8 For a recent strong endorsement of this ethnographic approach in the context of the human-animal nexus see Nadasy (2007).

9 How anthropologists might go about the research task of emic ethno-ethological ethnography—“an enterprise of multi-species ethnography” (Weston 2017: 25) or, given “the diversity of relationships between humans and animals”, “multispecies multiethnography” (White and Candea 2018: 19–20)—is an issue and a logistical, potentially perilous challenge I add to this chapter’s list of “further questions” for future researchers: Spend weeks in an aardvark’s burrow or ratel’s sett, pace Charles Foster? “Greet a jaguar eye-to-eye in the wee hours of the night” in Ecuador’s Amazon forest, as Eduardo Kohn attempted as part of his multi-species ethnographic field work among the Runa (Weston ibid.: 28), in hopes of entering through this exchange of gazes the animal’s perspectivist human-we purview, as either a fellow being or prey-meat (Kohn 2013: 2)? Join a Ju/'hoan trance dancer at night when, lion-transformed, he seeks out the company of real lions? Don an ostrich “saddle” and mingle with ostriches?

10 Eliade’s notion of *solidarité mystique* was focused specifically on the relationship between hunters and their prey: as per his oft-cited passage “…mais l’incessante poursuite et la mise à mort du gibier ont fini par créer un système de rapports sui generis entre le chasseur et les animaux massacrés” (Eliade 1980: 15). William Trask’s translation: “But the ceaseless pursuit and killing of game ended by creating a unique system of relationships between the hunter and the slain animal” (Eliade 1981: 5). Eliade engaged with Lévy-Bruhl’s concept, toward which he was favorably disposed (Saliba 1976: 123). The concept’s incipient relational-ontological aspect is conveyed from its succinct summation by C. G. Jung, in his own take on the concept, which he presents in his *Psychological Types*: “Participation mystique is a term derived from Lévy-Bruhl. It denotes a peculiar kind of psychic connection with objects, and consists in the fact that the subject cannot clearly differentiate himself from the object but is bound to it by a direct relationship which amounts to partial identity” (Jung 1971: 40, emphasis in original; also see p. 93, where Jung returns to the last aspect, “a condition of partial identity with the sensed object”). For a recent re-examination of Jung’s concept of *participation mystique* see Winborn (2014). On Lévy-Bruhl’s wider influence on Jung see Segal (2007).
An case in point is the Israeli-American political scientist Louis Herman who, in his book *Future Primal: How Our Wilderness Origins Show Us the Way Forward* (2013) published by the New Age publisher New World Library, draws both on his own (limited) first-hand experiences among San people when he lived in South Africa and (extensively) on San ethnography, especially Bradford Keeney (the “white man who dances”, pp. 237–41). He describes the analytical approach he follows in his book as “an unusual mix of political philosophy, shamanism, self-knowledge and science”, all of it converging into “the archetypal truth quest” (2013: 21). The book also includes, as an appendix, mental and physical exercises—a “future primal toolkit”—for the reader for “cultivating wilderness within” (pp. 384–92). As today’s exemplars of archaic, pre-industrial humankind, the San, through their lifeways and “earth-based culture”, reveal to this writer the “royal road back to the primal”.

First conceived of, as an aesthetic of Western Romanticism, and its Enlightenment forebear Herder (Cartmill 1993: 116), the idea of humans’ connectedness to and spiritual fulfillment by nature (and deemed inherent within Noble Savagery), was revitalized 200 years later as the “Deep Ecology” movement Taylor and Zimmerman (2005). One of the leading contemporary voice of this movement is the American philosopher—a Merleau-Ponty-inspired phenomenologist and Leopold-inspired ecologist—David Abram, especially through his books *The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-than-Human World* (1997) and *Becoming Animal: An Earthly Cosmology* (2010).
Correction

**Correction to: Human-Animal Relationships in San and Hunter-Gatherer Cosmology, Volume II**

Mathias Guenther

(1) Department of Anthropology, Wilfrid Laurier University, Ontario, ON, Canada

✉ Mathias Guenther

The updated versions of the book can be found at [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21186-8](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21186-8)

**Correction to:**

© The Author(s) 2020

M. Guenther, *Human-Animal Relationships in San and Hunter-Gatherer Cosmology, Volume II*, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21186-8](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21186-8)

This book was inadvertently published with few errors which has been corrected now.

**Corrections:**

p. 4, 11th line from bottom: ‘overeating’ has been changed as ‘over eating’.

p. 89, l. 6: has been changed as: Nevertheless, Chris Low, in an article that seeks to locate /Xam beliefs and practices among
contemporary Khoesan (Low 2014b), is struck, when reading the /Xam stories,

p. 99, 17th line from bottom: Guenther 1997 has been changed as ‘Guenther 1997a and the reference Guenther 1997b has been added to the list as well.


p. 153: two missing bibliographical entries has been added now:

Appendices

Appendix 1: A Lion Transformation

May 30, 1974, early evening

It took him [Sebetwane] about 1 hour to get ready—he made the rattles, changed into his dance costume (shorts and a singlet). Throughout the preparations he danced in short spurts, always with women around whom he danced beguilingly and with more or less subtle eroticism; both African [Black] and Bushman women. There are two women in the village (one a Herero and one Kgalagadi) who can sing his song. They were joined by four others—M T, S and two other Bushmen women ... two of the BU women slightly drunk)—who stood upright, in a line, clapping and singing a refrain.

Then he began dancing, in a preliminary and warming-up fashion and in the process he took the *doeks* [head-kerchiefs] off the heads of all the women, both those that sang for him and spectators. The de-*doek* ed women covered their heads again with caps or rags. He hang the *doek* like trophies—from his belt so that he looked as if he wore a skirt (note: both the erotic and sex reversal elements of this trait).

Then he began dancing: it was effective and skillful, captivating to watch. He danced vigorously, with precise and skillful steps and marvelous coordination—arms held down stiffly, hands stretched out parallel to the ground, moving back and forth, in scissor motion. While dancing he sang his refrain, loudly and harshly. His dance was erotic and scatological—erotic in that he would dance with women in the song circle for brief spells—around them like a snake around prey and with pelvic thrusts (including kissing one woman on the mouth) and scatological, in one amusing act (which, I think, was intended just to amuse spectators): he danced in a kneeling and squatting position. He held his hands under his buttocks and picked up a piece of cardboard from the ground and held it against his buttocks. Then to his nose and, with a grimace of disgust, he threw it away. Everyone roared with laughter.

His grimacing was another highly effective aspect of his dance: he screwed up his face—to look surprised, sneaky, sexually aroused or otherwise interested (including licking his mouth with his tongue) and angry. All this grimacing was accompanied by contortions of his head
and neck. The angry-emotion seemed to become increasingly predominant and at its height he shouted and screamed and charged at some of the spectators, especially the women and children. The latter ran away screaming and laughing; the former stood their ground and half laughingly and half annoyed slapping him or pushing him away.

The children became really afraid after he had caught one of them—a small boy (maybe 2 ½ years old), whom he grabbed, tried to carry on his shoulders, dropped and just caught by the arm, picked up again and held to his chest and dropped again. The poor child was screaming in terror and the mother tried to take him away from Sebetwane; he, however, grabbed the child again and threw him in the air and caught him and tried to hold the squirming child to him while dancing; lost his grip and dropped the terrorized child from his shoulders onto the ground. Everyone was shocked and I rushed forward to intervene but J [a middle-aged Herero man] carried the boy and rushed away some fifty yards, out of S’s reach, who now seemed in some kind of wild, vicious pre-trance.

Kennedy [my field assistant and interpreter] became quite apprehensive at this point and wanted us to leave. I stayed and saw S dancing more and more wildly, charging at spectators to glare at them and sing at them, and snarling at people, crouched, at times, on his fours. The child was now back with his mother who, strangely, quietly sat on the ground beside the singing women holding the child and comforting it. The poor boy kept looking at S, with big, fearful eyes, especially whenever S came near him. However, he had lost interest in the child.

Another act, which made Kennedy apprehensive and other people serious, was when he picked up some sand and threw it in one direction and then went to the spot where he had thrown it to scoop it all up in his hand. This wasmolo [Tswana sorcery; see Guenther 1996], I was told. Then he motioned J to come and sit on the ground and his dancing was now focused on J, who stared at him continuously.

During the dance there was a drunk Bushman (whom I do not know, the one in the blue overalls and green hat) who insisted on dancing, alongside S, until he was vehemently dragged away by J and given a warning that must have been severe and intimidating as he walked...
away sullenly and stood at one spot, about 3 yards from where Sebetwane danced, motionless, staring at S.

  The dance lasted about one hour and everyone seemed relieved when it was over as, had he gone on, one wouldn’t know what other violent or destructive things to expect.

Appendix 2: A Baboon Transformation
From field notes of Renée Sylvain (with permission)

September 8, 1996

Later in the day we got another phone call from Willam—this time to tell us that one of his friends is sick and needs to see a BM doctor, and if we could give him a lift, maybe we would like to ‘see the experience’ of a BM doctor. We dashed out to Epako.

When we arrived at Willam’s place, a young man was being supported and helped toward the bakkie, Ellie on one arm, Willam on the other. This young man was jumping and dancing and generally acting very crazy. E and W assured us immediately that the man, whose name is Oba, was not drunk. Rocky and I agreed that his symptoms resembled someone on a bad acid trip. Jan had to hold Oba with all his strength as Oba was flopping around violently. In the truck on the way to F#2 son’s farm, where the BM doctor is, Willem told us that the BM people are very powerful and can turn themselves into animals; Oba had turned himself into a baboon (eerily, just as he was explaining this, a big male baboon, the first we had seen since our first day out here, ran in front of the truck). Apparently, the poor fellow was just sitting in Epako when his hand started turning into a baboon’s hand. He begged Willem to hack it off with an axe, which Willem, of course wouldn’t do. Then he just continued his transformation.

We had to drive a fair way into the farm to get to the worker’s shacks behind the farm house. There were 3 BM doctors, an old man and his wife and one of Willem’s uncles. They lived in a metal and plastic shack thrown together with some bush-wood—the most dilapidated old scrap-metal shacks I have seen so far. When we arrived at the workers’ quarters (such as they were), two young men who came with us opened the canopy of our bakkie, and Oba bounded out—fully a baboon now, and loped across the veld, bounding up trees, and knuckle-running so convincingly that I need only squint slightly to
mistake him for an actual baboon in the dusk. The two young men gave chase, occasionally trying to pull Oba from a tree. Just as I was fixating on the baboon-man, I heard a heart-wrenching wail to my right and turned around to see Hendrik with his head thrown back, howling and stomping the ground with his foot, tears and snot streaming down his face. Wow—what animal is this man turning into???

We had brought Hendrik with us from Epako. Rocky and I didn’t know this at the time, but it turns out that Hendrik is the son of the two BM doctors and as soon as he got out of the bakkie he burst into hysterical tears upon seeing his parents again. Hendrik is, by any definition, an incredibly goofy-looking guy: he is short and squat, with a pushed-in round face that wears a constant grin and eyes that stare off in different directions. He has a likeable Quasimodo look about him. Whenever he talks his speech is accompanied by a whistle-hissing from a tracheotomy, required after he sustained a very bad beating in Epako. He had been in jail for about 8 months (for killing one of F#2’s goats) and he hadn’t seen his parents for a very long time. He flung himself onto the lap of a one-legged woman sitting by the fire and wept pitifully while she stroked his face and stared off into the distance. It was clear that they were family and were very close. I was almost moved to tears at such an emotional display. I am quickly coming to the conclusion that you cannot over-state the importance of family for San people. Not surprising really, they don’t have much else and family is probably to only thing saving them from complete isolation and despair that their crippling living conditions would inevitably produce. I watched the intensity of the interaction with some anguish, but this was mixed with fascination as I also followed the activities of the newly formed baboon-man.

After he was caught, the baboon-man had not ceased his violent flailing—flapping his arms, jumping around, head bobbing, tongue hanging out, eyes vacant and rolling back—he eventually just collapsed. Then his legs started twitching, making motions like a dog dreaming. There was nothing ‘medically’ wrong with him that I could detect—it appeared more like a psychotic episode of some sort. How can anyone from a comfortable background begin to comprehend the psychological effects of living as a BM here—in poverty, desperation and dirt, being the most oppressed, disenfranchised, dispossessed, and shit-on group
of all? Maybe many San live on the edge of psychosis their whole life. Communicating psychological distress engages the expressive resources the BM culture offers—and so Oba turned himself into a baboon. Who could blame him? Life as a human hasn't proven to be such hot shit so far.

While I was trying to comprehend the events around me, Besa run toward Rocky and I and told us, in a very urgent tone, that it was time to leave. Being an obtuse anthropologist, I resisted—there is no way I am leaving while a guy is turning into a baboon! Hell no! Then I saw the angry old man with the big stick coming toward us and I reluctantly agreed that we could consider leaving. We were not allowed to stay around to witness the ‘doctoring’—which Willem explained, would involve singing to the sick one and some dancing (described as a smaller version of a traditional trance dance). We were to leave the ‘baboon’ with the doctors. And we were to leave damn fast! Also, the old man was slightly (or a little more than slightly) pissed and chased us away with a stick. When we were in the bakkie, we weren’t moving fast enough for him so he continued to chase us away with his stick and picked up a rock to throw at the bakkie. Then the old man lay down on the ground in front of the truck to make sure we couldn’t come back....

Over the next 5 days ... We learned later that the old woman stroking Hendrik’s face is his mother and the old man with the stick is his father and they had thought that Rocky and I were police officers (there was also some inebriation involved). They hadn’t seen their son for months and thought the police had brought him home. Willem told us that when the doctors sobered up and all was explained, everybody had a good laugh. The doctors offered to help us with trance dancing if we needed it, and so we went to them to help our ex-soldier friend who has a very serious case of TB. We also learned that the BM doctors were unable to completely cure Oba, so they sent him to the white doctors for follow-up treatment.

References


———. 2006a. ‘N//ae’ (‘Talking’): The Oral and Rhetorical Base of San Culture. *Journal of


Herzog, Hal. 2010. Some We Love, Some We Hate, Some We Eat: Why It’s So Hard to Think Straight about Animals. New York: Harper Perennial.


International Development Research.


———. 2015a.*Myth and Meaning: San-Bushman Folklore in Global Context*. Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press.


———. 2017. Sound Artefacts: Recreating and Reconnecting the Sound of the!goin !goin with


Thurner, Ingrid. 1983. Die transzendenten und mythischen Wesen der San (Buschmänner) Eine


Index

1

A
Acculturative influences
Agama lizard, *see* !Khau, /Xam monster
Agamben, Giorgio
All-Devoure, *see* /Khkhwai-hem, /Xam monster
Altered states of consciousness
Alternate styles of rationality debate
Amazonian hunting people
Ambiguity
tolerance for
monstrosity, relationship to
Animals
“animal turn,”
interest in, by humans
personhood of
Animal skins
transformation effects on wearer
Animatism
Animism
New Animism
Old Animism
Animistic currents in Western thought
“animal turn,”
Cartesianism
ethology
anthropomorphism in
anthrozoology
cognitive ethology
empathy-based research
Foster, Charles
human-animal studies
Serpell, James
theory of mind
Uexküll, Jakob von
great chain of being
humanities
children’s literature
elementals
Faiërie
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von
Kafka, Franz
Lawrence, D. H.
Lear, Edward
Lewis, C. S.
Pope, Alexander
popular literature, human-animal depictions
of long standing
“Two Cultures” the
Anthropomorphism
≠Au//ei(si)

B
Badger
Being-in-the-world
  myth and spirits beings, impact on by
Benjamin, Walter
Bleek, Dorothea
Bleek, Wilhelm H. I.
Boyer, Pascal

C
Canetti, Elias
Cannibalism, see Carnivory
Čapek, Karel
Caracal (lynx)
Caribou Inuit
Carnivory
  justifications and rationalisations for
  meat eater's dilemma
  context, effects on meat eating
Cartesianism
  See also Animistic currents in Western thought
“Chaser-of-Food,”
Connective cosmology
Copper Inuit
Cultural revitalization
D
Darwin, Charles
Dawn’s Heart
Descola, Philippe
Diä!kwain, /Xam story teller
Disenchantment
  colonialism, effected by
  hunting, affected by
  storytelling, affected by
  trance dancing, affected by
  See also Re-enchantment
Distancing devices
Dogs

E
“Eldritch” figures in rock art
Eliade, Mircea
“Eyes-on-his-feet” Khoisan trickster figure

F
Frazer, James
Freud, Sigmund

G
Gasset, Ortega
Geertz, Clifford
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von
Great chain of being

H
Hallowell, Irven A.
Hallucinations, see Transformation
/Hanǂkasso/Xam story teller
Hardbattle, John
Hare
Human-animal relationship
  ambivalence about
  practical contextualization of
Hunter affluence
Hunting
  identification of women with prey animal
  story tellers’ motif
  sympathy bond between hunter and prey
Hunting ground
  linkages to Myth Time
  mystical aspects of
Hyena People

I
Identity
  “same as”--“other than” ratio
  relationship to alterity
Iglulik
Ingold, Tim
Inuit, Eastern Arctic
  animal skins, transformative effects of
  animist cosmology, comparisons with San
  bear (nanuq )
caribou
  Myth Time
  perspectivism
  shamanic animal transformation
  therianthropic spirits
Island of Dr. Moreau

J
Jack, Anthony
James, William
Ju/'hoansi

K
//Kabbo, /Xam story teller
Kafka, Franz
Katz, Richard
Keeney, Bradford
!Khau, /Xam monster
//Kkhwai-hem, /Xam monster
!Kia
Kohn, Eduardo
!Ko, /Xam monster

L
Landscape
connected ness to, by a “sense of place,”
intersection with world of myth and spirits
links to history
place legends
sound and vibrations of
See also Hunting ground; /Xam-ka! au

Lang, Andrew
Latour, Bruno
Lawrence, D. H
Lear, Edward
Leopards
Lévi-Strauss, Claude
Lévy-Bruhl, Lucien
Lewis-Williams, David
Lions
identification with Boers and Blacks
Mat and Belt, /Xam rogue lions
monstrosity, relationship to
transformation, of or into
Lynx (caracal)

M
Märchen
Marrett, Robert
Maupassant, Guy de
Metamorphosis, see Transformation
Metamorphosis literature
A Midsummer Night’s Dream
Mimesis
connections with metamorphosis
mimetic faculty
Mongoose, see !Ko, /Xam monster
Monsters
  cultural relativism in conceptualization of
  moral transgression, condition of
  ontological hybridity, condition of
  social disorder, relationship to
Monstrosity, see Monsters

N
Now
Narnia
Netsilik
Niche
!Nu !numma- !kuiten, /Xam monster

O
Ontological turn
Ontology
  “extraordinary ontology,”
Orwell, George
Ovid

P
Pausanias
Perspectivism
Pope, Alexander
Preece, Rod
Puck

Q
Qhomatcã (!Khuma≠ka), Naro story teller

R
Rasmussen, Knud
Re-enchantment, see Cultural revitalization
  “Religious musicality”
  individual variations of
Religious perspective
Rilke, Rainer Maria
Ritvo, Harriet
Rock art
  contact art
Rotpeter (Red Peter)

S
Sagan, Orion
Sense of place, see Landscape
Shamans
  rich fantasy life of
    ritual specialization of, among Inuit
Spirit Protector of the Animals

T
“Tappings,” see Transformation
Taussig, Michael
Tennyson, Alfred Lord
Thomas, Elizabeth Marshall
Tolkien, R. R.
Tracking
Trance dance
  revival of among contemporary San
Transference of essence
Transformation
  doubts about
    experience of
      anxiety-inducing
      experiential spectrum
        mentally, through myth, dreams and the imagination
hallucination, relationship to
mimesis, an incipient form of
  “tappings,”
  tranceformation
Tshao Matze, Ju/'hoan shaman
Tylor, Edward B.

U
Uexküll, Jakob von
Umwelt

V
Vivieros de Castro, Eduardo

W
Watership Down
Weber, Max
Wells, H. G.
Western thought, see Animistic currents in Western thought
Willerslev, Rane
Women
identification with elephants
identification with hunter’s prey animal
identification with ostriches
World of Story

X
/Xam
/Xam-ka! au
See also Hunting ground; Landscape
/Xue

Y
Yukaghir

Footnotes

1 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.